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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Pakistan 
It is January 2006. As representative of Erasmus School of Economics, I am visiting 
Pakistan together with colleagues from the Graduate School of Business Economics 
(Warsaw – Poland) to look for international cooperation possibilities in higher 
education.  
 
One of the trips takes us to Peshawar – a city with roughly 1 million inhabitants – and 
its surroundings. Peshawar – which means ‘City on the Frontier’ in Urdu – is a city in 
the west of Pakistan not far from the Afghan border (the Khyber Pass). Peshawar was 
– for a large share of its history – an important trading city located on the famous ‘silk 
route’ and a link between cultures in the west and Asia.1 ‘This is as far west as you 
should go,’ explained our driver,  ‘further west takes you into the tribal areas towards 
the Khyber Pass where there is a ‘different’ rule of law and where you are not safe as 
Westerners – especially not since 9/11’.  
 
During our stay, our friendly hosts take us to visit Buddhist remains near Mardan. 
Driving at high speeds wherever possible, occasionally slowing down for crossing 
cattle or donkeys with trolleys, we drive over the local ‘roads’. Having seen the 
impressive remains, upon our return, we stop for something to eat in a little place 
called Mayar. In Mayar I talk to our host – while having a good look around. The 
people are very friendly, offering us lassi and meat. The lassi is full of flies and so is 
the meat, but I eat and drink both not to disappoint those warm and friendly faces 
looking carefully whether we like it or not. The children – boys and girls – stare at us 
in amazement and make fun of our behaviour, white and burnt faces and way of 
eating and drinking. Except for an occasional woman in burka, the adults I see 
walking around are men. In Pakistan there are more men than women, which is 
surprising given the fact that women have greater longevity than men. It shows the 
divide between men and women in rural Pakistani society and the discrimination 
against girls in terms of nutrition and medical care. Infant mortality rates are just 
                                                 
1 Hopkirk, P. (1984) 
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below 200 out of every 1000 births. The children die from dehydration caused by 
diarrhea or from polio, tetanus and measles. Millions of children are infected by 
intestinal parasites – which comes as no surprise to me when I look at the hygienic 
standards people can afford, the quality of the water and the rotting dirt and rubbish 
that is covering the sides of the sand-roads and bigger ‘streets’. What really shocks 
me is that all these diseases are easily cured if basic medical care can be provided for 
the poor.  
 
Pakistan is one of the worlds’ poorest countries, with an average GDP per capita of 
$521 (2000 Dollars, World Bank WDI 2005) comparable to income levels in Senegal, 
Mongolia and Lesotho. On top of that (as figure 1.1. shows) Pakistan has a growth 
rate of GDP per capita from 1966 until 2004 which over the entire period exhibits a 
negative (linear) trend: Pakistan has a decreasing level of growth over time (despite a 
21st century revival). In reality this picture can be even more grim because we show 
here World Bank average growth rates, not to whom the growth benefits accrue.  
 
Figure 1.1 Pakistan’s GDP p.c. Growth (annual %) 
Source: WB, WDI 2005 
 
In rural Pakistan outside Peshawar the people are poor relative to the Pakistani 
average. When I ask him about it, Mr. Malik says that many families are in their 
current situation for decades and expect to remain there for decades more to come. 
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Our driver from Mardan says that he has to support his entire family, parents, wife 
and five children with his job paying him around $120 per month. 
 
I ask Mr. Malik, our host, about primary and secondary education in Pakistan in 
general and in Mayar in particular. He explains that in the very small villages like 
Mayar, large parts of the population cannot read or write and do not have access to 
education at all. The government is trying to improve this but is definitely more 
successful in the larger villages and cities in spite of widespread corruption in all 
layers of society. On top of that, the earthquake in Kashmir of October 8, 2005 is 
drawing away much needed financial resources from other areas in Pakistan, 
worsening the situation. Mr. Malik: ‘It is the lucky individual who gets a chance to 
study or even better go abroad to improve life for himself and his family. That is why 
your visit to Pakistan is so important for us’. It does not make me feel better, rather 
worse, realising the division in richess and the very few people we can actually help. 
Most likely none of the inhabitants of Mayar will ever see Poland or The Netherlands. 
 
There is a large economic literature investigating economic growth and many policy 
prescriptions have been given over the past decades to developing countries. All of 
this looks into the issues mentioned above or to working towards alleviating poverty, 
promoting education for the poor, promoting better hygiene and watching infant 
mortality rates drop. As Easterly (2002) puts it very to-the-point: ‘Poverty is not just 
low GDP; it is dying babies, starving children, and oppression of women and the 
downtrodden. The well-being of the next generation in poor countries depends on 
whether our quest to make poor countries rich is successful’.2 It is indeed this goal 
that should inspire us to look into the economic mechanisms and dynamics of growth 
and development.  
 
1.2.  A short history of economic growth 
Since the entire work of this thesis centres around economic growth and its various 
models, before explaining in detail the aims and structure of this work, we will give a 
short historical overview of economic growth. 
 
                                                 
2 Easterly (2002), ‘The Elusive Quest for Growth’, p. 14-15. 
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For over 200 years, economists have wondered about economic growth, its origins 
and consequences for wealth accumulation. In his ‘Wealth of Nations’ (1776), Adam 
Smith saw three causes for growth: a stable government3, division of labour4 and the 
creation of capital. David Ricardo developed these ideas further in the beginning of 
the nineteenth century (Ricardo, 1817) while Robert Malthus (1798) contributed to 
growth theory by claiming that population had the tendency to increase following an 
exponential sequence while food production would only increase along a linear 
sequence. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx (1890) developed a 
theory in which he proclaimed the end of capitalism due to increasing wage 
inequality.  
 
The Solow model 
In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s with the works of Harrod (1939), Domar (1946) and 
Solow (1956) a revival of growth theory occurred. These economists developed a 
series of exogenous growth models. In these models, population growth is equal to the 
long run growth of per capita income. Technological advancements are treated as a 
function of elapsed calendar time and provide the only source for long-run growth. 
Savings and investments may raise growth levels temporarily, when an economy 
grows from one steady-state to another, but not in the long-run. The Solow model was 
seen in the 1960s and 1970s as an adequate model to describe and predict economic 
growth in countries all over the world and today still is the ‘workhorse’ of growth 
theories used in modelling because of its relative simplicity.  
 
After a while, it became evident that empirical tests did not fully support the original 
Solow model. Differentiation in levels of technology was not possible due to the 
adopted model specifications, resulting in predictions about differences in savings 
levels which were prone to be not born out empirically. Next to the TFP issue, the 
convergence controversy appears to be a real test for all the developed types of 
growth models. The Solow model asserts that countries that are far behind would be 
expected to grow faster due to the fact they can generate much higher returns to 
capital in their early stages of production (that only start to diminish over time when 
they ‘catch up’) and due to the fact they merely need to copy/buy the already 
                                                 
3 Smith calls this ‘order and good government’ (1776). 
4 This aspect is illustrated by famous example of the ‘pin factory’. 
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developed technology instead of spending large amounts of resources on domestic 
R&D. In reality – as is shown in figure 1.2, we do not see this (absolute) convergence 
taking place. However, when we correct for population growth, depreciation rates and 
savings rates (i.e. apply conditional convergence), we do find that poor countries are 
catching up with the richer ones, showing a downward trend in annual average growth 
of income as their income levels start to reach the income per capita levels of the 
United States (the benchmark). 
 
Figure 1.2: Testing for convergence 
Initial income level and economic growth (1980-2002)
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Source: WB WDI 2005 
 
To solve for the challenges to the Solow model, two theoretical solutions have been 
proposed: one side of the economics discipline (Mankiw, Romer & Weil, 1992) 
would prefer the use of adapted neo-classical exogenous growth models, changing the 
production function to include aspects of Human Capital besides the originally used 
Capital (K) and Labour (L). In these models, technological progress was still coming 
like ‘manna from heaven’. On the other hand a ‘new’ strand of literature developed 
(Romer, 1986; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992 and 1998) 
when technological progress was looked at from a different perspective: the 
endogenous growth models.  
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Endogenous growth literature and its policy implications 
In the exogenous growth models, inventions are treated as a function of elapsed 
calendar time. Endogenous growth models were treating technological advancements 
as endogenous to the system, depending on for example the effectiveness of research, 
R&D-spending levels and/or the levels of Human Capital in the country. In these 
models, resources are devoted to R&D by profit-seeking entrepreneurs. R&D then 
results in the development of new goods (Romer, 1990; Grossman & Helpman, 1991; 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995), improving the quality of the existing goods 
(Grossman & Helpman, 1991) or process innovation (Aghion & Howitt, 1992; 
Grossman & Helpman, 1991; and Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995). Though all these 
models look at the endogenous process of doing inventions, what has been 
underemphasised in the literature is how these processes work under uncertainty and 
what the growth consequences of innovation dynamics are. Living in a world where 
the future is uncertain, those implications are potentially large. There are several ways 
to categorise the family of endogenous growth models. Van Marrewijk (1999) uses 
the distinction between accumulable-rival (K), accumulable-non-rival (A) and non-
accumulable-rival (L) for classification while Barro & Sala-I-Martin, 1995) use a 
categorisation into one-sector models (e.g. the AK-model), two-sector models, models 
of expanding product variety and models with endogenous quality improvements. For 
a detailed overview of these strands of models, we refer to Van Marrewijk (1999) and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
 
Openness and the introduction of new goods 
Growth models – whether exogenous or endogenous – try to explain what causes 
growth and to infer predictions about policies that may lead to higher economic 
growth to the benefit of societies and its peoples. In all the models, the level of 
technology growth is seen as crucial for economic development. In this PhD thesis 
much attention is given to technology growth and ‘how it ticks’.  
 
For ‘small’ developing countries the process of economic growth is not the same as 
for ‘large’ developed countries. This needs to be well understood in modelling their 
economic growth in growth models as well as in deriving government policies.  
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• A first difference is that poor countries have a catching up process to complete 
through accumulation of factors of production. They tend to have much lower 
levels of capital per capita and lower levels of human capital. Growth – for a part 
– needs to come from catching up. Empirically this means, for example, that we 
need to control for initial level of GDP as is shown in chapter three. 
 
• A second difference is that generally speaking small developing countries do not 
have a strong domestic R&D sector. Rather they rely on the import of new 
technologies from the developed world to improve their production processes, 
increase efficiency and in general improve their standards or living. This is an 
important assumption underlying the models developed in chapter four which is 
supported by figure 1.3.  
 
Figure 1.3: Technicians working in R&D (per million people) 
Technicians in R&D (per million people)
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Source: WB, WDI 2005 
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Figure 1.3 shows that the share of technicians working in the research and 
development sectors per million people differs a lot per country. Developing 
countries like Germany, Belgium have a relatively large share of technicians 
working in research and development while in developing countries like Uganda 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo this share is very low. 
 
• A third difference is that small countries (developing and developed alike) do not 
have much influence on world prices of tradable goods and services which means 
that to a certain extent uncertainty and volatility is a ‘fact of life’ that cannot be 
avoided. Large countries also experience levels of uncertainty but through their 
market power tend to have more policy influence. 
 
Romer (1994) argues that welfare losses, when not introducing goods for an extensive 
period of time, amount to much higher levels than have so far been measured using 
Harberger triangles and static welfare analysis. Especially for small developing 
countries – where technology is mainly imported – the failure to introduce new goods 
is dynamically destructive for a domestic economy.  
 
1.3. Overview and structure 
Aims 
The aims of this PhD thesis in adding its contribution to economic science are 
threefold. Firstly, we aim to provide new answers and insights with respect to the 
roles of uncertainty and technology in economic growth of developing countries. 
Secondly, we aim to address some omissions or even misrepresentations in parts of 
the economic growth literature. Finally, this thesis aims to make additions to 
economic growth models to make them reflect more ‘facts of everyday life’. 
 
Methodologies 
Throughout this work, different methodological approaches are used. In chapter two, 
the simple endogenous growth model of expanding product varieties is used as a basis 
for incorporating uncertainty. The model changes include introducing a variable for 
uncertainty and changing the basic model from a deterministic into a probabilistic 
setting, which, as we will see, will lead to a fundamentally different interpretation of 
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the growth outcomes. In chapter three, an extensive literature overview on terms-of-
trade trends and volatility serves as a basis for an Armington-type model that looks at 
terms-of-trade volatility and its effects on openness and growth. Additionally, the 
model outcomes are tested empirically, with mixed results. In chapter four, the idea of 
dynamic welfare effects, first mentioned by Romer (1994), is put to the test in an 
endogenous growth model. Many simulations are run – based on realistic assumptions 
regarding parameter- and variable-values – to look at the model predictions. Finally, 
in chapter five, we again turn to improving the endogenous growth model also used in 
chapter two, this time to incorporate a maintenance cost sector and to introduce the 
concept of obsolescence. Through extensive model simulations, also these results are 
researched and analysed. 
 
Structure 
Chapter two will analyse the effects of introducing uncertainty in the endogenous 
growth model of expanding product varieties which has not been attempted before. In 
an endogenous growth model, where R&D is endogenous to the process, we cannot 
stick to a deterministic environment, because R&D is uncertain by nature. We analyse 
carefully the effects the introduction of uncertainty has on economic growth (the final 
result) and via which mechanisms this outcome is influenced. The core issue is 
whether the rate of innovation in a probabilistic environment can be sustained and if 
so, under what circumstances. 
 
Chapter three takes the uncertainty level one step further by looking at terms-of-trade 
uncertainty and its effects on economic growth by using an Armington specification 
with tradable and non-tradable sector. Openness already lurked around the corner 
slightly in chapter two (more openness leads to lower costs for R&D in a developing 
country) but now becomes a cornerstone of the model. There is a vast literature on the 
relationship between openness and growth and also on the relationship between 
terms-of-trade volatility on growth. We develop an Armington model with terms-of-
trade uncertainty and then look at the mechanisms that operate under the surface. Next 
to the direct effect of terms-of-trade volatility we also find an indirect effect of 
volatility on growth through openness. This is an important result, not only because of 
the two-type of effect that terms-of-trade volatility has on economic growth, but also 
because uncertainty seems to endogenously reduce the level of openness. It is this 
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level of openness that is so important for economic growth, either directly or in order 
to stimulate technological innovation (chapters two and four). 
 
Chapter four looks at the dynamic costs of trade restrictions. We argue that classical 
micro-economics looks at the world in an oversimplified way that is excluding one of 
the most important processes in an open economy: innovation and the introduction of 
new goods. Furthermore, chapter four shows that the estimated static welfare costs of 
trade restrictions are smaller than the dynamic costs of trade restrictions if, and only 
if, the increase in trade restrictions reduces the share of invented capital goods 
introduced on the market. In this dynamic setting it is therefore not the fact that we 
ignore the Dupuit triangles of newly invented goods in estimating the effects of an 
increase in trade restrictions, as it is in the Romer (1994) model, but the fact that an 
increase in the trade restrictions affects the share of newly invented goods not 
introduced on the market. A second achievement of this chapter is that as a result of 
the sunk-cost nature of the introduction costs, there is an asymmetric adjustment path 
of the developing economy after a change in trade restrictions. An increase in the 
level of trade restrictions will slow-down economic growth and put the economy on a 
transition path to a new balanced growth rate. If the new level of trade restrictions 
exceeds a critical value, the new growth rate will be zero and stagnation occurs. If 
trade restrictions fall, the developing economy may embark on a rapid catch-up 
process of economic growth by benefiting from the backlog of previously-invented-
but-not-yet-introduced capital goods which may now, as a result of the increase in 
operating profits resulting from the decrease in trade restrictions, be introduced on the 
market in the developing economy. The second effect, I believe, is one of the main 
reasons for the observation that economies that have been isolated and closed for 
prolonged periods of time (e.g. North-Korea) have failed to bring prosperity and 
growth to their citizens. 
  
Chapter five first of all shows the effects of introducing the phenomenon of 
obsolescence into a horizontal growth model via the modelling of maintenance costs. 
In the horizontal endogenous growth literature the restrictive assumption is used that 
technological innovations last forever and do not get outdated, which is not realistic. 
In light of our insights from chapters two and four, where the introduction of new 
goods is important output growth, we analyse the consequences of dropping this 
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assumption. By allowing firms to become obsolete via the introduction of 
maintenance costs of innovations we develop a three-sector endogenous growth 
model that shows the implications for economic performance of small developing 
countries of what we know to happen around us all the time: inventions lose their 
worth over time (some faster than others) .5 
 
Chapter six summarises the finding of the previous chapters, comes back to Pakistan 
for a moment, and concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
5 We will define the concept of ‘maintenance costs’ in chapter five. 
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Chapter 2: Uncertainty in Endogenous Growth Models 
 
“The only thing that makes life possible is permanent, intolerable uncertainty; not 
knowing what comes next” 
 
Ursula Le Guin, writer 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Every day, in newspapers all over the world we read articles that deal with facts and 
problems concerning economic growth. We read about the financial problems in 
Russia, about the effects of the North American Free Trade Area on U.S. economic 
growth or about the prolonged recession in Japan and/or South East Asia and the 
possible negative impact this situation might have on the rest of the world economy. 
The importance of economic growth, also outlined in chapter one, seems to be 
stressed and recognised by many people over and over again.  
 
An important problem we face in economics in general and with economic growth in 
particular is that we have to predict how economic situations will develop in the 
future, without ex ante knowing what that future has in store for us. Not only for 
individual people uncertainty is important, also for a company or for a country as a 
whole uncertainty can have a major impact. In reality we do not live in a deterministic 
world but rather in a stochastic world full of uncertainty (Pomery, 1984). 
 
This chapter shows how to incorporate uncertainty in an endogenous growth model 
and investigates and analysis the growth implications of doing so. 
 
When making investment decisions, firms have to form expectations about how total 
sales will develop, about the impact the introduction of a new good has on the market 
or about how much product development is going to cost. In section 2.2, we will start 
by looking at the process of product development and the characteristics of this 
process in order to determine the appropriate distribution for introducing uncertainty. 
In section 2.3, we build the specific-information model and look at a way to 
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incorporate a component of uncertainty therein. Section 2.4 differs from section 2.3 in 
that it deals not only with the private but also with the public aspect of knowledge 
capital. Throughout both sections the implications of introducing uncertainty for the 
model are discussed. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2. Uncertainty introduced 
In the daily life of people, uncertainty plays an important role. The fact that people 
insure themselves for example has to do with guarding oneself for possible future 
injuries or accidents that cannot be predicted with certainty ex ante. The way a person 
or the economics profession deals with uncertainty has great effects on both the 
everyday world and (therefore) needs to be explained by and incorporated in 
economic theories and analyses. 
 
2.2.1. Uncertainty in an economy 
In economics many theories and models assume uncertainty away, ignoring the large 
consequences that follow from this restriction. It is convenient and necessary for 
economic analysis to be able to draw certain conclusions from a model or a situation. 
Take for example basic economic theory: very often it is stated that economics is 
about the distribution of scarce resources. Figure 2.1 depicts the situation in which we 
have goods A and B.6 It is shown that in this case, A and B are both being produced 
because consumer preferences are tangent to the production possibility frontier in 
point E, a point in which quantities AE and BE are being produced. In this case it is 
assumed that all goods are present in an economy with only distributional problems 
left to solve.  
 
                                                 
6 This analysis follows Romer (1994). 
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Figure 2.1: Production and consumption equilibrium  
 
 
However, it is also possible to imagine a valuable good C that has not yet been 
introduced; it still has to be invented. In order to invent this good C, fixed initial costs 
need to be made. Let's assume that this can be done at fixed cost (a1-a2). Figure 2.2 
depicts the already existing good A and the good-to-be C. Will good C be introduced 
in the economy? The answer depends on two factors. First of all, the inventor has to 
be able to appropriate the resulting benefits from the invention in order to recuperate 
the fixed costs made. This means that under perfect competition, where supernormal 
profits are competed away instantly through entry by new firms, the initial investment 
cannot be earned back resulting in the failure to introduce new goods. Figure 2.2 
illustrates this situation. If (a1-a2) cannot be recuperated, a firm under perfect 
competition prefers point a1 to point E.                         
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Figure 2.2: Production and consumption equilibrium with fixed costs 
 
 
Secondly, the utility for the producer from introducing a variety has to be greater than 
the utility derived from not introducing the variety. If the first condition is met, the 
answer whether good C will be introduced is 'yes' in the case of figure 2.3, because 
U1>U0, but 'it depends' in general. Recall that in figure 2.1 the problem was to decide 
between different quantities of existing goods. Figure 2.3 poses a far more important 
and far more common problem to economic theory: the decision whether each 
potential good (represented by good C in this example) is worth the cost it takes to 
bring it into existence. In figure 2.3 good C will be introduced because the expected 
worth of good C is larger than the expected inventory costs shown by an increase in 
utility for the representative agent in this economy from U0 to U1 (and assuming the 
fixed costs can be recuperated by the inventing firm). However, if for another good D 
very large expenses have to be made, the expected costs may very well exceed the 
expected future benefits, resulting in a decrease in utility for the representative agent 
in this economy. The latter example is shown in figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.3: Costs of introducing goods are lower than expected profits 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Costs of introducing goods are higher than expected profits 
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Romer (1994) gives a lengthy presentation on the so-called principle of plenitude 
(Lovejoy, 1933; Warsh, 1984) and argues that it does not hold.7 To put it in Romer’s 
words: ‘To an economist, it [the principle of plenitude] means that we can always 
assume that we are in the interior of goods space. […] When it is applied in a specific 
scientific context … it is now obvious that the principle of plenitude is not just false; it 
is wildly misleading. […] Scientifically, a far better guiding principle would [be] that 
of sparsity: only a vanishingly small fraction of all conceivable entities can actually 
exist in the physical world.’ 
 
If we acknowledge that we live in a world in which not every good has yet been 
invented, the problem we face consists of deciding whether each potential new good 
is worth the cost it takes to bring it into existence rather than the mere problem of 
deciding between different quantities of existing goods as basic micro-economics tells 
us. Thus we will have to look at the introduction of new goods. More specifically – 
like Grossman and Helpman (1991) have done – we will look at the introduction of 
new varieties in an economy. 
 
2.2.2. The Poisson process and the exponential distribution 
When looking at the introduction of potentially valuable varieties, one of the main 
problems becomes that the costs of invention are not known for certain ex ante. It can, 
for example, take a few weeks to invent a variety F in which case the costs ex post 
will be likely to be a lot lower than when the inventory process takes two years in 
order to invent variety G. As a consequence the product development costs of variety 
F might be lower than F's worth resulting in an introduction in the economy while the 
costs of variety G might exceed G's worth, making this specific type of variety 
unprofitable to introduce. But again: this knowledge is not available ex ante.  
 
The process of product development takes place within every individual firm 
independently from other competing firms.8 At the aggregate level, we can say that 
the longer resources are allocated to research, the greater the number of new 
inventions is likely to be. At the individual firm level, because of uncertainty, some 
                                                 
7 The principle of plenitude states that every possible entity already exists or every conceptual 
possibility already has a realisation in the real world today. 
8 That is given certain specifications to be developed in the following two sections. 
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inventions might take weeks, others years, independently from the time that has 
passed since the previous invention.9 
 
If we look at the Poisson postulates and compare them to the aspects of the product 
development process mentioned above, we notice several similarities. 
 
1.  First of all, the events – being inventions – that take place in intervals that do not 
overlap are independent of each other because independent firms cause them.  
 
2.  The probability an invention occurs in a small time interval is proportional to the 
size of this interval. This means that the larger the time interval, the larger the 
probability one or more inventions take place. 
 
3.  The probability is independent of the position of the interval mentioned under 
point 2 on the time axis. The time that has elapsed since the previous invention 
has no influence on the time until the next invention is to take place. This 
postulate is to be modified in a later stadium. 
 
4.  The probability two or more inventions take place in a very small interval is 
negligible compared to the probability one invention occurs.  
 
The Poisson distribution seems to be the distribution that best suits the problem we 
would like to solve. The Poisson distribution is the probability distribution of the 
number of successes that occur in the chosen interval. The inventions take place 
incidentally but randomly within a certain time interval which is exactly what happens 
under a Poisson process that belongs to the Poisson distribution. 
 
The Poisson distribution has the following form: 
    
 
   For r = 1, 2, 3, ...     (2.1) 
 
                                                 
9 It can be argued here that the time it takes to invent a new variety is dependent on the time research 
has already been going on for. If knowledge is partly a public good, the larger the number of new 
varieties, the larger the pool of knowledge that is generally available and thus only the specific research 
has to be done. 
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Special properties of the Poisson distribution are that the expected value and variance 
are equal to each other and that the additivity property holds for this distribution.10  
 
The stochastic variable, r, can theoretically, but also practically, take many possible 
values. We introduce a real stochastic variable, x, and a continuous function, f(x). The 
function f(x) does not represent a probability but merely a ‘start to a probability’. 
 
Upon integrating the probability density function, f(x), we get the probability 
distribution function, F(x). This integral shows the ‘probability of a specific event’ 
within a certain interval. 
 
In order to be able to model waiting times, the exponential distribution, a special case 
of the family of gamma distributions will be used.11 The probability density function 
of the exponential distribution looks as follows: 
     
                                      With x > 0 ; β > 0    (2.2) 
 
When we integrate, we get the probability distribution function F(x): 
 
          (2.3) 
 
The expectation of f(x) is E(x) = β and the variance V(x) = β². The waiting time is a 
continuous stochastic variable with the property of being memory-less. This property 
can be written as follows:  
 
P{X > s+t │ X > t}   =   P{X > s}  ∀ s, t ≥ 0   (2.4) 
 
That means that the time until the next event does not depend on how much time has 
already elapsed since the last one. In this case the time until a new invention is 
                                                 
10 See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) 
11 The exponential distribution sets the value of α below equal to zero which simplifies the gamma 
distribution considerably. The general form (gamma distribution) then becomes the more specific form 
(exponential distribution): 
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independent from how much time has passed since the last one. This meaning is 
exactly what is of vital importance for the exponential distribution: it can be seen as 
the probability distribution of the waiting time between two events under a Poisson 
process. To show this take a Poisson process in which within one hour, on average λ 
events occur. Then in a time interval h, on average hλ events take place. We take h 
sufficiently small in order to satisfy the fourth Poisson postulate. According to the 
Poisson distribution, the following probabilities can be calculated: 
 
the probability 0 events occur in h is:  heP λ−=)0(  
the probability 1 event occurs in h is:  heP λλ −=)1(  
 
The probability of waiting r time intervals of length h between the occurrance of two 
subsequent events is equal to the probability that in the rth interval an event takes 
place and in the preceding (r-1) events no event has taken place.  
 
This can be written down as follows: 
 
( ) hrhrh heheerP λλλ λλ −−−− == 1)(       (2.5) 
 
But this is the probability belonging to a waiting time of r time intervals of length h. 
Strictly speaking we now have a discrete probability distribution with a large number 
of possible values for r. By going to a continuous probability density function, we 
replace the discrete variable r by the continuous stochastic variable w. We can write 
(2.5) as: 
 
hwhewf λλ −=)(   w>0      (2.6) 
 
In order to return to the original time interval-size, i.e. the time interval in which on 
average λ events based on the Poisson process take place instead of the used size h, 
we apply a scale transformation. We get the continuous stochastic variable x in the 
following probability density function: 
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xexf λλ −=)(          (2.7) 
 
by taking x = hw and dx = h dw. 
 
In this section, first we have established that the inventory process can best be 
characterised by a Poisson process with accompanying distribution. Second, the 
exponential distribution is shown to be the continuous probability distribution of the 
waiting time between two events under the aforementioned Poisson process. 
 
2.3. The product-specific information model with uncertainty 
We live in an economy in which producers direct resources into Research & 
Development in order to invent new varieties and spend money on producing the 
already discovered varieties. Consumers aim at maximising utility and consume all of 
the products produced in the economy.  
 
A component of uncertainty is incorporated in the R&D process as producers do not a 
priori know the efforts and time necessary to invent a new variety of an existing 
product. The way knowledge capital is being treated has large implications for the 
model. In this section, non-rivalry and in most cases non-excludability – two distinct 
features of technology – will be ignored. In section 2.4 the specifications will be 
altered in order to incorporate these characteristics of knowledge capital. 
 
2.3.1. The Model 
Consumer behaviour 
Consumer households aim at maximising utility over a given horizon with preferences 
as given by (2.8): 
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The index vector )(xU  in (2.8) shows the household’s taste for diversity in 
consumption and )(ix  denotes the consumption of brand i . From the used 
specifications a liking for an increasing diversity in consumption follows because new 
goods are not perfect substitutes for old goods. The elasticity of substitution between 
two products is 1
1
1
>
−
=
α
ε . The parameter α characterises the different tastes for 
variety. Equation (2.9) represents the consumer's budget constraint. Using (2.8) and 
(2.9) and Lagrange optimization, we calculate the demand for x(i): 
 
Max L 


−+



= ∑∑
==
N
i
N
i
ixipIix
1
1
1
)()()( λ
αα
 
∑
=
−
−
= N
j
jp
iIpix
1
1)(
)()(
ε
ε
        (2.10) 
     
An important consequence of the used specifications in (2.8) is that – if we view 
equation (2.8) as a production function as suggested by Ethier (1982a), productivity 
rises with the number of varieties or in other words: total factor productivity rises with 
the number of varieties. )(xU  can be viewed as a quantity of the same type of final 
goods and )(ix  represents the input of intermediate good or service i into the final 
good. If we assume a symmetric equilibrium xix =)(  and all inputs have the same 
price. The summation can be simplified as follows:   
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For all inputs x of the same size the same quantity of resources is needed. NxX =  
therefore measures the total amount of resources used in final goods. Total factor 
productivity (the final output per unit of input) becomes: 
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With 10 << α  (necessary because of the mark-up pricing due to monopoly power) 
the first derivative of 
X
xU )(  turns out to be positive: 
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This means that the productivity of a given amount of resources increases with the 
number of available varieties. 
 
Producer behaviour 
As indicated above, producers take part in two activities. First, they manufacture the 
products and varieties that have been developed in the past. Second, producers spend 
resources on R&D in order to invent new types of varieties. We assume that each 
variety is produced by a single atomistic firm.12 For simplicity, we assume labour to 
be the single factor of production. This means we have a total amount of labour, L, 
part of which is used in R&D ( RL  ) and part of which is used to produce the 
previously developed varieties (LP): 
 
RP LLL +=          (2.14) 
     
• Manufacturing the existing varieties 
We assume that all known differentiated products are manufactured subject to a 
common constant-returns-to-scale technology. It takes LP labour to produce 1 unit of 
good x(i). The profit and price made by the supplier of variety i equals: 
 
                                                 
12 This assumption can be justified in two ways. First, one could argue that inventions are protected by 
infinitely lived patents given out by the government. Second, if imitation costs money and firms engage 
in ex post price competition, the imitator would earn no profits in Bertrand competition and 
consequently would be unable to recuperate the costs made, therefore making imitation financially 
unattractive. 
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)()()()( iwxixipi −=π        (2.15) 
 
We have already calculated the elasticity of substitution to be equal to 
α
ε
−
=
1
1 . For 
each variety we are dealing with a monopolistic firm that under constant returns to 
scale with L as the single factor of production sets the price as follows: 
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11)(         (2.16) 
 
When we set MC=w, p(i) simplifies to13: 
 
α
wip =)(          (2.17) 
 
Aggregate production depends on the part of the labour force devoted to production, 
LP. Total production of all existing varieties is: 
 
INxLP ==          (2.18) 
 
In the momentary equilibrium, all varieties are priced the same at p. We will use the 
normalisation p=1:  
 
1==
α
wp          (2.19) 
 
From the above equations it follows that the share α of total income goes to the 
workers as a reward while the share (1-α) goes to the shareholders as profit. The 
result in total profit π (equation 2.20) and reward to the workers (equation 2.21) is:  
 
                                                 
13 This can be shown straightforwardly as follows: 
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N
LP)1( απ −=         (2.20) 
 
The reward to the workers can be calculated as follows: 
 
Reward workers 
N
I
N
Lwxwx P αα
α
α
====  
 
Reward workers 
N
LPα
=        (2.21) 
 
Equation (2.20) can identically be shown by substituting (2.10) into (2.15).14 
 
As mentioned above, the profits from equation (2.20) go to the shareholders of a firm 
(for example in the form of dividends) as competition among manufacturers ensures 
that the rental rate for capital matches the value marginal product of a machine. 
Together with possible capital gains or losses the discounted stream of profits 
constitutes the value of the firm. Consumers will be willing to hold claims to the 
existing units of capital only if the return of these units is at least equal to the return to 
a perfectly substitutable asset, like a consumption loan. In a perfect-foresight 
equilibrium the sum of the profit plus the capital gains/losses must equal the yield on 
a riskless loan. Thus equilibrium in the capital market requires: 
 
rvv =+ &π          (2.22) 
 
This equation represents a 'no-arbitrage condition' on the capital market. If the stock 
markets correctly price the firms, that is, if the stock market value of a firm equals the 
present discounted value of its profit stream, we can write the value of any firm as 
follows: 
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When we combine equations (2.23) and (2.20) we get (2.24) with gtetNN −= )()(τ .  
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Here g stands for the rate of innovation in the economy which we assume constant for 
the moment: 
 
0≥≡
N
Ng
&
 with g being a constant     (2.25) 
 
Equation (2.25) shows the value v(t) of a firm given success in the research sector. It 
is important to note that this firm value is conditional upon having success. The value 
of the firm is inversely proportional to N(t), indicating that the larger N(t), the lower 
the firms expected value v(t). Furthermore from (2.25) also follows that the larger the 
share of the labour force working in the manufacturing sector of the representative 
firm, the higher the expected firm value which can be expected with (2.19) in mind.  
 
• Inventing new varieties 
Every individual firm spends money and resources on research and development in 
order to invent new varieties that thereafter start to generate a continuous profit 
stream. We assume that a firm spends resources on R&D with the possibility of 
stopping instantly if necessary. Also we take the resource of product development to 
be 'large' in the order of magnitude to the value of the stream of profits that the 
entrepreneur appropriates. RL  is the amount of labour available for the R&D sector. 
Intuitively, we expect the number of varieties to go up faster, the larger RL . If λ is the 
probability for successfully inventing a new variety (we see in a moment), using the 
law of large numbers, we can write RL  as follows: 
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( ) =NE &  probability of success  x  the resources in the R&D sector ⇔ 
RLNE ⋅= λ)( &         ⇔ 
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        (2.26) 
 
As shown in section 2.2, if the invention costs exceed the future discounted revenues, 
a good-to-be will not be introduced. This means that for every individual firm the 
expected revenues should equal the costs and thereabove be fully appropriable. If a 
firm can stop the inventory process at all times, it will stop researching a certain 
variety as soon as the costs exceed the future expected revenues: 
 
Expected revenues  < Costs of invention 
 
The expected revenues can be found by multiplying the conditional value of the firm 
by the chance of success, P(success). The probability for success, λ, is given by the 
exponential distribution discussed in section 2.2.  
 
The probability λ is independent from the number of varieties that already exist, 
because in this section we still ignore the public character of knowledge. This means 
that spillovers to other firms do not occur because all generated knowledge is 
appropriated by the inventing firm. 
 
In order to invent a new variety a firm has to direct labour to the R&D sector, LR. For 
a time interval of length dt a firm has an expected production dtLdn Rλ=  new 
products where λ is the probability a new variety will be invented. The total costs of 
this research amount to wdt=αdt with total value for the firm amounting to 
dtLv R )(λ .15 
 
Cost α== w          (2.27) 
 
                                                 
15 From w=α following from (2.19). 
 28
To maximise the value of the firm, LR will be chosen as large as possible if 
wv >λ and equal to zero if wv <λ . In general equilibrium the expected value cannot 
be greater than the wage rate since that implies an infinite demand for labour by the 
research sector. The other case, in which wv <λ , is an equilibrium in which no R&D 
takes place at all. The combination of free entry and the constant returns to scale 
production function prevents the research sector from earning excess returns. 
Therefore we get the following equilibrium condition: 
 
λvw ≥  with equality when 0>N&      (2.28) 
 
Once we know that λ is the probability the research and development sector will 
successfully invent a new variety, we can calculate the expected revenues from the 
equations (2.24) and (2.28): 
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If in equilibrium expected revenues equal the costs of invention, with (2.27), (2.28) 
and (2.29) we get the following equation: 
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Finally, the labour market has to be in equilibrium. The total population provides the 
factor of production labour, L. According to (2.14), labour will be directed toward 
both the manufacturing and research sectors. If the flow of new varieties is N&, total 
employment in the R&D sector is equal to 
λ
NLR
&
=  (see equation (2.26)). Concerning 
the manufacturing sector, we know that the price of a representative variety is p  from 
(2.17). An aggregate spending level, I, implies that each firm sells NpI / units. 
Aggregate sales by N manufacturers therefore demand pI / units of labour. Thus 
labour market equilibrium requires: 
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         (2.31) 
 
Finally, since employment in any activity cannot possibly be negative, the equilibrium 
price, p , must satisfy: 
 
L
Ip ≥           (2.32) 
 
2.3.2. Dynamic analysis 
The inverse relationship between profits and the number of varieties (see (2.20)) 
shows that profits are lower the greater the number of varieties. If this number is very 
large, profits might be so low that product development might not occur at all. In 
other words, depending on the starting point, it could be possible that there will be no 
R&D taking place at all.  
 
These two intuitive propositions can be verified. If N(t) is very large, intuition tells us 
that no R&D takes place. We know that the change in N over time equals the 
probability of success times the amount of labour directed into the R&D sector. This 
was shown in equation (2.26). Using (2.14), (2.28), (2.30) and (2.26), we get the 
following expression for g: 
 
αρλα −−=
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tN
Lg         (2.33) 
 
First of all, (2.33) shows that the assumption made in (2.25), namely g has a constant 
growth rate, is violated for all but one value of g. The only value for g satisfying 
(2.28) irrespective of any value for N(t) is when g=0. For all the other values, g 
changes as soon as N(t) changes and is therefore not constant which makes it 
impossible to integrate the way it was done in (2.28). 
Secondly (2.33) shows that g decreases with increases in N(t). Therefore if N(t) grows 
very large, growth eventually comes to a halt. 
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If we equate (2.33) to zero, that means 0=≡
N
Ng
&
, the assumption made in (2.28) is 
not violated. The rate of innovation is equal to zero only if no resources are devoted to 
R&D which means that the entire labour force must be employed in producing the 
already existing varieties. Therefore, the value of )(tN with 0=g   in (2.33) is 
consistent with the free-entry condition (2.28) if and only if NtN ≥)( . We calculate 
N  as follows: 
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So if the initial number of varieties exceeds N , there exists an equilibrium with no 
product development: the resources spent on R&D are equal to zero, the flow of new 
varieties is equal to zero and the growth rate of innovation in the economy is zero. 
From (2.35) it also follows that the greater the probability of successfully inventing a 
new variety, the greater N . 
 
With total L fixed, the introduction of new varieties causes firms to compete ever 
fiercer for labour. Because equilibrium mark-ups do not vary with the number of 
varieties (see equation (2.19), sales per variety must decline. Because of this decline, 
profits also decline over time. Eventually, inventions drive the profit rate down to the 
level of the discount rate at which point it is no longer attractive for individual firms 
to engage in research and development. In other words: for R&D to be profitable the 
reward for successful research must be sufficiently high; that is for 0>N& , vv > . 
The value of v  can be derived mathematically from the free-entry condition (2.28), 
the pricing equation (2.19) and the constraint (2.32) that employment in R&D be non-
negative: 
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So if vv ≤ , there will be no R&D and therefore no increase in the number of varieties 
over time ( )0=N& . If vv > , resources will be allocated to the R&D sector in order to 
invent new varieties and therefore the number of varieties will increase over time 
( )0>N& . From the free-entry equation (2.28), the pricing equation (2.19) and the 
resource constraint (2.31) we can calculate the path of N&when vv > : 
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Depending on the value for v  with respect to v , we can now write an expression for 
the way N&evolves over time: 
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The incorporated uncertainty in this model has the effect of shifting the vv =  line 
down. We have seen from (2.35) that if λ increases, v  will decrease. This can be 
understood intuitively because the greater λ, the greater the expected value of the 
representative firm. With costs remaining the same, the higher initial value of the firm 
has to decrease more in order to break even.  
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An increase in λ has a proportional effect in the same direction on N  (see equation 
(2.34)). This effect can be understood in two ways. First, if λ increases, the 
probability a new variety will be invented increases. If the probability of inventing 
new varieties increases at the micro-level, there will be a higher initial rate of 
innovation at macro-level. Therefore growth rate, g, will be higher initially (g1 instead 
of g0 at Ni) and consequently take longer to diminish to zero resulting in a larger value 
for N  ( 1N  instead of 0N ).
16 Figure 2.5 shows the situation with the initial λ=λ0 and 
the new λ=λ1 where λ1>λ0.  
 
Figure 2.5: The model with two values for λ, with λ1>λ0. 
 
 
In this model the effects of uncertainty boil down to shifts in the vv =  and NN =  
curves thereby shifting any stationary equilibrium. With lim λ→1, the model turns out 
to be a model set in a deterministic environment as developed similarly by Grossman 
and Helpman (1991). An increase in λ might prolong growth for a short while, but the 
important thing to notice from the product-specific model used in this section is that 
for all stationary solutions of the model, the innovation rates are equal to zero. So the 
important conclusion that can be drawn from the section 2.3 model is that the growth 
                                                 
16 The implicit assumption here is that the growth diminishing process is the same regardless the initial 
values of g. In figure 2.5, for illustrative purposes, we have drawn a linear decrease in g  toward g=0. 
 N(t) Ni 
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rate of innovation will eventually become zero. This happens because the costs of 
inventing new varieties do not decrease over time while the expected profit streams 
do. The costs of inventing new varieties do not decrease over time because the 
specification in the model that no knowledge-spillovers can occur prevents firms from 
inventing ever more cheaply despite the fact more and more technologies and 
different varieties become known. In the next section, we will alter the specification 
in the model in order to incorporate the public character of knowledge. 
 
2.4. The general information model with uncertainty 
In the previous section the product-specific information model leads to the conclusion 
that the innovation rate eventually comes to a halt. Because of the private character of 
knowledge capital firms are unable to benefit from the knowledge generated by 
competitors. Therefore, despite the increasing number of different varieties, the costs 
of inventing a new variety do not decrease. With a limited market and an increasing 
number of different varieties, profit rates go down on products that cost the same to 
develop. Growth is bound to stop.  
 
In this section, an important characteristic of knowledge will be introduced: its public 
aspect. The assumption that knowledge is merely a private good seems too stringent 
in real life: patents, though intentionally there to protect knowledge from dispersing, 
are not perfect, competitors can analyze the newest products in order to find the 
innovative aspect or some uses of invented products might simply not be recognized 
by the original inventors.  
 
The Model 
Romer (1990) distinguishes between two types of products resulting from R&D 
activities. First of all, as in section 2.3, R&D boosts product development and 
therefore the number of new varieties. Second, each research project generates 
knowledge capital that cannot be appropriated by the inventors. This product of R&D 
contributes to a large pool of general knowledge, KR(t) and cannot be influenced by 
individual firms nor be excluded from public use. Every time a new product is 
developed, part of this knowledge flows to the general knowledge capital which 
increases. Intuitively, we can see that the larger the number of different varieties, the 
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larger also the general pool of knowledge capital must be. Because this general 
knowledge is freely available to every individual firm, when the number of different 
varieties increases, more and more knowledge can be used without having to pay for 
it, therefore making product development less costly as time goes by. So not only the 
labour employed in the R&D sector determines the flow of new varieties, also the 
general knowledge capital, KR(t), has to be taken into account.  
 
The incorporation of the public aspect of knowledge capital is captured by a slight 
alteration of the model developed in the previous section. 
 
Equation (2.38), the section 2.4 equivalent of equation (2.28), shows the relationship 
between the flow of new varieties and the share of the labour force employed in the 
R&D sector: 
 
R
R K
NL
λ
&
=          (2.38) 
 
From the equation it follows that 'advancements in the fields of applied science and 
engineering reduce the labour requirements for designing new products' (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991, p. 58).  
 
The probability of successfully inventing a new variety is not only dependent on λ  
anymore, but also on KR(t) because of the general knowledge capital accumulation. 
Now that we have identified a second – and public - component to the process of 
knowledge creation, it is important to specify a link between this process and the 
accumulation of general knowledge capital. Mansfield (1985) and Adams (1990) use 
lags between the end of the research process and the dispersion of knowledge into the 
'pool'. Rather than investigating this link in detail, we would like to focus on the 
comparison between sections 2.3 and 2.4 as we go along. We follow Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) by assuming, by appropriate setting of the units, that the knowledge 
capital is directly proportional to the cumulative R&D-level: 
 
NK R =          (2.39) 
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Taking this into consideration, equation (2.38) can also be derived as follows: 
 
)(NE &  = probability of success  x  the resources in the R&D sector 
)(NE &  = RLtN •)(λ  
 
)(tN
NLR λ
&
=          (2.40) 
 
With the new specification in the R&D market given in (2.38) and the assumed 
proportionality from (2.39), we can write the labour market clearing condition as 
follows: 
  
p
I
N
NL +=
λ
&
         (2.41) 
 
Costs are also influenced by the existence of a pool for general knowledge capital: the 
greater this general knowledge, the smaller the costs. This is shown in equation (2.42) 
by using equation (2.41): 
 
Costs 
NN
w α
==         (2.42) 
 
As in the previous section, we can determine the free-entry condition (2.43): 
 
v
N
w ≥
λ
 with equality whenever 0>N&     (2.43) 
 
The value of the firm is not influenced by the pool of general knowledge capital as the 
value depends on the present discounted value of the firm's profit stream, therefore, 
equation (2.44) is equal to equation (2.25): 
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Again we have made the assumption that there is a constant growth rate of innovation, 
g: 
 
0≥≡
N
Ng
&
 with g constant      (2.45) 
 
Solving (2.44) with (2.43) and (2.45) yields the following expression: 
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This time, unlike with equation (2.29), we can see that N(t) falls out of the equation. 
Therefore, as we will come to see in a moment, when we solve for g, N(t) will have 
no effects. This is a major difference with the model in the previous section, where 
growth diminished because the number of varieties increased all the time, therefore 
lowering profits right until the cost level of research and development. 
 
The inverse relationship between profits and the number of varieties (from equation 
(2.20)) shows that profits decrease with the number of varieties increasing. However, 
because of the existence of a pool of general knowledge, the costs of developing new 
varieties also fall with a greater number of varieties. The net effects on the growth rate 
g can be calculated by solving for g from (2.46): 
 
( ) αρλα −−= Lg 1         (2.47) 
 
From (2.47) it is straightforward to see that the number of different varieties has no 
effect on g. Equation (2.47) is similar to equation (2.34) used in Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, p. 61) with 
α
λ 1= . The rate of innovation depends on the parameters 
of the model only. Therefore, this time, the assumption that g is a constant growth rate 
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is correct with the following specifications determining whether that be greater or 
smaller than zero: 
 
g: 
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From the labour market clearing condition (2.41), the free-entry condition (2.43), the 
pricing equation, 
α
wp =  and (2.44) we can derive the path for the rate of growth of 
the number of varieties: 
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Equation (2.49) is equal to the derived equation (2.47) with the greater the probability 
for success, the greater the rate of growth of new varieties. According to (2.49) a 
change in the value of the firms has no effect on the rate of innovation. We can now 
write an expression for the growth rate (2.49) given the value of the parameters from 
(2.48): 
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Next we substitute the profit equation into the no-arbitrage condition with )(tr=ρ .17 
We then get a relationship between the change in the value of a firm over time and the 
present value of an invention and the number of available brands as presented in 
equation (2.51): 
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Unlike in the previous section, because of a constant growth rate, g, I is also a 
constant. Dynamic equilibrium now boils down to the two equations (2.50) and 
(2.51). 18  
 
In order to simplify matters further, we can use 
Nv
V 1=  to represent the inverse of the 
total equity value in the economy. This allows us to create a phase diagram. From the 
definition 
Nv
V 1=  we get the following expression in relative changes: 
 
v
vg
V
V &&
−−=          (2.52) 
 
Combining (2.52) with (2.50) gives us one single differential equation which we can 
solve for 0=V& : 
 
( ) ρα −−−= gV
V
V 1
&
        (2.53) 
                                                 
17 )(tr=ρ  because we use the normalisation p=1. If the prices are fixed, expenditure can only 
change because of a change in the division of labour between the production sector and the R&D 
sector. As we find ourselves on an equilibrium path with a constant growth rate, the relative factors will 
not change and neither will total income, I. This gives:  )(0)( trtr
E
E
=⇔=−= ρρ
&
 
 
18 The only way to set I = constant in the previous section is to set expenditure equal to 1 (see 
Grossman and Helpman (1991)). Because we took p=1, I was not constant as long as the growth rate g 
was not a constant. 
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Now we can set up a phase diagram. Figure 2.6 shows the VV-line (equation (2.53)) 
and the gg-line (equation (2.50)). On the VV-line, 0=V& . 
 
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium of VV- and gg-lines 
 
 
The gg-curve: 
The gg-curve shows the evolution of the rate of innovation in the economy. The slope 
of the gg-curve can be explained directly from equation (2.50). The rate of innovation, 
g, is dependent on the parameter values and with those constant, the growth will also 
be constant for any value V. 
 
The VV-curve: 
The VV-curve shows the loci with values for V and g implying that 0=V& ; that is the 
rate of decline in the share price of the representative firm exactly matches the rate of 
new product development. Above the curve, the number of varieties grows less 
rapidly than the value of the firm and below the curve the opposite occurs.  
 
At the equilibrium point E, V and g will not change anymore over time. In other 
words: at this point, the economy continues to grow with a constant growth rate g* 
with a fixed division of labour between the production and R&D sectors.  
 g 
 g 
V 
0 g* 
 g 
 V 
 V 
 E 
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However, the economy will only grow with g* if point E is the immediate starting 
point. Any other starting point on the gg-line will lead to either an infinite or a zero 
value of the firm. The economy should therefore start at point E and remain there 
forever with a constant rate of innovation, g* as shown by equations (2.47) and (2.49). 
The growth rate can be sustained because even though the returns of developing a 
new variety decrease, so do the costs of product development due to the general 
knowledge capital. 
 
The equilibrium point E in figure 2.6 has been drawn on the condition that 
( ) αρλα >− L1 . If this specification of the parameter values is violated, the 
equilibrium will generate a zero value for g in point E0 and the intersection between 
the VV- and gg-curves will occur in the negative quadrant. This situation has been 
depicted in figure 2.7 below: 
 
Figure 2.7: Intersection of VV- and gg-lines in the negative quadrant 
 
 
Instead of a positive value for g, g*, growth will equal zero. When we have a closer 
look at the parameters, we can conclude the following: 
  
 g 
 g 
V 
0 
 g 
 V 
 V 
 E0 
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Growth will be greater than zero only if: 
- the economy is sufficiently big: L is sufficiently large 
- the people are patient enough: ρ  is sufficiently small 
- the probability for successfully inventing a new variety is sufficiently big: λ  is 
large enough 
- households sufficiently value variety in consumption: α  is sufficiently small 
 
The public character of knowledge has a lowering effect on the costs of product 
development. However, if the parameters explained above do not comply, this pool of 
general knowledge is not large enough to ensure continuous growth in the economy. 
Contrary to the model in the previous section, the innovation rate can be sustained at a 
rate greater than zero. In this section, the public character of knowledge creates spill-
over effects that prolong growth indefinitely given the correct specification of the 
model parameters. The introduction of uncertainty was also possible in this section 
like in the previous one. Despite the fact the mathematical alterations in the model 
developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991) were not too large, the interpretation is 
a new one. Instead of looking at labour productivity in a certain R&D sector, we look 
at the probability the R&D sector is successful in inventing a new variety thus 
changing the value of the firm and the growth rate depending on a value for λ . 
Because of the introduction of uncertainty, the model incorporates an important fact 
of life, thus showing a more realistic approach to every day situations concerning 
uncertain situations individual firms face. 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
Uncertainty has successfully been incorporated in the Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
endogenous growth model. The Poisson process with the exponential distribution as 
the waiting time between two discrete Poisson processes best fits the characteristics of 
the inventory process. We find that λ is the probability a firm successfully invents a 
new variety. In a deterministic world the problem a firm has to solve is to equate the 
costs of product development to the discounted revenues. If uncertainty is introduced 
however, the costs must equal the expected revenues, given the fact a new variety has 
been developed successfully, times the probability, λ , that a firm is successful.  
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In section 2.3, the rate of innovation in the model goes to zero in the long run, because 
we only look at knowledge capital as a private good. This can be seen as follows: in 
the production sector of the firm, workers that are paid certain wages, produce goods 
that are being sold. The production in the production sector goes partly to the workers 
in that sector in the form of wages and partly to operating profits. From these profits 
the wages of the workers in the R&D sector have to be paid. Only as long as the 
profits exceed the costs in the form of wages, the firm will continue R&D. A growth 
rate greater than zero cannot be sustained indefinitely. This is due to the fact that the 
marginal returns of a variety decrease while the costs of product development remain 
constant. The effect of uncertainty on the model in section 2.3 is that growth, if 
greater than zero initially, will come to a halt. An increase in λ might prolong growth 
for a short while, but the main conclusion from the section 2.3 product-specific model 
is that for all stationary solutions of the model, the innovation rates are equal to zero.  
 
Section 2.4 looks at the same model but now with not one but two products resulting 
from R&D. The first product – with which we are familiar from section 2.3 – is the 
possible new invention. Second, with every invention, a part of the knowledge 
production is regarded as a public good. Since this part cannot be appropriated by the 
inventing firm, all other firms can benefit from this generated knowledge. A constant 
growth rate can this time be sustained because even though the returns of developing 
a new variety decrease (like in section 2.3), so do the costs of product development 
due to the existence of a pool of general knowledge capital. Whether this growth rate 
is greater than or equal to zero depends on certain parameter values used in the model, 
like the size of the economy, the discount factor and the household valuation of 
variety in consumption. Also λ , the probability for successfully inventing a new 
variety, is one of these parameters. The greater the value of λ , the greater the rate of 
innovation in the economy, ceteris paribus. 
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Chapter 3: Terms-of-trade uncertainty, Growth and the Endogeneity of 
Openness  
 
 “The best weapon of a dictatorship is secrecy, but the best weapon of a democracy 
should be the weapon of openness” 
 
Niels Bohr, Physics Nobel Prize Laureate 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This research sheds new light on two important aspects in development economics. 
First, the theoretical aspects underpinning the relationship between fluctuations in 
(primary) commodity prices, the terms-of-trade and the lagging growth performance 
of many of the poorest developing countries. Second, the relationship between 
openness and growth.  
 
The relationship between term-of-trade and output growth is an issue that has drawn a 
lot of attention, especially in empirical studies. This should not come as a surprise, 
since this relationship is a problem that – when answered and policy implications 
drawn – offers the potential to improve the welfare and quality of economic life in 
large parts of the world for many of the world’s poorest through higher economic 
growth and increased levels of investment. The terms-of-trade are an important 
determinant of economic welfare since they determine the quantity of imports that can 
be bought with a given amount of domestic production (exports). Moreover, 
commodity price volatility is an incentive for the reallocation of resources from 
agriculture to industry or from the export-oriented sector to domestic production that 
could lead to a major redistribution of income between sectors in the economy. 
Finally, changes in primary commodity prices could have large consequences for the 
distribution of the gains from international trade between countries. In a world of 
uncertainty (read: in a world with terms-of-trade fluctuations) that hits the export 
sector disproportionately hard (like for example the fourfold increase in the price of 
oil in 1973-74) volatility has a negative effect on the share of exports in gross 
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domestic product (i.e. a country is becoming ‘closed’), the level of investment and 
economic growth. 
 
We can make some important observations related to commodity price fluctuations, 
terms-of-trade developments and output growth: 
- Ricardo (1817) and John Stuart Mill (1848) predicted a long-run improvement in 
the prices for primary products while Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) on the 
other hand argued that there is a secular deterioration in relative prices of primary 
products over time: the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.19 The Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis is further supported by some empirical observations (e.g. protection of 
domestic primary production in industrialised countries versus the need for 
developing countries to import manufactures, mainly capital goods, to proceed on 
the road towards industrialisation) and rejected by others. 
- Primary products tend to have fairly inelastic demand and supply curves, leading 
to relatively large price fluctuations in short time periods. This implies higher 
levels of volatility in the terms-of-trade which is a fact economic scholars agree 
to. 
- Growth rates of developing countries with large shares of primary product exports 
have been significantly lower than developing countries that were less endowed. 
- There is a positive relationship between openness of an economy to international 
trade and capital and economic growth performance. 
 
This has led us – like several authors before us - to believe that terms-of-trade 
uncertainty is detrimental in determining output growth and explaining output 
volatility. Essentially, terms-of-trade fluctuations may have an effect on economic 
growth through a – long-debated - long-run trend in the terms-of-trade and/or through 
levels of short-run fluctuations in the terms-of-trade around the trend. We believe it is 
                                                 
19 The classical economists believed that the combination of decreasing returns to scale in the 
production of primary commodities and constant to increasing returns to scale in producing 
manufactures would lead to increases in the terms-of-trade of primary products. This effect would even 
be strengthened by population growth and the fact that land and natural resources are in inelastic 
supply. Contrary to that, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis was based on the fact that primary products 
experience a low income elasticity of demand and that material-replacing technical change takes place 
in manufacturing, reducing the amount of raw materials needed per unit of manufacturing output. Also 
productivity gains in the primary sector – especially in countries with surplus labour and lower degrees 
of labour market organisation – translate into lower wages rather than higher rewards for local factors 
of production. 
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the existence of price volatility with its effects on economic growth – in which 
investment plays a crucial role – that needs to be looked at more carefully.20 
Moreover, one of the distinguishing features of this paper is that we show that terms-
of-trade volatility makes it possible to endogenously determine the level of openness 
of a country – to be approximated by the ratio of exports to gross domestic product – 
and thus infer conclusions about higher or lower levels of economic growth following 
the observation of a positive relationship between openness and growth. No longer do 
we have to treat ‘openness’ as an exogenous factor in growth regressions. Instead we 
can treat it as determined endogenously from within the model or within the system of 
regressions. 
 
In this chapter, we develop a stylised theoretical representation of the effects of short-
run volatility in the terms-of-trade. We show that a higher variance in the terms-of-
trade leads to lower levels of openness, a lower steady-state income and thus lower 
transitional levels of economic growth. Using cross-country regressions, these model 
outcomes are tested for a longer time horizon and for various sub-periods. Section 3.2 
will provide a theoretical overview of previous work on the terms-of trade literature 
and the openness-growth literature while in sections 3.3 and 3.4 the model is 
developed. In section 3.5 we analyse the significance and implications of the model 
while in section 3.6 the theoretical predictions are tested empirically by analysing the 
relationship between price volatility, openness and output growth. Section 3.7 
concludes. 
 
3.2. Theoretical considerations 
After looking at economic growth over longer periods of time, Diaz-Alejandro (1984) 
has observed what he termed the ‘commodity lottery’, an observation supported by 
data according to Hadass and Williamson (2003) when commenting on the Grilli and 
Yang (1988) dataset. That is: exportable resources of a country are determined by 
geography and chance and differences in economic development stem from the 
economic, political and institutional attributes of each of those commodities. Though 
                                                 
20 In section 3.2 we provide a concise literature overview among others about the debate on a secular 
trend in the commodity terms-of-trade. This is important since from the policy perspective effects 
running from the terms-of-trade to economic growth through a trend or through volatility around the 
mean make a large difference (Sapsford and Balasubramanyam, 1999). 
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institutions, geography and culture are able to explain large shares of growth 
differentials between countries, these fundamentals are much less volatile than the 
growth rates they are supposed to explain (Pritchett, 2000; Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett 
and Summers, 1993). It seems that an important factor for economic growth has been 
omitted: terms-of-trade shocks stemming from the abovementioned characteristics of 
primary commodities. This chapter argues that – contrary to the findings of Ramey 
and Ramey (1995) one important channel through which the term-of-trade shocks 
influence output growth and its volatility is investment. Another factor that we show 
to have an important impact on gross domestic product is the endogenously 
determined level of openness of a country. 
 
Throughout the 19th century, the classical economists, notably Ricardo and John 
Stuart Mill, believed there would be an increase in the ratio of primary commodity 
prices relative to manufacturing prices over time. This line of thought was reversed by 
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis in 1950 (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950).21 Since then 
many have looked at the secular deterioration in the commodity terms-of-trade. 
Firstly, looking at the trend in the terms-of-trade, Lewis (1952), Spraos (1980), 
Sapsford (1985), Thirlwall and Bergevin (1985), Sarkar (1986) and Grilli and Yang 
(1988) have all found evidence in support of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. The 
declining trend in the terms-of-trade was also found by Basu and McLeod (1992), 
Sapsford, Sarkar and Singer (1992), Barros and Amazonas (1993) and Cashin and 
McDermott (2001). The downward trend was however contested by Cuddington and 
Urzua (1989) who found support for a structural break in 1920/21, Powell (1991) 
whose findings support three downward jumps in real commodity prices (in 1921, 
1938 and 1975) and Cuddington, Ludema and Jayasuriya (2002) who find stationarity 
of the terms-of-trade once structural breaks are introduced. Bleaney and Greenaway 
(1993) find a significant but slow downward trend in prices of primary products 
relative to those of manufactures of little more than 0,5% per annum (for non-fuel 
primary commodities) and argue that only a fraction of this decline passes through to 
the terms-of-trade of developing countries. Moreover, the negative trend varies across 
                                                 
21 The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis is not uncontested though, especially when looking at the data 
available on which Prebisch based his hypothesis. For a good overview of the issues, see Spraos (1980) 
where he identifies four principal criticisms brought up in the fifties, sixties and seventies by 
economists no less than Kindleberger (1956), Haberler (1959), Lipsey (1963), Johnson (1967), Viner 
(1953), Baldwin (1955) and Bairoch (1975). 
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the 1900-1991 time span and price behaviour of different categories of primary 
commodities is sufficiently different to doubt the validity of a long-run downward 
trend for primary commodities as a whole. Gillitzer and Kearns (2005) carry out an 
interesting study on long-term patterns in Australia’s terms-of-trade and conclude that 
there is an overall negative – though insignificant – trend in Australia’s terms-of-trade 
of -0.1% per annum.22 (Short-run) volatility in the Australian terms-of-trade was 
much more pronounced. Also Cuddington (1992) and more recently Newbold et. al 
(2005) find that in the majority of investigated cases, no significant trends were 
inferred. Moreover, for those trends that were found, the estimates were not always 
negative. Newbold et. al (2005) – like Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) before them – 
conclude that it is volatility that matters. Like them we conclude that – in light of the 
mixed evidence on a secular positive/negative trend or not there is one stylised fact 
that applies to commodity prices in general which is that of overall (short-run) 
volatility rather than predictable trend movements’.23  Another complicating factor – 
when carrying out an investigative analysis of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis – is the 
fact that in a world that is globalising more and more, with international production 
fragmentation that leads to the inclusion of developing countries into international 
production networks as suppliers of basic parts and components, an easy distinction at 
country level between primary product exporters and industrialised economies can no 
longer be made. A recent UNCTAD (2005) study supports this observation.  
 
Though much research focused on the long-running debate surrounding the 
deterioration in the terms-of-trade of internationally traded primary commodities vis-
à-vis manufactures as argued by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950), much less 
attention was initially given to the impact of terms-of-trade movements on economic 
growth. Instead early research has focused on the effects of exports on GDP 
movements. A first overview of the literature in this area is provided by Behrman 
(1987). Exports and export instability play an important role in explaining output 
growth according to Feder (1983), Ram (1987) and Gyimah-Brempong (1991). 
However, Fosu (1992), basing his research on Glezakos (1973) – the same study on 
which Gyimah-Brempong (1991) base their work – finds no relationship between 
                                                 
22 Interestingly they find that Australia’s commodity exports have risen faster in price than average 
world commodity prices and that growth in manufacturing exports had little to do with the negative 
trend. 
23 Newbold, P., S. Pfaffenzeller and A. Rayner (2005). 
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export instability and growth. More recently Dehn and Gilbert (2001) – in line with 
the export instability literature – fail to find evidence of commodity price variability 
or uncertainty on growth. 
 
Turning away from exports alone and looking at the terms-of-trade effect on growth, 
it was the strand of empirical growth literature in the 1990s (Barro, 1991; Barro and 
Lee, 1993; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Fischer, 1993; Easterly et al., 1993; Razin and 
Yuen, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) that found that the terms-of-trade play a 
significant and robust role in explaining growth differentials. According to the 
economic growth literature there is empirical evidence for a link between the long-run 
terms-of-trade fluctuation and economic growth. Mendoza (1997) and Reinhart and 
Wickham (1994) argue indeed that the opposing trends of terms-of-trade between 
developing and developed countries stem from the strong (relative) decline of 
commodity prices much as predicted by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (Prebisch, 
1950; Singer, 1950). Moreover, Easterly et al. (1993), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
and Fischer (1993) further support the importance of the terms-of-trade for economic 
growth relative to other explanatory variables used to explain growth differentials, 
like education, human capital and political factors.24 A positive and significant link 
between improvements in the terms-of-trade of internationally traded primary 
commodities vis-à-vis manufactures and output growth is akin to technological 
advances. Those lead to improved levels of productivity, more rapid capital 
accumulation and economic growth. According to Mendoza (1997) the mechanism 
runs from high terms-of-trade growth to higher expected real rates of return on 
savings (in units of imported goods) which in turn affect the savings rate and thus the 
growth rate of an economy. Bhagwati (1973) in his work on immiserizing growth 
contests these outcomes and shows that economic growth, leading to higher levels of 
production and exports of goods may lead to a disproportionately large fall in prices 
of those products. This deterioration in the price level may more than offset the 
increases in production thus leading to a loss of welfare. 
 
Besides Bhagwati (1973), another strand of literature that contends the view of a 
positive relationship between improvements in the terms-of-trade and economic 
                                                 
24 Raddatz (2005) however, shows that external shocks (like commodity price fluctuations) can only 
explain a small fraction of output variance of a developing country compared to internal factors. 
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growth is the ‘curse of natural resources’ or ‘Dutch disease’ literature. It states that 
abundance of resources leads to lower economic growth and development.25 Sachs 
and Warner (1995, 1999, 2001) show repeatedly that indeed abundance of resources 
and not other variables that have been suggested – like omitted geographical or 
climate variables – explain the curse.26 Neither do they find evidence for bias 
resulting from other unobserved growth deterrents. Rather they claim that resource-
abundant countries were ‘high-price economies’ and as a possible consequence have 
missed out on export-led growth. Also Hadass and Williamson (2003) find evidence 
of the Dutch disease between 1870 and World War I where improvements in the 
terms-of-trade reduced growth in certain commodity exporting countries.27 That is, 
initially, a positive terms-of-trade shock will raise GDP but over the longer run, a 
positive terms-of-trade shock in primary product-producing countries will strengthen 
comparative advantage forces, reallocating resources into primary product production 
which leads to de-industrialisation.28 
 
Besides the ‘resource curse’ argument as previously discussed, Pritchett (2000) and 
Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1993) argue that the fundamental 
determinants of growth exhibit far more persistence than do the rates of output the 
determinants are supposed to explain. No matter whether there is an empirical trend in 
terms-of-trade fluctuations or not, we need to turn to the issue of volatility which we 
believe to be of much more significance and which is much less contested. There is a 
vast literature on the effects of different types of risk on output growth.29 Early work 
on the effect of short-term terms-of-trade volatility on growth is performed by Basu 
                                                 
25 Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999, 2001) and Gylfason et al. (1999). 
26 Sachs and Warner (1999) show that there is evidence from seven Latin-American countries that 
natural resource booms are sometimes accompanied by declining levels of GDP per capita. 
27 Firstly, their dataset covered only a few of the developing countries that remained poor up to World 
War II and neither did they look at volatility. Secondly, the causal relationship between terms-of-trade 
can also be seen the other way as demonstrated by Bhagwati (1973) in his work on immizerising 
growth. 
28 Paul Samuelson – when challenged by Stanislaw Ulam (a mathematician) to ‘name […] one 
proposition in all of the social sciences which is both true and non-trivial’ – answered: ‘Comparative 
advantage. That it is logically true need not be argued in front of a mathematician; that it is not trivial is 
attested by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have never been able to grasp the 
doctrine for themselves or to believe it after it was explained to them.’ Allowing free trade to determine 
national and international trade patterns leads to specialisation of countries in an immense range of 
products. The discussion on fluctuations in the terms-of-trade has arguably made the theory even less 
obvious. 
29 Aizenman and Marion (1993, 1997) Turnovsky (1993), Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay (1998), 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Devereux and Smith (1994), Obstfeld (1994), Asea and Turnovsky 
(1998), Imbs (2002). 
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and McLeod (1992) who use impulse response functions to show a negative effect of 
greater variance in price fluctuations on economic output; a result that is a year later 
supported by Edström and Singer (1993) who find a significant negative effect of the 
net barter terms-of-trade volatility on output growth using pooled cross-section and 
time-series data.30 Cashin and McDermott (2001) add that volatility has different 
causes: in certain time periods the increase would come from a greater amplitude in 
price movements (in the early 1900s) and in other periods (the early 1970s) from 
increased frequency of large price movements, i.e. a fall in the duration of large price 
cycles. The study of Basu and McLeod (1992) also raised another issue: the problem 
of distinguishing between a trend and the transient components around that trend. 
Already in 1979, Gelb (1979) claimed to have found at least sixteen different methods 
of doing that. Basu and McLeod (1992), Cuddington (1992) and Reinhart and 
Wickham (1994) follow Beveridge and Nelson (1981) in distinguishing between a 
stochastic trend that allows for a random walk and a stationary cyclical component 
and use Cochrane (1988) to provide a convenient nonparametric estimator of the 
‘size’ of the random walk trend component – the variance ratio. Studies by Watson 
(1994), Cashin, McDermott and Scott (1999) and Cashin and McDermott (2001) deal 
with data in levels avoiding the subjective choice as to which detrending method to 
use.31 Sapsford and Balasubramanyam (1999) argue that – apart from econometric 
challenges – trend and volatility in the terms-of-trade are maybe not Siamese twins 
but at least twin pillars of the same fundamental problem of less developed countries 
and should not be seen separately at all. It is the heavy dependence on primary 
commodities (or more recently upon components and parts of manufactured goods) as 
a source of export revenue that is the problem.32 Ramey and Ramey (1995) – in 
support of previous work – found that countries with large volatility in output growth 
                                                 
30 More recently Moledina, A.A., T.L. Roe and M. Shane (2001) show that a large share in commodity 
price volatility is predictable, leaving only a small share for unpredictable components – thus 
suggesting lower levels of terms-of-trade volatility than expected. 
31 This means price slumps (booms) are seen as periods of absolute declines (increases) in the series, 
not as a period of below-trend (above-trend) growth in the series. 
32 Arguably, the parts and components the less developed countries provide as inputs for manufactured 
goods are the ones at the labour intensive and technology extensive range of intermediate inputs. This 
implies that the gains from investment will be lower in the less developed countries. Also, whether the 
transmission mechanism works through the trend in the terms-of-trade or volatility around that trend is 
a matter of great concern for policy makers. In case of the former, a country can diversify its exports 
away from commodities that experience a secular deterioration in their terms-of-trade into commodities 
and products that do not show that trend. Volatility of the terms-of-trade around a negative or positive 
trend do not offer such a policy solution; it just warrants measures to dampen the fluctuations to 
mitigate its adverse consequences for capital accumulation and output growth. 
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tended to have lower average growth rates.  Sapsford and Balasubramanyam (1999) 
argue that the previous studies might even underestimate the effects of volatility on 
investment and growth because (government) policies may be in place to insulate the 
domestic economy from fluctuations in commodity prices creating the ‘illusion’ of no 
significant relationship. Those policies are not costless though because the 
opportunity costs are the loss of investible resources: a link between volatility, 
investments and growth is therefore likely to be underestimated.  
Theoretically we expect a negative impact of volatility in the degree around the trend 
terms-of-trade on output growth as well as on the share of exports in gross domestic 
product (Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson, 1990; Go and Sinko, 1993).  
- For output growth, firstly, the volatility effect runs through the tradable 
component of output (X-M). Fluctuations in the term-of-trade lead to fluctuations 
in X-M that lead to fluctuations in gross domestic product (GDP). This link 
explains output volatility but not how output is actually reduced as a consequence 
of uncertainty.  
- For that we need to look at the behaviour of agents at the micro-level under 
uncertainty; that is to incorporate uncertainty into the theory of production.33 So, 
secondly, uncertainty at the micro-level leads firms (micro-economic agents) that 
are risk-averse to reduce production compared to a situation with full certainty – 
an outcome that follows from including uncertainty in the theory of expected 
utility.34 Uncertainty may reveal itself here through prices – i.e. here the price of 
exports with normalised import prices – or technology. The larger the level of 
uncertainty, that is the larger the mean-preserving spread (a ‘Sandmo’ increase in 
risk), the lower output growth (as supported by Basu and McLeod, 1992; and 
Ramey and Ramey, 1995). In an industry with perfect competition, this leads to 
lower levels of production for a given level of resources because firms operate at a 
sub-optimal level with average costs above the Pareto-optimal minimum. Looking 
at different sectors in the economy, we also argue that the export sector 
experiences larger volatility in the terms-of-trade (like Devarajan, Lewis and 
Robinson (1990) and Go and Sinko (1993)) which means that increased volatility 
will lead to a disproportionately larger decrease in production for exports when 
                                                 
33 An analysis of industry-level uncertainty can be found in Shesinsky and Dreze (1976). 
34 See Sandmo (1971), Hey (1984) and Gravelle and Rees (1992) for outcomes in terms of including 
uncertainty in expected utility theory. 
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compared to sectors producing for domestic consumption. It means that we expect 
countries with higher levels of volatility to be more closed, i.e. to have a lower 
share of exports in gross domestic product, than countries with lower levels of 
volatility.  
- Thirdly, an increase in volatility/uncertainty – modelled as a mean-preserving 
spread in the terms of trade – may lead to a lower expected growth rate of output 
(Basu and McLeod, 1992) because of the effect uncertainty has on financial 
decisions of producers, governments and households.  
• Uncertainty changes producer’s incentives to invest, since in the presence 
of (capital) restrictions that could lead to sunk costs, uncertainty may cause 
additional costs to investments (Pindyck, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
That means uncertainty leads investors to place a risk premium (or an 
‘option value’ according to Lutz (1994)) inside their net present value 
(NPV) or return on investment (ROI) calculations, essentially lowering the 
level of investments undertaken because of ‘higher costs’ leading to lower 
levels of economic growth.35 Indeed some investigations find that 
temporary trade shocks show that investment can be expected to respond 
strongly to discrete ex post commodity price shocks (Bevan, Collier and 
Gunning, 1990; Collier, Gunning and Associates, 1999). Firms that are 
risk-averse and that operate in the export-sector will adjust their 
investment decisions – even without the irreversibility of investments 
indicated by Pindyck (1991).  
• Governments may under-invest in public goods, given revenue 
uncertainty, especially given the fact they may well face borrowing 
constraints on international capital markets. Indeed, Ramey and Ramey 
(1995) find that government spending and macro-economic volatility are 
closely related and lead to lower output growth.36  
                                                 
35 Additionally, the risk premium of uncertainty may lead to a reallocation of investments 
geographically or in terms of composition (e.g. from financial investments to property investments or 
to investments in the non-tradable sector that is to a lesser degree affected by uncertainty in the terms-
of-trade).  
Also note that with the risk premium (or option value) on terms-of-trade equal to zero, there is no 
uncertainty in investment decisions and we operate in a certain world. 
 
36 Catao and Kapur (2004) have shown that for the period 1970-2001 with greater volatility comes a 
greater need for international borrowing by governments but less willingness from international capital 
markets. 
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• Risk-averse households save less when returns to capital are fluctuating a 
lot. Mendoza (1997) models the idea that terms-of-trade volatility 
discourages savings among households by assuming they consume 
imported goods and save for future consumption. That means terms-of-
trade are directly related to the real returns to saving which combined with 
sufficient levels of risk-aversion and closed capital markets leads to the 
conclusion that countries with more fluctuations grow slower.  
Mendoza confirms, in a sample of 40 industrial and developing countries for 1970-
1991, a positive relationship between terms-of-trade trend and economic growth as 
well as a negative relationship between terms-of-trade volatility and growth. These 
empirical findings have been corroborated by Bleaney and Greenaway (2001), 
Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay (2003) and Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2004). 
The latter study additionally emphasises an asymmetry between ‘core’ and 
‘periphery’ in the world for 1870-1939. Where terms-of-trade volatility was present, it 
was found to have a much stronger negative impact on economic growth in the 
‘periphery’ than in the ‘core’. The ‘core’ benefited strongly from positive secular 
growth in the terms-of-trade while in the ‘periphery’ the effects on output growth 
were negligible or even negative. Moreover Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2004) 
find a negative influence of terms-of-trade volatility on capital flows in the 
‘periphery’ but not in the ‘core’.37  
 
In light of the observation that terms-of-trade volatility may not only have a negative 
impact on output growth but also on the level of openness of a country, i.e. the share 
of exports in gross domestic product, we investigate the literature that looks at the 
relationship between openness and growth in more detail. It was Baumol (1986) who 
started the empirical debate about economic convergence and the argument – 
stemming from the Solow-model (Solow, 1956) that poor countries should grow 
faster than richer ones due to their higher marginal products of capital. The 
combination of large datasets (Madisson, 1982; Summers and Heston, 1991) 
combined with growth empirics (for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992, 
1995 and Lee, 1994) has lead to an investigation regarding the effect of openness in 
explaining economic growth.  According to Dollar and Kraay (2004): ‘Openness to 
                                                 
37 For a more detailed analysis of the reasons for these observations, we refer to the original article by 
Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2004). 
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international trade accelerates development: this is one of the most widely held beliefs 
in the economics profession, one of the few things on which Nobel prize winners of 
both the left and the right agree’. And with some notable exceptions, the majority of 
the economics profession agrees (Dollar, 1992; Harrison, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 
1995; Edwards, 1998; Pain, 2000; Dollar and Kraay, 2002, 2004; Baldwin, 2003; 
Cuadros, Orts and Alguacil, 2004). Corden (1984, 1985) argues that indeed opening 
up the economy to international trade will produce benefits through higher 
productivity in terms of greater consumer choice and higher living standards38. 
Though the static effects of more openness on economic growth performance are not 
large, Romer (1994) and Berden and Van Marrewijk (forthcoming JDE 2007) argue 
that the dynamic welfare implications are much larger. Quah and Rauch (1990) use 
the idea of freer trade having a positive effect on growth using time series analysis 
while Edwards (1993, 1998) uses comparative data for 93 countries to analyse and 
find the robustness of the relationship between openness and total factor productivity. 
Also Harrison (1995) finds that overall there is a positive association between growth 
and various approximations to openness.39 Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1999) – though 
not in favour of the shift from case studies to cross-country work – quote studies by 
the OECD, NBER and IBRD during the 1960s and 1970s that have plausibly shown 
that trade leads to higher growth, possible even for prolonged periods of time.  
 
Some authors have challenged the aforementioned studies based on econometric, 
policy variables or omitted variables grounds. It is interesting to see that many of the 
critical research focuses on Latin-American examples. Cimoli and Correa (2002) find 
that there are other factors that are more important for determining growth. 
Additionally they show that a virtuous link between exports and output can only be 
maintained with an increasing deficit on the trade balance. Yanikkaya (2003) finds 
that the specific approximation for openness matters for the results found on the effect 
of openness on growth. Regressions using trade intensity ratios show a positive effect 
on growth while higher trade barriers seem to have a positive effect also. The former 
is in line with the existing literature, the latter clearly not. Vamvakidis (2002) checks 
historical evidence from 1870 to the present and finds that the positive relationship 
                                                 
38 See Van Marrewijk (2002) for an overview of the underlying (trade) theories of comparative 
advantage and intra-industry trade. 
39 Though the strength of the association depends on the specification of the data (cross-section or 
panel data) 
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between openness and growth is there but hinges on a very strong positive correlation 
in the post 1970 period. In fact, the relationship is a negative one for the period 1920 
– 1940. This may suggest that the third wave of globalisation has changed the 
parameters in the world economy in such a way that openness is more important for 
growth today than it was, for example in 1930. Figure 3.1 shows slight differences in 
foreign capital stock as share of a developing country’s GDP, merchandise expoerts 
as share of world GDP and immigrants to the US in millions for each of the waves of 
globalisation.  
 
Figure 3.1. Three waves of globalization 
 
Source: Globalization, Growth and Poverty, World Bank (2001) 
 
Fundamental criticism on the empirical observations regarding openness and growth 
comes from Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000). They challenge the outcomes of several 
cross-country regression analyses that openness is good for growth. They look at the 
outcomes of Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Edwards (1998) among 
others, and argue that these are methodologically flawed for several reasons. First, the 
openness indicators used are poor measures of trade barriers and secondly they are 
highly correlated with other variables measuring ‘bad performance’. Dollar and Kraay 
(2004) partially agree with this critique but argue that Levine and Renelt (1992) 
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criticised the cross-country work before and also find that certain variables (like 
changes in average tariff rates) are not strongly correlated with changes in trade 
volumes. Moreover, Dollar and Kraay (2004) look at changes in trade policy and 
changes in growth, thus eliminating other factors that may blur the relationship in 
standard cross-country growth regressions. 
 
Pain (2000), Baldwin (2003) and Cuadros, Orts and Alguacil (2004) find that 
openness is to include more than just trade liberalisation in order to have a positive 
impact on output growth. According to Pain (2000), openness is part of a 
development strategy, no a goal in itself, and needs to be complemented by a solid 
institutional and legal framework. Cuadros, Orts and Alguacil (2004) argue that 
international capital flows with a focus on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) matter 
while Baldwin (2003) looks at measures like stable exchange rates, prudent monetary 
and fiscal policy and a corruption-free administration to support the positive 
relationship. Berg and Krueger (2003) ask themselves how important trade policy is 
for poverty reduction. They find that openness has a positive effect but only through 
the general effect on overall economic growth. Lee, Ricci and Rigobon (2004) take 
the lessons from the Rodriguez-Rodrik paper and apply a heteroskedasticity 
methodology to measure the effect of openness on growth while controlling for the 
effect of growth on openness. Though small, the outcomes show that openness has an 
unequivocally positive effect on growth. 
 
When summarising the openness-growth literature we conclude that most evidence 
points in favour of a positive relationship between openness and growth despite the 
dissenting view by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000). There are means to mitigate the 
critiques raised and after doing so (Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Lee, Ricci and Rigobon, 
2004) the evidence is decisive. It is interesting to note that openness is seen as an 
exogenous policy variable in its effects on output growth with only a rare exception 
(Aizenman, 2004). In this paper we will show that in addition to financial openness 
mentioned by Aizenman (2004), terms-of-trade volatility can also endogenously 
explain the level of openness and thus indirectly as well as directly the rate of growth 
in an economy. In order to do that, we now turn to the model in section 3.3. 
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3.3. Uncertainty in a general framework 
In order to work out the relationship between volatility, openness and economic 
growth, let’s assume a Ramsey economy with a national budget constraint that holds 
each time period. Assuming a steady-state with certainty, that leads to the following 
general system of equations for the steady-state structure of a small open economy: 
 
Bppmvkpgqpe =−−− *)():,(),(       (3.1) 
pp gem −=          (3.2) 
'* Tpp ⋅=  (with T = 1 + t )      (3.3) 
q
k
e
g
kTr =),(          (3.4) 
)( ρδ +=r          (3.5) 
rkTr =),(          (3.6) 
 
In equation (3.1) the term )(⋅e  is the expenditure function for the composite good q 
depending on the vector of domestic prices, p. The composite good can either be 
consumed or directly invested. )(⋅g is the GDP function that depends on the domestic 
price vector, capital, k, and other factors of production, v. B is the trade balance which 
we will assume to be equal to zero down below while )(⋅m  represents the vector of 
imports that – according to equation (3.2) – is the difference between domestic supply 
and demand. Equation (3.3) shows the difference between domestic and world prices, 
whereby the difference arises from T’ our variable – made explicit here but essentially 
‘inside’ p* - to model price volatility. Equation (3.4) relates real investment 
expenditure – as a function of T and capital – to the expenditure function and revenue 
function. The equilibrium real rate of return in steady state is determined by the rate 
of time discount, ρ , and the rate of depreciation, δ . The long run equilibrium supply 
and demand in investments is given by equation (3.6).  
 
We can introduce uncertainty, like trade volatility in the terms-of-trade, by 
characterising variable T with the probability density function )(Tf 40: 
                                                 
40 It is possible to introduce different types of uncertainty besides the volatility in the terms-of-trade. 
We refer to Francois (1997), Baldwin et al (1997), Rodrik (1986, 1994) and Nelson (1994).   
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∫∞
∞−
⋅= dtTfT )(µ         (3.7) 
 
We can then express the real return to investment by combining equations (3.6) and 
(3.7) into: 
 
∫∞
∞−
⋅⋅= dtTfkTrr )(),(µ        (3.8) 
 
In order to relate the uncertainty of investment returns to savings – since the two are 
related and an assumption regarding behaviour under uncertainty lies underneath – we 
need to model exponential temporal utility functions of consumers whereby they 
maximise the present value of utility streams. Equation (3.9) models this utility 
function: 
 
cqbecu ⋅−−=          (3.9) 
 
In equation (3.9), u stands for temporal utility which depends on a constant, c, the 
measure for risk aversion, b, and the consumption of q, cq . For reasons of 
mathematical rigour, note that we employ the CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) 
specification of risk in this model.41 We can now combine equations (3.6) and (3.9) in 
order to get the certainty equivalent rate of return to investment. ‘Certainty 
equivalence’ is the return needed under complete certainty to provide the same 
expected utility as a particular return with mean µ  and variance 2rσ . If we assume a 
normal or gamma distribution for T, we get the following certainty equivalents (CE) 
respectively: 
 
Normal: 2
2 rr
bCE σµ −=       (3.10a) 
                                                 
41 Using a different type of risk aversion, like Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), makes the 
calculations more complex but does not yield much different results.  
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Combining equations (3.6) and (3.10a/3.10b) to equation (3.11), we find the certainty 
equivalent expression, characterised by µ  and σ  for the long-run equilibrium on the 
savings-investment market. Equation (3.11) states that, at the margin, savers/investors 
will allocate their spending between current and future consumption so that the 
certainty equivalent return is exactly enough to offset the discounting of future 
consumption. 
 
rCE rr =),(
2σµ         (3.11) 
 
3.4. An example with an Armington model 
Having discussed the specifications and model structure in general form in section 
3.3, let’s now turn to a specific example using a stylised model based on Armington-
type trade, following De Melo and Robinson (1989) and Francois and Reinert (1997). 
A neat feature of the model is that it exactly addresses the nature of external shocks 
that we investigate: terms-of-trade shocks and the mechanisms by which these shocks 
pass through the economy of a country.  
 
We assume a small open economy (i.e. facing fixed world prices for exports and 
imports) with two sectors: a tradable and non-tradable sector and three goods, which 
we call the 1-2-3 model. This allows us on the one hand to look at the relationship 
between the external sector and the rest of the economy (e.g. in terms of relative 
prices allowing a country to affect its international competitiveness) and on the other 
hand makes the country part of the world because it is not immune to shocks that 
occur elsewhere affecting the global economy. For our purpose, within the category of 
tradable goods, we also distinguish between export goods and importables since it 
enables us to analyse the effects of terms-of-trade shocks. 
 
The 1-2-3 model is different from the standard trade models in that it allows for non-
tradable goods as well as imperfect substitution between import goods and goods that 
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are produced domestically. Also it specifies imperfect transformability on the export 
side.42 Following early work by Taylor (1975), Salter (1959) and Swan (1960) this 
allows us to look more realistically at the empirical observation that changes in world 
prices are only partially transmitted into the domestic economy (with the level of 
openness dictating the strength of these effects). The aforementioned specifications in 
the 1-2-3 model actually extend and generalise the Salter-Swan model, rendering it 
empirically relevant. 
 
The demand-side is modelled as a CES composite good that can be used for 
consumption or savings/investment. The composite good, Q, is defined by two 
components: domestic good, D, and imported good, M, as shown in equation (3.12).43 
 
[ ]ρρρ ββ 11 )1( DMAQ ⋅−+⋅⋅=       (3.12) 
 
The supply side of the economy is defined as a composite, X, over the domestic good, 
D, and export good, E. A certain level of technology is used on the domestic and 
export goods. The total GDP (size) of the economy, indexed below by X, is 
determined by the aggregate CET production function based on capital and labour 
combined in a Cobb-Douglas form. Equation (3.13) shows us the substitution 
possibilities while (3.14) represents the resource constraint. 
 
[ ]hhh DEAX 12 )1( ⋅−+⋅⋅= αα       (3.13) 
 
aa LKAX −⋅= 13         (3.14) 
 
In order to simplify the calculus we normalise quantities so that world prices for X 
and M are unity. From optimisation on the product transformation surface we can 
relate relative supply to the price of domestic good DP .  
 
                                                 
42 This is important since without this assumption, the law-of-one-price would still hold for all sectors 
that have shares in exports. 
43 In multi-sector models the composite commodity idea is extended, assuming that imports and 
domestically produced goods are imperfect substitutes (Armington, 1969). 
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In equation (3.15), Ω  is the elasticity of transformation of production (supply-side) 
and in equation (3.16), s is the elasticity of transformation of demand (demand-
side).44 
 
Also, from First Order Conditions (FOC) for utility maximisation, we can relate 
relative quantities demanded to the price of domestic good DP . 
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The price of utility (identical to qe in (3.4)) can be related to relative prices through 
the CES price index for Q as presented in equation (3.17). This relationship shows the 
internal price of imports by the power of the tariff (recall that world prices are unity): 
 
[ ] ssDsssqQ PTeP −−− ⋅−+⋅⋅= 1111 )1( ββ      (3.17) 
 
As already indicated above, we assume balanced trade (B=0). Balanced trade 
combined with unity of world prices means that imports, M, must equal exports, X, in 
equilibrium. Combining equations (3.15) and (3.16) satisfies this condition as is 
presented in equation (3.18) below: 
 
           (3.18) 
 
From equation (3.18) we can deduce the price level DP : 
 
                                                 
44 The elasticities Ω  and s are defined as follows: 1
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Now that we have DP , we can solve for equilibrium quantities D and E and prices XP  
and QP : 
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From the FOC associated to equation (3.14) we can show that the equilibrium real 
return on capital is: 
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Combining (3.24) with equations (3.22) and (3.23) yields (3.25) where the real rate of 
return is expressed in endogenous variables T and K only: 
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A nice property of (3.25) is that the marginal returns effect due to changes in K and 
the relative price effect due to changes in T are separable. 
 
Equation (3.26) shows the steady-state capital stock under certainty. The coefficients 
jA  (with j ranging from one to eight) used in equations (3.20) to (3.26) represent 
reduced form constants.45 
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Equations (3.19) to (3.26) provide us with the entire system needed to determine the 
equilibrium values. The (non-linear) relationship between real returns, r, and volatility 
in world prices is represented by the )(Tj  function. The overall impact of uncertainty 
on real returns in the economy depends on the characteristics of the function )(⋅j . The 
characteristics are specified in equation (3.27): 
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From (3.25), (3.26) and (3.27) it becomes clear that a higher level of volatility leads 
overall to a lower real expected return to capital (3.25 and 3.27) and a lower level of 
                                                 
45 See Appendix 1 for the exact specification of those constants. The parameter 
Ω+
=
s
sφ . 
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capital (3.26 and 3.27) – which means the economy is less efficient when subject to 
uncertainty. These are important implications of the model and the )(Tj  function.  
 
But there is more to this model than only the overall economy-wide effects 
represented by the )(Tj  function. Next to those, the model also shows implicitly that 
sectoral re-allocation of resources takes place because we need certainty equivalence 
to be equalised. At a risk-neutral production equilibrium equations, (3.28) and (3.29) 
show that the expected rates of return must be equal in the overall economy: 
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Writing (3.28) and (3.29) in natural logarithms, we get (3.30) and (3.31). Note that we 
use lower case Qp , Ep  and Dp  because now they are the variation in  proportional 
changes in the rate of return. 
 
EEEQE GKEppar =−++−= lnlnlnlnlnln     (3.30) 
DDDQD GKDppar =−++−= lnlnlnlnlnln     (3.31) 
 
Turning to the zero-arbitrage condition for capital in a risk-averse CARA world, with 
help of (3.9), we calculate the expected real rate of return to capital in the two sectors 
where the risk/variance comes from volatility in export prices: 
 
)var(lnlnlnlnlnln EEEQ
CE
E rKEppar ⋅+−++−= ω    (3.32) 
)var(lnlnlnlnlnln DDDQ
CE
D rKDppar ⋅+−++−= ω    (3.33) 
 
Looking carefully at (3.32) and (3.33) we see that volatility in CEr  for both D and E 
comes from volatility in Qp  and Ep  and not from volatility in Dp  nor in the other 
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variables on the right-hand-side.46 And since Qp  shows up equally in both (3.32) and 
(3.33) the difference between the two equations comes from var( Ep ). However, for 
certainty equivalence returns to be equal, this difference must be zero. Rewriting 
(3.32) and (3.33) shows this as follows: 
 
)var(ln EE
CE
E rGr ⋅+= ω        (3.34) 
)var(ln DD
CE
D rGr ⋅+= ω        (3.35) 
 
where from (3.28) to (3.31) it follows that [ ]EE rEG =  and [ ]DD rEG = , at the risk 
neutral production point DE GG = . Therefore, for certainty equivalence arbitrage to 
hold economy-wide we would need )var()var( DE rr ⋅=⋅ ωω .
47 But because 
0)var( =Dr  and 0)var( ≠Er  this cannot hold at the risk neutral equilibrium.  
 
The only way to achieve equal certainty equivalent returns economy-wide is through 
reducing the number of exports because a reduction leads to a higher marginal 
product to the composite good (X - the tradable sector) which is needed to offset the 
reduction in mean returns as a consequence of volatility in the terms-of-trade. In the 
optimum, the tradable sector will shrink exactly enough to raise the expected rate of 
return in that sector to equal the marginal product of capital under certainty plus the 
certainty equivalent (CE). We note here that the entire surplus from the tradable sector 
is allocated to capital for risk compensation which leads to a lower marginal product 
of labour and thus lower wages. Fully in line with the finance literature, this result 
implies that through diversification away from the risky sector, investors decrease the 
variance at the expense of lower mean returns. 
 
                                                 
46 Note that Dp  does not change. The relative price 
M
D
p
p changes but that is due to changes in 
Mp . 
47 The parameter ω is negative, implying that a higher variance (i.e. higher volatility) leads to lower 
returns, which needs to be compensated for by reducing production in the export sector. 
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3.5. Analysis and transition dynamics 
Section 3.2. provides an extensive literature overview on terms-of-trade, economic 
growth, investment and openness. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, the 1-2-3 model has been 
developed and explained. From the final set of equations (3.19 to 3.35) we can draw 
conclusions on the theoretical predictions regarding the effects of volatility in the 
terms-of-trade. This leads us to present the following stylised observations: 
• Observation 1: When the variance in the terms-of-trade increases, according to 
(3.34) there is a decrease in the level of openness of a country.  
• Observation 2: When the variance in the terms-of-trade increases, steady-state 
income levels will be lower as real returns to investors and the equilibrium capital 
stock will be lower according to (3.25) and (3.26). 
• Observation 3: When the variance in the terms-of-trade increases, transitional 
economic growth will be lower. This follows from observation two and the 
transition dynamics of this section. 
• Observation 4: When there is terms-of-trade uncertainty, the expected GDP-
function, responding efficiently to uncertainty, has a lower mean value at any 
point in time compared to a deterministic situation. 
• Observation 5: Given the starting level of real per capita GDP, countries that are 
on low-income trajectories because of terms-of-trade volatility tend to be more 
closed.  
 
Analytically, these observations can be explained with support of figure 3.2. and 
figure 3.3. below (from: Devarajan et al. in Francois and Reinert, 1997). Figure 3.2. 
depicts the situation with full certainty and figure 3.3. shows the situation with terms-
of-trade volatility (uncertainty). 
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Figure 3.2. The 1-2-3 model under certainty (Pareto-optimal). 
 
 
 
Starting from the IVth quadrant in Figure 3.2. the supply side of the economy is in 
steady-state equilibrium (under full certainty) where the tangency of the price ratio 
ED PP / with the domestic production possibility frontier – assumed to be concave 
and specified as a CET function – determines the amounts of domestic (D) and export 
(E) goods produced (equation 3.13). We assume Cobb-Douglas technology in 
producing the goods and show that the share α goes to capital and (1-α) to labour 
(equation 3.14). The returns to labour  and capital in the export sector and domestic 
production sector are the same; that is: DE ww =  and DE rr = . If we assume that the 
trade balance (B) is zero (i.e. there are no capital inflows or outflows) and we 
normalise world prices to one, it is simply a 45° line through the origin as depicted in 
quadrant I. It is important for the analysis to realise that with B=0, the only source of 
foreign capital needed to pay for imports must come from exporting goods. Quadrant 
II shows the optimal consumption situation where the consumers can choose between 
goods that are produced domestically and imports. In the optimum the consumption 
possibility frontier is the image of the production possibility frontier and the tangent 
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between prices of domestic goods over imports ( MD PP / ) to the frontier determines 
how many imports and how many domestic goods are being consumed. Thus in 
equilibrium, the economy would produce in P* and consume in C*. 
 
If we then turn to terms-of-trade volatility, essentially introducing uncertainty into the 
model, we start from the trade balance in quadrant II of figure 3.3. (the link between 
exports and imports!). Imagine lots of volatility around the mean of the terms-of-trade 
all the time. Sometimes the volatility is high, sometimes lower but it is always there in 
an unpredictable fashion. The direct effect of those terms-of-trade shocks is to shift 
the trade balance in quadrant I erratically left and right all the time. At some points in 
time the country can buy fewer imports with the foreign currency earned by exports 
and at other points in time the opposite is true.  
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Figure 3.3. The 1-2-3 model with terms-of trade-volatility. 
                                  
 
                                               
 
Also with uncertainty, prices DP  and EP are a function of the production of the ratio 
of goods produced domestically and good that are exported. With respect to the 
workers in both sectors, again DE ww =  holds. For investors that make investment 
decisions, the picture is now different. Investors in the domestic industry would want 
the marginal product of capital, a, like before.  
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However, risk-averse investors want a compensation above marginal product to 
capital, a* > a to offset the volatility risk in world prices in the exporting sector. 48 
That is: a* needs to be equal to the marginal product of capital under certainty plus 
the certainty equivalent. The only way to do this is to reduce the output of exports, E, 
as a share of gross domestic product which leads to a fall in the ‘price of exports’ 
(Observation 1). This fall is a ‘fall’ in producer price at cost terms which means that 
we could also look at this reduction in exports as a reduction in ‘costs’ and thus the 
appearance of a wedge between revenues and costs: profits.49 It is these profits that 
are the compensation for higher risk for firms in the exporting sector. So relative 
supplies depend on the volatility in the terms-of-trade, shifting demand toward the 
domestic sector and reducing trade as a share of gross domestic product (Observation 
1). The real return to capital is inversely related to the supply of capital – representing 
diminishing marginal returns in the GDP-function – and to volatility in the terms-of-
trade leading to lower steady-state levels of output (equation 3.26 – Observation 2). 
Both the real return to investors ( r ) and the equilibrium capital stock (K) will be 
negatively affected by terms-of-trade volatility (equations 3.25 and 3.26). If the 
steady-state output level is lower because of a lower equilibrium capital stock, then 
the transitional growth levels towards that lower equilibrium must be lower also 
(Observation 3) and the GDP-function is less efficient at any point in time compared 
to a situation characterised by full certainty (Observation 4). Combining Observations 
1, 2 and 3, we derive Observation 5: countries that are on low-income trajectories 
because of terms-of-trade volatility tend to be more closed. So the level of openness is 
endogenously determined through terms-of-trade fluctuations. This means economic 
growth is directly and indirectly (through openness) affected by terms-of-trade 
volatility. The level of openness is endogenous.  
 
Transition dynamics 
Before turning to the empirical part of this paper one important issue needs to be 
addressed. The 1-2-3 model assumes economies to be in steady-state before shocks 
occur (see equations (3.6) and (3.11)). Looking again at the model observations, 
                                                 
48 The assumption of constant absolute risk aversion. 
49 This ‘wedge’ and implicitly the fact that the economy is no longer under Pareto-optimality 
conditions can be seen from the fact that the price line is no longer tangent to the production possibility 
frontier but actually intersects with it. 
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however, we see that the economy is less efficient because of terms-of-trade volatility. 
Lower efficiency shows through the GDP-function that generates lower income levels 
than without risk.50 This is due to the fact that risk-averse investors demand a 
premium, a higher real rate of return (as if it were a greater rate of time discount – 
compare equation (11) in Chapter two of Blanchard and Fischer, 1989) to compensate 
for the higher risk which leads to lower steady state levels of capital per capita and 
income levels per capita. That also implies the transition growth rate must be lower 
than in a world of certainty. On top of that, the collected data in section 3.6 are not 
steady-state data but rather annual measurements. This means we need to look briefly 
at the transition paths of economies towards their steady states – rather than assuming 
they are in a steady state. 
 
In this we follow Blanchard and Fischer (1989) to describe the dynamic system and 
dynamic behaviour of the economy assuming constant absolute risk aversion. The 
change of capital per person over time can be linearised in the neighbourhood of the 
steady state to give an idea about the dynamic behaviour of the economy: 
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According to equation (3.36), on a transition path towards the steady state, there are 
two effects at work.51 Due to terms-of-trade volatility there is a risk premium 
(essentially a deadweight tax) which leads to a lower level of (ultimate) steady-state 
capital, k* and a lower f’(k*). With the CARA assumption and uncertainty, f’(k*) 
leads to a lower rate of change of capital over time: dt
dk  is lower. On the other hand, 
due to higher marginal products in countries with lower starting levels of capital, k, 
far from the steady-state (k - k*) is large and may offset the lower level of f’(k*) 
resulting in a higher level of capital accumulation over time. Noting, however, that we 
have applied linearization of the dynamic system in the vicinity of the steady state, it 
                                                 
50 Even though this lower mean is the most efficient way to react to uncertainty.  
51 Alternatively, the dynamic adjustment may also be modelled as an economy with full capital 
mobility with adjustment costs (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). 
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is safe to argue that the former argument dominates the latter and the overall effect on 
capital accumulation is negative. With a negative overall impact on capital 
accumulation over time, also economic growth on the transition path towards steady-
state – though still growing towards the equilibrium values in the economy – will be 
lower. 
 
3.6. Cross-country regression analysis 
The model makes some interesting theoretical predictions about the relationship 
between terms-of-trade volatility, openness and economic growth. Before we turn to 
methodology and results, let’s look at the data first. 
 
Data 
Our analysis covers the period of 1970 – 2000 from the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods System of exchange rates and the oil crises to the eighties and nineties when 
countries continued to open up and integrate their economies more and more into 
international production networks. We chose this period because there have been clear 
developments in the terms-of-trade volatity (e.g. the oil price shocks in the seventies) 
as well as clear differentiated developments in the level of openness of countries. 
Some – notably the Asian economies – have relied on export orientation as a road to 
development and been successful at it while others – notably many African countries 
– applying import substitution policies have not been so open. Other periods have also 
been looked at by others, for example Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2004).  
 
We have collected data for 53 countries as listed in Appendix 2. Because we are 
looking for overall effects of terms-of-trade volatility we did not split the sample into 
various subcategories. The key variables that we used are the following: 
 
• GDP per capita (at constant 1995 US$). We have used the World Development 
Indicators 2005 of the World Bank for time series on GDP per capita and from 
there calculated the growth rates in GDP per capita per country. Given the time 
span of 1970 – 2000 the data were available for 53 countries (see Appendix 2). 
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• Openness measured as the share of exports of goods and services in GDP 
(X/GDP). Using the World Development Indicators 2005 of the World Bank we 
obtained the time series for 1970 – 2000 for 53 countries. It is the effect of 
openness on economic growth per capita that we are looking for as well as the 
effect on terms-of-trade volatility on the level of openness. 
 
• Terms-of-Trade volatility. Since we are interested in volatility in the terms-of-
trade and not any kind of trend, we first calculated the net barter terms-of-trade 
from the unit price of exports and imports (IMF International Financial Statistics) 
and then regressed the terms-of-trade on time and the square of time: 
 
tttToT εααα +++=
2
321       (3.37) 
  
Thus eliminating a possible trend or cyclical component, the part that was not 
explained, i.e. the short-run volatility around the mean is captured by the variable 
tε  as standard error of the regression. This SE is used as the measure for terms-
of-trade volatility in the subsequent regressions. 
 
• Secondary school enrolment (gross %). In standard growth regressions, human 
capital is an important explanatory variable. Secondary school enrolment is a 
proxy for the level of human capital in the country. The data were obtained from 
the World Development Indicators 2005 of the World Bank. 
 
• Personal freedom and liberties are approximated with the Gastil index that we 
obtained from Freedom House. The index ranges from 1 to 7 where 1 is the higher 
degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. 
 
Empirical strategy 
There are two model predictions that we want to test empirically in this section of 
chapter three: first of all the effect of terms-of-trade volatility on the level of openness 
of a country and secondly the effect of terms-of-trade volatility directly on the per 
capita economic growth rate. The basic empirical specifications look as follows: 
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 (3.38) 
 
ttt TOTVGDPXGDP εγγγ +++= lnlnln 3197021    (3.39) 
 
Because the log-level of openness as well as the log-level of terms-of-trade volatility 
are present in both equations there is interdependence of the two equations. The 
terms-of-trade volatility has an effect on openness and thus on growth and we also 
expect terms-of-trade volatility to have a direct impact on output growth. In order to 
avoid multicollinearity between openness and volatility, we first carry out regression 
(3.39) and use the residuals from openness regression (3.39) (denoted as 
tXGDPR ln_  ) in growth regression (3.38). This way we split the two effects and we 
can look at the coefficients separately: 3γ  measures the effect of volatility on 
openness and 5β  measures the direct effect of terms-of-trade volatility on output 
growth corrected for the indirect effect of volatility on openness. 
 
In order to avoid a problem with possible heteroskedastic properties and 
misspecification because of OLS regression, we also carry out the growth regression 
with robust standard errors.52 
 
Given our model outcomes, ex ante we expect the following results: 
- A negative relation between initial GDP p.c. and GDP growth p.c. because we 
expect poor countries to grow faster than rich ones (based on the conditional 
convergence literature). 
- A positive relation between openness and GDP growth p.c. because trade is good 
for growth and it allows the imports of new technologies and inventions done 
elsewhere in the world. 
- A positive relation between % of secondary education enrolment and GDP growth 
p.c. because investments in human capital make an economy more productive. 
                                                 
52 Ordinary Least Squares estimation leads to overestimation of the error-term in case of 
heteroskedasticity which leads to t-values that are too low. This can be corrected for by using robust 
standard errors. 
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- A negative relation between terms-of-trade volatility and GDP growth p.c. 
because volatility leads to uncertainty and higher ‘costs’ of investment. 
- A positive relation between personal freedom and GDP growth p.c. because more 
freedom means individual thinking and creativity are valued more which is good 
for innovative behaviour. 
- A negative relation between terms-of-trade volatility and openness because we 
expect the tradable sector to suffer more from volatility than the non-tradable 
sector reallocating resources in the economy away from the tradable sector, 
leaving it more closed. 
 
Results 
The results of the regression analyses are shown in table 3.1 and in table 3.2. 
Specifications 3.1.B and 3.2.B are the openness regressions using robust standard 
errors correcting for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 3.1. Regression results ‘Growth Regression’* 
Variable 3.1.A. 3.1.B.  
 
Constant 
 
Ln p.c. GDP1970 
 
R_Ln XGDP 
 
Ln SE 
 
Ln TOTV 
 
Ln PF 
 
5.16** 
(0.077) 
-0.78** 
(0.009) 
0.77 
(0.143) 
1.32** 
(0.016) 
-0.73 
(0.117) 
-0.58 
(0.387) 
 
5.16 
(0.106) 
-0.78** 
(0.019) 
0.77 
(0.144) 
1.32** 
(0.009) 
-0.73* 
(0.093) 
-0.58 
(0.426) 
P-values in parenthesis; R² = 0.30; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level 
 
From table 3.1, column 3.1.B. it becomes clear that initial level of per capita GDP has 
a negative impact on economic growth per capita at the 5%-level (P-value of 0.017). 
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There is a positive effect of openness on growth even though it is not significant. 
Secondary education has a strong positive and significant effect on per capita growth 
in GDP. Terms-of-trade volatility has the expected sign and is statistically significant 
at the 10% level. When running the growth regression again, this time without TOTV, 
the difference is about 4% in the variation in growth rates. This is not a huge direct 
effect of TOTV on GDP growth, but it is significant. 30% of the variation in growth 
rates is accounted for by the explanatory variables. 
 
Table 3.2. Regression results ‘Openness Regression’ 
Variable 3.2.A. 3.2.B.  
 
Constant 
 
Ln GDP1970 
 
Ln TOTV 
 
4.32** 
(0.000) 
-0.17** 
(0.000) 
-0.34** 
(0.001) 
 
4.32** 
(0.000) 
-0.17** 
(0.000) 
-0.34** 
(0.005) 
P-values in parenthesis; R² = 0.36; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level 
 
Our results in table 3.2 column 3.2.B. show that there is a negative and significant 
relation between initial levels of GDP and openness and that there is a negative and 
significant relation between volatility in the terms-of-trade and openness (a P-value of 
0.000). This is evidence that terms-of-trade volatility is a significant determinant for 
openness. Overall we find that 36% of openness is related to the size of the economy 
and terms-of-trade volatility. Only about 5% of this is related to volatility itself. This 
means the volatility – openness – growth mechanism is weak. The direct link between 
volatility and growth is significant at the 10% level with volatility explaining about 
4% of the variation in economic growth rates. 
 
3.7. Conclusions 
Looking at the effect of uncertainty on economic growth, an important factor that 
emerges from the literature is the terms-of-trade. Whether or not there is a trend in the 
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terms-of-trade is still a matter of debate while there is widespread agreement about 
the fact that terms-of-trade volatility has a negative impact.  
 
We show that in a theoretical setting with an Armington model, we expect terms-of-
trade volatility to have a negative effect on economic growth and on the level of 
openness of a country. A higher variance in prices leads to lower steady-state income 
levels because real returns to investors will drop and so will the equilibrium capital 
stock. This means that countries that experience high levels of volatility are expected 
to be on lower transitional growth paths. Given the starting level of real per capita 
GDP, we then find that countries on lower transitional growth paths tend to be more 
closed. 
 
Empirically, we find evidence for a weak indirect effect of volatility on economic 
growth per capita through the level of openness. However, the direct effect matters as 
it can explain around 4% of the variation in growth rates which is not large but 
significant nonetheless. Also our evidence suggests that growth does depend on 
openness and openness does indeed depend on variance in prices. 
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 Chapter 4: The static and dynamic costs of trade restrictions 
 
“I think there is a world market for maybe five computers” 
Thomas Watson, Chairman IBM, 1943 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Empirically, developing countries are largely dependent on R&D efforts undertaken 
in the industrial countries for access to newly developed products and services and the 
availability of quality improvements for existing goods and services (see Coe, 
Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 1997). A few years earlier, Romer (1994) already 
incorporated this aspect of a developing economy in a static model, where he argued 
that the costs of unexpected increases in trade restrictions (estimated using Harberger 
triangles) are smaller than the costs of expected increases in trade restrictions 
(estimated using Harberger and Dupuit triangles), because the latter affects the range 
of goods available in the developing economy.  
 
We provide a dynamic extension of this framework in an endogenous growth setting, 
see Romer (1986, 1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992).53 We analyze a small developing economy which depends on R&D 
undertaken in the rest of the world and introduced on its market for an extension of 
the available range of (intermediate) capital goods. Using the variety approach, the 
introduction of new capital goods is associated with a positive production externality. 
The providers of the capital goods have market power and are therefore able to charge 
a mark-up over marginal costs, allowing them to enjoy positive operating profits if 
they introduce their capital good on the market in the developing economy. They will 
only do so if the discounted operating profits are larger than the introduction costs for 
their particular variety. In general, therefore, only a fraction of all newly invented 
goods in the rest of the world will actually be introduced on the market in the 
developing economy. We analyze how changes in trade policy and various parameters 
affect the share of actually introduced capital goods. This set up enables us to explain 
the level of economic development in a dynamic setting and analyze the static and 
                                                 
53 See van Marrewijk (1999) for an overview. 
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dynamic costs of trade restrictions (Berden and Van Marrewijk, forthcoming JDE 
2007).  
 
Two implications of our model are worth emphasizing from the start. First, the 
estimated static costs of trade restrictions are smaller than the dynamic costs of trade 
restrictions if, and only if, the increase in trade restrictions reduces the share of 
invented capital goods introduced on the market. In this dynamic setting it is therefore 
not the fact that we ignore the Dupuit triangles of newly invented goods in estimating 
the effects of an increase in trade restrictions, as it is in the Romer (1994) model, but 
the fact that an increase in the trade restrictions affects the share of newly invented 
goods not introduced on the market. Second, as a result of the sunk-cost nature of the 
introduction costs, there is an asymmetric adjustment path of the developing economy 
after a change in trade restrictions. An increase in the level of trade restrictions will 
slow-down economic growth and put the economy on a transition path to a new 
balanced growth rate. If the new level of trade restrictions exceeds a critical value, the 
new growth rate will be zero and stagnation occurs. If trade restrictions fall, the 
developing economy may embark on a rapid catch-up process of economic growth by 
benefiting from the backlog of previously-invented-but-not-yet-introduced capital 
goods which may now, as a result of the increase in operating profits resulting from 
the decrease in trade restrictions, be introduced on the market in the developing 
economy.  
 
We believe that the second implication of our model, that a decline in prosperity 
following increases in trade restrictions is more gradual than the potential increase in 
prosperity following reductions in trade restrictions, is in accordance with empirical 
observations. In the period 1973-1991, for example, Maddison (2003) estimates per 
capita GDP in the North Korean economy to be stagnant at $2,841 (in 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars). Arguably, this stagnation is caused by the high 
level of trade restrictions, which makes it unprofitable to introduce newly invented 
goods and services on the North Korean market. Since the rest of the world continues 
to grow in this same time period (by investing in capital, schooling, and R&D to 
develop new goods and varieties or discover quality improvements for existing 
goods), North Korea’s level of income per capita relative to the world average 
gradually declines from 69 percent in 1973 to 55 percent in 1991. The South Korean 
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economy, in contrast, continues to rapidly open up to the world economy in this 
period and experiences an impressive increase in GDP per capita relative to the world 
average, namely from 69 percent in 1973 to 184 percent in 1991. In the absence of 
extreme terms of trade effects and catastrophes, such as wars, floods, and famines, it 
appears that a relative decline in production occurs more gradually than seems to be 
possible in the catch-up process of a relative increase in production. For example, 
seven countries (mostly the ‘Asian Tigers’) have experienced an increase of more 
than 100 percent in per capita income relative to the world average within a 20 year 
period at least once in the last decade of the 20th century.54 Although a similar 
decrease also occurred seven times, this is never due to the size of the contraction of 
economic production, but always the result of a large negative terms of trade effect, 
namely in the price of oil.55  
 
Section 4.2 provides the basic structure of the model. Section 4.3 determines the range 
of invented capital goods actually introduced on the market in the developing 
economy. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 focus on the balanced growth path and the long-run 
implications of changes in trade restrictions. Sections 4.6-4.8 analyze the asymmetric 
transition dynamics and the static and dynamic costs of trade restrictions, followed by 
a brief discussion in section 4.9 and a general summary and conclusions in section 
4.10.  
 
4.2 The model 
Our analysis focuses on a small developing economy which at time t  uses labor )(tL  
and a range (indexed by i ) of different types of capital goods ),( tix  to produce a final 
good )(tY . The set of available capital goods at time t  is denoted by )(tA . We use 
the term capital goods in a broad sense to refer to intermediate goods and services 
used in the production of final goods, that is we employ the Ethier (1982) 
interpretation of a continuous representation of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) constant 
elasticity of substitution variety function (a generalization of Romer, 1994). It is well-
known that, given the claim on real resources, an increase in the number of varieties 
                                                 
54 The countries are: Norway, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
55 The countries are: Venezuela, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Gabon 
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available in the economy will lead to higher productivity through a positive 
externality effect, see van Marrewijk (2002, chs 10, 16). Since our focus is on the 
introduction of new capital goods, we keep the level of employment constant, that is 
LtL =)( . It is, however, straightforward to allow for changes in employment. This 
brings us to the following aggregate production function:56 
 
)1,0(;),(.)(
)(
1 ∈α=
α
∈
α− ∫ ditixLtY
tAi
      (4.1) 
 
The ultimate objective is to explain the level of economic development in a dynamic 
setting and illustrate various types of welfare costs of imposing trade restrictions or 
other impediments to economic interaction with the rest of the world. To do this, we 
have in mind a Romer (1990) or Grossman and Helpman (1991) type endogenous 
growth model giving rise to an ever expanding variety of capital goods in the rest of 
the world. Since the economy we are analyzing is only a small developing economy, 
we make two simplifying assumptions, namely (i) this economy cannot influence the 
economic growth rate in the rest of the world and (ii) this economy does not engage in 
any R&D activity to develop new types of capital goods. As mentioned in the 
introduction to this dissertation, these are exactly the assumptions we generally make 
with respect to developing economies. 
 
Assumption (ii) implies that the small developing economy depends on R&D activity 
in the rest of the world for introducing new types of capital goods, which is in 
accordance with the empirical results of Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997). 
Assumption (i), in combination with the assumption that the rest of the world is on a 
positive balanced growth path, implies that the world’s growth rate of knowledge 
(measured by the total range of invented capital goods )(tN ) is equal to a constant 
0>g , that is:  
 
dtdxxwheregtNtNeNeNtN gtgt /;0)(/)(;)0()( 0 ≡>=≡= &&  
gtgt eNeNtN 0)0()( ≡=        (4.2) 
                                                 
56 The notation .t  signals that the income level may depend on historical developments, see the sequel. 
See Berden and van Marrewijk (2001) for a similar structure to determine active and non-active firms. 
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In general, the range of invented capital goods available to producers in the 
developing country is a subset of the total range of invented goods (assumed to be a 
measurable set), see equation (4.3). The objective of this chapter is to determine the 
size of this subset as a function of trade restrictions and the costs of introducing the 
capital good on the market of the developing country in a small general equilibrium 
model.  
 
[ ])(,0)( tNtA ⊆         (4.3) 
 
Given the range of available capital goods )(tA , the production function exhibits 
constant returns to scale in L  and ),( tix . This allows us to model the production of 
final goods in the developing economy as perfectly competitive, where the producers 
face wage rate )(tw  for the use of labor and prices ),( tip  for the use of capital goods 
),( tix . In equilibrium, profits by the final goods producers are zero, labor’s share of 
income will be equal to α−1 , and in the aggregate the share of income paid for the 
use of all capital goods will be equal to α , see equation (4.4). Moreover, the price 
elasticity of demand for individual capital goods by final goods producers is equal to a 
constant 1>ε , see equation (4.5). 
 
)(),(),(;)()1()(
)(
tYditixtiptYLtw
tAi
α=α−= ∫
∈
    (4.4) 
1)1/(1;),(),( >α−≡εα= ε−ε tipLtix      (4.5) 
 
To determine the range of invented capital goods actually introduced on the market of 
the developing economy, we have to confront the costs and benefits of doing this to 
the inventor of a particular capital good. Starting with the latter, we will assume that 
the monopolistic producer of a capital good (who has the sole property rights to 
selling this good) can produce a unit of the capital good at a constant marginal cost of 
1. To enable us to investigate the dynamic effects of trade restrictions, we will assume 
that the government of the developing country requires a payment of tariff T  for the 
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imports of foreign goods.57 The foreign producers of capital goods take this tariff rate 
as given and assume that it will be applied indefinitely. As a result of the additively 
separable structure of the production function, the demand for a particular capital 
good if it is introduced on the market in the developing economy is stable over time, 
see equation (4.5) and Romer (1994). Since the price elasticity of demand is constant, 
the price of introduced capital goods is a constant mark-up over marginal costs and 
does not change over time, see equation (4.6). Obviously, an increase in the tariff rate 
leads to a higher price charged for the use of capital goods and thus a lower quantity 
demanded. The equilibrium quantity demanded for actually introduced varieties can 
be easily determined by substituting the optimal price (eq. 4.6) into market demand 
(eq. 4.5), see equation (4.7).  
 
0/1)(';)(/)1(),( >α=≡α+= TpTpTtip     (4.6) 
 
0)1/()()(';)()1(),( 2 <+ε−=≡+α= ε−ε TTxTxTxTLtix   (4.7) 
 
As a result of the above, instantaneous operating profits π  for the providers of capital 
goods actually introduced on the market are constant over time, see equation (4.8). 
This means that the present value of operating profits of a capital good introduced at 
time t  and discounted at the interest rate 0>ρ  is equal to the instantaneous operating 
profits divided by the interest rate, see equation (4.9).  
 
ε−−ε +αα−=+−≡π 112 )1()1()()1()()()( TLTxTTxTpT    (4.8) 
 
0)1/()()1()(' <+π−ε−=π TTT  
 
ρπ=τπ∫∞ −τρ− /)()()( TdTe
t
t        (4.9) 
 
Before the owner of capital good i  invented at time t  can reap the benefits of 
discounted operating profits from the market of the developing economy she has to 
                                                 
57 Equivalently, the domestic government could impose a tax on goods produced by foreign companies. 
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introduce this good to the market at a fixed introduction cost ),( tic . This can be the 
cost of setting up a service and parts supply network or the costs of setting up a local 
branch consulting office, etc. We assume these introduction costs may vary for the 
various producers of intermediate goods varieties from a minimum of a  to a 
maximum of b . More specifically, we will assume that these costs are drawn 
independently from a cumulative distribution function F , without mass points and 
with support ],[ ba  (where ba <<0 ), see equation (4.10).  
The decision on whether or not to introduce the newly invented capital good on the 
market in the developing economy is now simple. The answer is yes if the discounted 
value of operating profits is larger than the costs of introduction. Otherwise, the 
answer is no. This decision process is summarized by the indicator function ),( tiI  
defined in equation (4.11), see also (4.3’). 
 
[ ] ,1)(,0)(,,;)(),( ===∈ bFaFbaXxxFcdfwithiidtic   (4.10) 
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{ }1,.)()](,0[)( =∈= iItNitA       (4.3’) 
 
4.3. The range of introduced capital goods 
We are now in a position to determine the range of capital goods introduced on the 
market in the developing economy relative to the total range of invented goods in the 
rest of the world as a function of the trade restrictions T , as summarized by the 
introduction decision of equation (4.11). At each point in time, the growth rate of new 
capital goods invented in the rest of the world is g , implying that )(tgN  new goods 
become available for introduction on the market in the developing economy. Clearly, 
if the discounted value of operating profits ρπ /)(T  is smaller than the minimum 
introduction costs a  none of the new capital goods will be introduced on the market 
in the developing economy. Similarly, if the discounted value of operating profits is 
higher than the maximum introduction costs b  all of the new capital goods will be 
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introduced on the market. The more interesting case occurs, therefore, if the 
discounted value of operating profits is in between these two extremes, that is 
XT ∈ρπ /)( . Since the introduction costs are drawn independently from the same 
distribution function, the law of large numbers, which holds in this continuous 
specification over the number of capital goods and time, ensures that a stable fraction, 
β  say, of the newly invented capital goods will actually be introduced on the market 
in the developing economy. At each point in time, therefore, )(tgNβ  new capital 
goods will be available in the developing economy.  
 
Figure 4.1. Distribution function F  and share of introduced goods β  
Introduction cost distribution function & share of introduced goods
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The illustrated cdf is a beta distribution with support [2,10] and parameters equal to 2.  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the fraction of introduced capital goods β  depends on the 
trade restrictions T  as a function of the operating profits π , the rate of discount ρ , 
and the distribution function F . Suppose the import tax is initially 0T , leading to 
discounted operating profits ρπ /)( 0T . Given enough observations, a fraction 
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( )ρπ /)( 0TF  of the randomly drawn introduction costs will be below the discounted 
operating profit threshold ρπ /)( 0T . All these capital goods will be introduced on the 
market. Similarly, a fraction ( )ρπ− /)(1 0TF  will be above the discounted operating 
profit threshold ρπ /)( 0T . All these capital goods will not be introduced on the 
market. If the trade restriction falls, say to 01 TT < , the discounted operating profit 
threshold will rise to ρπ /)( 1T  and a larger share of newly invented capital goods 
( )ρπ /)( 1TF  will actually be introduced on the market, see figure 4.1. To summarize, 
the share of capital goods actually introduced on the market in the small developing 
economy is equal to: 
 
( )
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0/'''
0'
;/)(
;/)(
;/)(0
,1
,/)(
,0
)(
=β
<ρπ=β
=β

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
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ρπ≡β F
Tbif
bTaif
aTif
TFT   (4.12) 
 
The crucial point is, of course, that the range of introduced new capital goods depends 
negatively on the trade restrictions T , which allows us to investigate both dynamic 
and static welfare costs in the analysis below. This is illustrated in figure 4.2, where it 
is assumed that in the absence of trade restrictions ( 0=T ) all newly invented capital 
goods will actually be introduced on the market in the developing economy.  
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Figure 4.2 Trade restrictions, profits, and the introduction of new capital goods 
Trade restrictions, profits, and the introduction of capital goods
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Note: 05.0,10,5.0 =ρ==α L , for the distribution function see figure 4.1. 
 
An increase in the level of trade restrictions immediately implies a higher price 
charged for the use of capital goods (eq. 4.6), a lower quantity of capital goods used 
(eq. 4.7), and lower profits for the producers of capital goods (eq. 4.8 and figure 4.2). 
Despite the lower profit level, however, the inventors of new capital goods will still 
introduce all of them on the market, provided the trade restrictions are not too high. 
Beyond a critical value of trade restrictions, equal to 25 per cent ( 25.0=T ) in figure 
4.2, some inventors of new capital goods will decide that the costs of introducing the 
capital goods on the market in the developing economy are higher than the discounted 
value of operating profits. The share of actually introduced capital goods then starts to 
decline gradually until a second critical value is reached, equal to 525 per cent 
( 25.5=T ) in figure 4.2, beyond which no newly invented capital goods will be 
introduced on the market. These critical values are, of course, determined by the 
support limits a  and b  of the distribution function in conjunction with discounted 
profits, see equation (4.12). For ease of reference we will call these critical values 
upperT  and lowerT , defined as follows: 
 0)(;)(1 =β⇒≥ρπ≡ − TTTaT upperupper  

1)(0;
1/)0(
,)(
,0
1
=β⇒≤≤
<ρπ
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− TTTotherwise
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b
T
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4.4. Government revenue and welfare 
This section focuses on government revenue and welfare as a function of trade 
restrictions under the assumption that the same policy has been operative indefinitely. 
We therefore assume that the same fraction of capital goods as dictated by the 
function )(Tβ  of equation (4.12) has also been introduced at time 0. The next section 
analyzes transitory dynamics if government policy is changed. Under the simplifying 
assumption above, the share of actually introduced capital goods is constant over 
time. More specifically, if (.)M  is the Lebesgue measure, it follows that: 
 
gtNtNtAMtAMTtNTtAM ==⇒>ββ= )(/)())((/))((0)(;)()())(( &&  (4.13) 
 
The growth rate of newly available capital goods in the developing economy is 
therefore equal to the growth rate g  in the rest of the world for all time periods. This 
allows us to explicitly determine the level of output at any point in time as a function 
of the level of trade restrictions by using equations (4.7), (4.12), and (4.13), see 
equation (4.1’). Since both the use of capital goods x  is a declining function of T  and 
the share of new capital goods introduced on the market is a non-increasing function 
of T , the output level is a decreasing function of the level of trade restrictions.  
 
gtgt eTYeNTTxLTxtAMLTtY )()()()())(()( 0
11
≡β== αα−αα−   (4.1’) 
[ ] 0)()1/()/'()(' <+αε−ββ= TYTTY  
 
In the absence of an efficient tax collecting system, which requires detailed 
information on the inhabitants of a country, their income level, etc., as well as public 
servants gathering and processing information, the governments of many developing 
nations are tempted to collect tax revenue by imposing trade restrictions on the import 
of goods and services.58 Total government revenue G  is equal to the tariff T  
multiplied by the import of capital goods x  and the measure of active firms ))(( tAM . 
As with the income level given in equation (4.1’), this implies that government 
                                                 
58 The government of Swaziland, for example, relied on import duties to collect 55 per cent of total tax 
revenue in 2000 (World Bank Development Indicators CD-Rom 2003). 
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revenue increases exponentially and depends on the level of trade restrictions as 
follows: 
 
gtgt eTGeNTxTTTxTtAMTtG )()()()())(()( 0 ≡β==     (4.14) 
[ ] 0)0(';0)()0(;)()1/()/'()(' 0 >==+ε−ββ+β= GTGGTGTNxTG upper  
 
Figure 4.3 Trade restrictions and government revenue 
Trade restrictions and government revenue
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Note:  10 =N , for the other parameter values see figure 4.2. 
 
From the properties of the government revenue function, it follows that there exists a 
strictly positive level of trade restrictions, ),0(max upperG TT ∈−  say, which maximizes 
the present discounted value of government revenue.59 This is illustrated in figure 4.3. 
Note that for the parameter setting used in figure 4.2 the level of government revenue 
maximizing trade restrictions max−GT  is higher than the level for which the share of 
introduced capital goods starts to decline ( 0>lowerT ). In general, this depends on the 
specific parameters and lowerG TT << −max0  is also possible.  This finding is in line with 
                                                 
59 Alternatively, myopic government revenue maximization (which takes the measure of active firms as 
given) leads to )1/(1 −ε=myopicT , which in general is larger than max−GT  due to the term ββ /'  in 
(4.14). 
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Rodrik (1994) who emphasises the importance of tariffs as a source of government 
revenue. 
 
Figure 4.4 Trade restrictions, optimal welfare, and maximum government revenue 
Trade restrictions, optimal welfare, and max government revenue
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Same parameter values as used in figure 4.3. 
 
Instantaneous welfare W  for the small developing economy is the sum of government 
revenue (eq. 4.14) and labor income (eq. 4.4), see equation (4.15). As explained 
below the equation, given t  instantaneous welfare is a declining function of trade 
restrictions T , where the first inequality follows from ignoring some negative terms, 
after which we use sequentially 1)1( =εα− , the fact that 0Nβ  is equal to the 
Lebesgue measure of active firms at time 0 in conjunction with the second part of 
equation (4.4) while simultaneously using equations (4.6) and (4.7), and again the 
optimal pricing rule given in equation (4.6), leading eventually to the conclusion that 
0)(' <TW .  
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Since total welfare is just the discounted value of instantaneous welfare, the optimal 
policy is to impose no trade restrictions at all, leading to total welfare )/()0( gW −ρ . 
As follows from equation (4.14) and is illustrated in figure 4.4, however, a 
government maximizing the discounted value of government revenue would choose 
the level of trade restrictions 0max >−GT , leading to a sub-optimal outcome in terms of 
welfare. In general, therefore, any government assigning a disproportionate weight to 
the importance of obtaining government revenue from trade restrictions will impose a 
too high level of trade restrictions. In the thought experiment of this section, which 
ignores transition dynamics, the increase in the number of new goods, which is equal 
to the growth rate of the economy, is dictated by progress in the rest of the world and 
equal to g  for all time periods. The next section briefly discusses the long-run 
implications of policy changes along this balanced growth path. Sections 4.6-4.8 
demonstrate not only that the economy will indeed evolve over time towards the 
balanced growth path, but also that the deviation in economic growth rate and the 
level of income can be substantial if we allow for changes in government policy and 
incorporate transition dynamics. Proposition 4.I summarizes the main analytic results 
derived so far.  
 
Proposition 4.I. The balanced growth path of the economy regarding income, 
government revenue, and welfare is given in equations (4.1’), (4.14), and (4.15), 
respectively. Income, welfare, and the share of capital goods introduced on the 
market in the developing economy increase if the level of trade restrictions falls.  
 
4.5. Long-run implications of policy changes60 
As discussed in sections 4.6-4.8 below, the economy will adjust from one balanced 
growth path to another after a change in government policy, where the speed of 
adjustment depends on the size of the policy change as well as its direction. The long-
run implications of the policy change are, however, determined by the new balanced 
growth path, which was characterized in sections 4.3 and 4.4, see equations (4.1’) and 
(4.12)-(4.15). The discussion and exposition in section 4.4 emphasizes the 
implications of a change in the level of trade restrictions. An increase in trade 
                                                 
60 The terms ‘increases’ and ‘decreases’ as used in this section indicate ‘non-decreasing’ and ‘non-
increasing’, respectively. 
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restrictions (i) increases the price of capital goods, (ii) decreases the quantity 
demanded, (iii) decreases the profit level, (iv) decreases the share of capital goods 
introduced on the market in the developing economy, (v) reduces the income level, 
and (vi) reduces the welfare level. The effect of an increase in trade restrictions on 
government revenue is ambivalent. We now briefly review the impact of other 
parameter changes.  
 
Figure 4.5 Effect of changes in the shape of distribution function on β  
Trade restrictions, distribution, and the share of introduced goods
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Beta distribution function parameters are 0.5, 2, and 8; for other parameters see figure 4.3. 
 
The effect of a change in the discount rate ρ  is straightforward. A decrease in the 
discount rate increases discounted profits and therefore the share of introduced capital 
goods. This, in turn, increases the income level, government revenue, and welfare. 
The effect of a change in the distribution function F  is quite similar to a change in ρ , 
as it also only affects the equilibrium through the share of introduced goods. Other 
things equal, a decrease in the lower limit of introduction costs a  or the upper limit of 
introduction costs b  tends to increase the share of introduced goods, which is similar 
to a decrease in ρ . Changes of the distribution function itself (but not its limits) will 
affect the speed with which the share of introduced goods changes as the level of 
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trade restrictions changes, but not the critical values upperT  and lowerT , see figure 4.5. 
The share of introduced goods curve in figure 4.5 could therefore have any smooth 
downward sloping shape, as long as it connects the points )1,( lowerT  and )0,( upperT . In 
contrast to changes in the discount rate and the distribution function, changes in the 
labor force L  affect the equilibrium not only through changes in the share of 
introduced goods but also through other economic variables. Since an increase in the 
labor force increases the demand for capital goods and hence instantaneous and 
discounted profits, this implies an increase in the share of introduced capital goods, 
the income level, government revenue, and welfare.  
 
Figure 4.6 Effect of a change in α  and T  on profitability 
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Parameter values: 05.0;10 =ρ=L . 
 
The effect of a change in α  is a little more involved than the effect of a change in the 
other parameters. On the one hand, an increase in α  increases the importance of 
capital goods in total production and raises the share of income spent on capital 
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goods, thus raising profitability for the capital goods suppliers. On the other hand, an 
increase in α  reduces the firm’s market power, leading to a reduction in the mark-up 
of price over marginal cost and hence profitability. As illustrated in figure 4.6, the 
first effect (increased importance of capital goods) dominates for low values of α , 
such that profits initially rise as α  increases, while the second effect (reduced market 
power) dominates for higher values of α . In short, given T , there exists a critical 
value of α , say )(Tα , such that a rise in α  implies increasing profits as long as α  is 
below )(Tα  and falling profits thereafter. Calculations show that 28.0)0( ≈α , 
0)(' <α T , and 0)(lim =α
∞→
T
T
. The effect of a change in α  on the share of goods 
introduced on the market is basically a truncated translation of the level of discounted 
profitability, see figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.7 Effect of a change in α  and T  on the share of introduced goods  
0
10
0
1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
beta
T
alpha
Share of invented goods introduced 0.9-1
0.8-0.9
0.7-0.8
0.6-0.7
0.5-0.6
0.4-0.5
0.3-0.4
0.2-0.3
0.1-0.2
0-0.1
 
Parameter values: see figure 4.1 and figure 4.6 
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4.6. Policy changes and transition dynamics 
A crucial aspect of this model is the sunk cost nature of the costs of introducing a 
capital good on the market of the developing economy, implying that once such a 
good is actually introduced it will continue to be supplied on the market 
independently of subsequent changes in the level of trade restrictions. This implies 
not only that the income level is path-dependent (hysteresis) but also that the response 
of changes in government policy is asymmetric. We will start our discussion of policy 
changes and transition dynamics with a simple thought experiment. Section 4.7 relates 
this to the static and dynamic costs of an increase in trade restrictions, section 4.8 
analyzes a decrease in trade restrictions, followed by a brief discussion in section 4.9.  
 
Policy change experiment 
Suppose the government of the developing country imposes a tariff level 0T  from 
time 0 to time 1t . We assume that (i) within this time frame it is expected that this 
tariff level will be maintained indefinitely, (ii) initially a positive fraction of newly 
invented goods in the rest of the world is actually introduced in the developing 
country ( upperTT <≤ 00 ), and (iii) the economy is initially on a balanced growth path 
( 000 )())0(( MNTAM ≡β= ). At time period 1t , however, as the measure of active 
firms has increased to 11))(( MtAM ≡ , the government unexpectedly changes its 
policy by imposing a tariff level 1T . We furthermore assume that (iv) the government 
henceforth actually maintains tariff level 1T  indefinitely and (v) it is (perhaps 
surprisingly) immediately expected from time period 1t  onwards that the new tariff 
level will be maintained indefinitely. Obviously, the new level of trade restrictions 
may be either higher or lower than the old level. To analyze the impact of policy 
changes in this thought experiment, the notation +1t  will be used to indicate a rise in 
the level of trade restrictions ( 01 TT > ) and the notation 
−
1t  will be used to indicate a 
fall in the level of trade restrictions ( 01 TT < ). 
 
Section 4.8 will focus on a decrease in trade restrictions. This section analyzes the 
impact of an increase in the level of trade restrictions. Initially, that is in between 
periods 0  and 1t , the economy is on a balanced growth path. The government levies 
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tariff 0T , the active capital goods providers charge price )( 0Tp , and the final goods 
producers demand quantity )( 0Tx  of each capital good. This implies that the capital 
goods producers receive operating profits )( 0Tπ , which they expect to enjoy forever. 
Consequently, of the )(tgN  new capital goods that are invented each period in the 
rest of the world, a constant fraction )( 0Tβ  will be actually introduced in the 
developing economy, such that the income level and government revenue evolve 
according to (4.1’) and (4.14), respectively.  
 
Figure 4.8 Impact of an increase in trade restrictions on the rate of economic growth 
Growth rate of income and real wage rate
0
0.01
0.02
0 20 40 60 80 100time
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
t = t 1
 
Parameter values: 6.0;5.0;10;02.0;05.0;60;8.0 101 =====ρ==α TTtgL , combined with a 
beta distribution function with support [2,10] and parameters equal to 2.  
 
From time period 1t  onwards, the government levies tariff 01 TT > , the active capital 
goods providers charge price )()( 01 TpTp > , and the final goods producers demand 
quantity )()( 01 TxTx <  of each capital good. The capital goods producers therefore 
receive operating profits )()( 01 TT π<π , which we assumed they expect to enjoy 
forever. Regarding the range of active capital goods producers we have to distinguish 
between two groups of producers.  
The first group consists of all capital goods producers who entered the market of 
the developing economy before the policy change at time period 1t . Since the costs of 
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introducing the capital good on the market are sunk costs, they will remain active 
despite the policy change which reduces the discounted value of operating profits. 
Consequently, some of these producers will ex post conclude that they have made the 
wrong decision by introducing the capital good on the market as the discounted value 
of operating profits turns out to be actually lower than the introduction costs.  
The second group consists of all capital goods producers who may enter the 
market of the developing economy after the policy change at time period 1t . They 
know their instantaneous profits are )( 1Tπ  and will enter the market if the discounted 
profits are higher than the introduction costs, as given in equation (4.12). Since at 
each point in time )(tNg  new capital goods are invented in the rest of the world, a 
fraction )( 1Tβ  of these will enter the market of the developing economy from time 
period 1t  onwards. This allows us to explicitly determine the range of active firms 
after the policy change: 
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To summarize, we can now determine the range of active capital goods producers on 
the market of the developing economy, the income level, and the government revenue 
as a function of time if the government increases trade restrictions at time 1t : 
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Note that, because of the sunk cost nature of the introduction costs, the measure of 
active firms does not jump at time period 1t . This does not mean that the number of 
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active firms cannot jump, see section 4.8. After the policy change, the economy 
adjusts over time to a new asymptotic balanced growth path dictated by the new level 
of trade restrictions 1T . This implies an immediate fall in the economic growth rate, 
which then gradually rises back to its pre-policy change level, see figure 4.8. The next 
section discusses the static and dynamic costs of trade restrictions based on the 
adjustment path given in equations (4.16)-(4.18). Proposition 4.II summarizes the 
results of this section. 
 
Proposition 4.II. After an increase in the level of trade restrictions in accordance with 
the policy change experiment, the economy adjusts over time to a new balanced 
growth path. The transition dynamics regarding the number of active capital goods 
producers, the income level, and government revenue after an increase in trade 
restrictions are given in equations (4.16)-(4.18), respectively.  
 
4.7. Static and dynamic costs of an increase in trade restrictions 
The main economic implications of the increase in trade restrictions are illustrated for 
the income level (a perfect measure of the real wage rate in our model) in figure 4.9 
using a logarithmic graph. At the time of the policy change there is an immediate 
reduction in the income level (indicated by the arrow in the figure), not because the 
number of capital goods firms active in the developing economy changes 
instantaneously, but because they all charge a higher price for the use of their goods 
(thus reducing demand and the income level). We will label this the static costs of 
increasing trade restrictions and we will measure it by calculating the reduction in 
income at time period 1t  as a percentage of income before the policy change. (This is, 
of course, the same as calculating the fall in discounted income under the assumption 
that the measure of active capital goods firms grows at the constant rate g  after the 
policy change.) The static costs are equal to: 
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After the policy change, the economy adjusts over time to a new asymptotic balanced 
growth path dictated by the new level of trade restrictions 1T , as illustrated in figure 
4.9. This implies that the economic growth rate falls instantaneously (to half its 
previous level in this case) at time period 1t  and increases gradually thereafter until 
the old growth rate g  is reached asymptotically, see figure 4.8. We will label the 
decrease of income in all time periods after the policy change the dynamic costs of 
increasing trade restrictions. We will measure these dynamic costs as the discounted 
value of the reduction in income after time period 1t  as a percentage of the discounted 
value of income from 1t  onwards without the policy change. With the use of the 
above equations the dynamic costs are: 
(4.20)   
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Figure 4.9 Dynamic effects of an increase in trade restrictions 
Increase in trade restrictions and income (ln scale)
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Parameter values: see figure 4.8. 
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Measuring the static or dynamic loss of an increase in trade restrictions in terms of 
income is equivalent to measuring the static or dynamic loss in terms of the real wage 
rate, see equation (4.4). However, these measures tend to overestimate the welfare 
loss to the small developing economy since the latter should take into consideration 
the change in government revenue from increasing the trade restrictions. Appendix 3 
therefore derives analogous static and dynamic welfare costs in terms of welfare.  
 
Figure 4.10 Static and dynamic welfare and income costs; increase in trade 
restrictions 
Static and dynamic costs of increase in trade restrictions
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Parameter values: 0;02.0;05.0;14;7.0 0 ===ρ==α TgL , combined with a beta distribution 
function with support [2,10] and parameters equal to 2.  
 
Figure 4.10 illustrates the static and dynamic welfare costs, both in terms of income 
and in terms of welfare, starting from an initial position of no trade restrictions 
( 00 =T ). A few things are worth noting. First, to illustrate these losses in a compact 
space, the horizontal axis depicts Te−−1 , which ranges from 0  to 1; it is 0  if 0=T  
and rises monotonically with increases in T  to approach 1 as ∞→T . Second, as 
already noted above, the static welfare costs are lower than the static income costs and 
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the dynamic welfare costs are lower than the dynamic income costs. Third, there may 
be an initial range in which the static costs are equal to the dynamic costs, as is the 
case for the parameter setting illustrated in figure 4.10 for ],0[1 Ce T ∈− − . It should be 
noted that this is not necessarily true for all parameter settings. In particular, it holds 
only if lowerTT <≤ 00 , in which case 0)(' =β T  and all newly invented goods in the 
rest of the world are introduced on the market in the developing economy for all T  
within that range. Fourth, and most importantly, the dynamic costs of an increase in 
trade restrictions are larger than the static costs as soon as lowerTT > . This implies that 
the static costs of imposing trade restrictions, measured by estimating the size of 
Harberger triangles of actually introduced goods on the market, underestimate the 
actual (dynamic) costs of imposing trade restrictions as soon as an increase in these 
costs decreases the share of newly invented goods introduced on the market. In this 
dynamic setting it is therefore not the fact that we ignore the Dupuit triangles of 
newly invented goods in estimating the effects of an increase in trade restrictions, as it 
is in the Romer (1994) model, but the fact that an increase in the trade restrictions 
affects the share of newly invented goods not introduced on the market. As long as 
this share of introduced goods is not affected, as is the case for ],0[1 Ce T ∈− −  in 
figure 4.10, the usually estimated static costs of an increase in trade restrictions are a 
perfect measure for the actual dynamic cost of an increase in trade restrictions.  
 
Proposition 4.III. After an increase in the level of trade restrictions in accordance 
with the policy change experiment, the estimated static costs of trade restrictions are 
smaller than the dynamic costs of trade restrictions if, and only if, the increase in 
trade restrictions reduces the share of invented capital goods introduced on the 
market. 
 
4.8. Reducing trade restrictions: asymmetry in adjustment 
The results discussed in sections 4.6 and 4.7 on the effects of an increase in trade 
restrictions would hold in reverse for a decrease in trade restrictions, that is lead to an 
increase in income and welfare gains mimicking the discussion in section 4.7, if we 
assume that capital goods producers can only enter the market of the developing 
economy at the moment the new capital good is invented, in which case equations 
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(4.16)-(4.18) also hold for a decrease in trade restrictions. This, however, seems to be 
a too restrictive assumption. The crucial difference between an increase and a 
decrease in the level of trade restrictions is that capital goods producers will not 
decide to exit the market once they have entered it if restrictions increase (as 
operating profits are always positive), but may decide to enter the market if they 
earlier opted not to do so if restrictions decrease. This asymmetry has implications for 
the adjustment path of the economy.  
 
Suppose that initially a strict fraction of newly invented goods is actually introduced 
on the market in the developing economy, that is 1)(0 0 <β< T . A decrease in trade 
restrictions 01 TT <  at time 1t  will ensure that from then on a larger fraction 
)()( 01 TT β>β  of all newly invented capital goods in the rest of the world will be 
introduced on the market in the developing economy. However, at time 1t  there is 
also a positive mass of capital goods owners who have decided not to introduce the 
good on the market because the introduction costs were too high compared to the 
discounted value of operating profits ρπ /)( 0T .  Since at time 1t  the range of invented 
capital goods in the rest of the world is equal to 10
gteN , we know that ( ) 100 )(1 gteNTβ−  
of these goods are not available in the developing economy. At the moment of the 
policy change (at time 1t ), a fraction )()( 01 TT β−β  of the total available capital goods 
(so ( ) 1001 )()( gteNTT β−β  varieties) would decide to enter the market if they believed 
the new trade policy to be operative from then on, as we have assumed in section 4.6. 
This implies that the economy immediately jumps to a new balanced growth path if 
trade restrictions are decreased, see equations (4.16’)-(4.18’). This asymmetry in 
adjustment is further discussed in section 4.9. 
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Proposition 4.IV. After a decrease in the level of trade restrictions in accordance with 
the policy change experiment, the economy immediately jumps to a new balanced 
growth path, as summarized by equations (4.16’)-(4.18’).  
 
4.9. Discussion 
Although a policy thought experiment like that introduced in section 4.6 and analyzed 
thereafter is quite commonly used in economic analysis to better understand the 
structure and main implications of a model, it is clear that we should allow for some 
flexibility in interpreting the results. First, policy changes are usually not quite as 
abrupt as analyzed here but changed more gradually, leading to a more gradual 
transformation from one growth path to the other. Second, the assumption that the 
owners of capital goods are initially convinced that the imposed policy will be equal 
to 0T  indefinitely, at time 1t  are taken completely by surprise regarding the change in 
policy to 1T , and from then on are immediately convinced that it will remain 1T  
indefinitely, is questionable. We should, of course, expect the owners of capital goods 
to form expectations regarding all future trade policies before introducing the good on 
the market in the developing economy. A significant change in trade restrictions will 
then only gradually shift their expectations regarding commitment of the government 
to the policy change. As this process takes time, we should again expect a more 
gradual transition process than depicted in figure 4.9 and implied by equations (4.16)-
(4.18) and (4.16’)-(4.18’).  
 
It is relatively straightforward to incorporate expectations into the model. The crucial 
variable is, of course, the expected level at time t  of all future trade restrictions, 
),( tTe τ  say, for t≥τ . Using equation (4.8), we can then derive the expected 
instantaneous profits at time τ  conditional on information available at time t , 
denoted ),( te τπ : 
 
LwheretTtTLt eee
121112 )1(;)),(1()),(1()1(),( −εε−ε−−ε αα−≡θτ+θ=τ+αα−=τπ  
(4.21) 
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This allows us to calculate the expected discounted value of future profits, )(teΠ  say, 
at time t , given the available information at that time. By differentiating with respect 
to t  we can determine how this value evolves over time, as indicated below. 
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where ),(' tTet τ  is the derivative of ),( tTe τ  with respect to t . If the level of trade 
restrictions is stationary, we get ρπ=Π /)()( ttt , see equation (4.9).  
 
Figure 4.11: Catching up in economic prosperity 
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Data source: Maddison (2003) 
 
The limitations above notwithstanding, some crucial implications will continue to 
hold in a flexible interpretation of the model. First, a permanent change in policy will 
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imply a transition from one balanced growth path to another. The long-run 
implications of the policy change can therefore be deduced from changes in the 
balanced growth path, see section 4.5. Second, as long as the share of capital goods 
introduced on the market is affected by the policy change, the static welfare costs 
underestimate the actual (dynamic) welfare costs of an increase in trade restrictions. 
Third, an increase in trade restrictions leads to a welfare loss and a decrease to a 
welfare gain. Fourth, there is an asymmetry in adjustment with respect to increases 
and decreases in trade restrictions. An increase leads to a slow-down in economic 
growth during a prolonged period of time due to the sunk-cost nature of the 
introduction costs. In the most extreme case, no new capital goods are introduced on 
the market, the growth rate reduces to 0 and per capita income is stagnant. Arguably, 
this is what happened in North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s.61 A decrease in trade 
restrictions may result in rapid increases in economic growth rates if the reduction is 
deemed structural and reliable. The primary reason is the availability of a pool of 
capital goods producers (owning ( ) )()()( 101 tNTT β−β  varieties) who previously 
deemed it unprofitable to introduce their good on the market in the developing 
economy and are now standing by to do so, enabling the economy to rapidly catch-up 
to its new balanced growth path.  
 
Figure 4.11 depicts the rapid catch-up processes of Japan and Singapore in the second 
half of the 20th century relative to the benchmark level of the United States. We do not 
want to argue that the model is fully applicable to these two cases as other factors not 
explicitly modeled here have also contributed to their impressive economic growth 
performance, think of capital accumulation, schooling, and the size of the labor force 
(demographic transition).62 However, all these other factors feed into the 
attractiveness of the economy for the catch-up process modeled here: as the labor 
force expands, as capital accumulates, and as schooling improves, the profitability for 
the providers of capital goods and intermediate services rises, such that a larger share 
of varieties will be introduced on the market, which leads to a virtuous cycle of rapid 
                                                 
61 Maddison (2003) reports stagnant per capita income in North Korea from 1973 to 1991. After 1991 
income dropped sharply as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. No reliable data is available 
before 1973, although Maddison reports the South Korean estimates before this time period as a lower 
bound. 
62 It is also clear that both economies became increasingly active in their own R&D projects as income 
rose. 
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economic growth. We should expect that this process comes to a hold once the 
boundaries of the state-of-the-art knowledge are reached, as indeed it did in Japan and 
Singapore. In general, our model predicts that a decline in prosperity following 
increases in trade restrictions is more gradual than the possible increases in prosperity 
following reductions in trade restrictions.  
 
Having discussed North-Korea, Singapore and Japan as case-study examples, we then 
combined Sachs and Warner’s (1995) trade openness indicators with the Maddison 
(2003) per capita GDP data to test our model predictions of an asymmetric adjustment 
process, with a potentially more rapid increase in GDP growth after a decrease in 
trade restrictions than the decrease in GDP growth after an increase in trade 
restrictions. Sachs and Warner classify a country as closed or open based on tariff 
rates, non tariff barriers, a black market exchange rate, a state monopoly on major 
exports, and a socialist economic system. The emphasis in this work is on trade 
liberalization, as it is in Wacziarg and Welch’s (2003) update, who conclude (p. 3): 
“the effects of increased policy openness within countries through time are positive, 
economically large, and statistically significant.”  
 
Using a similar, within-country-through-time analysis, we are equally interested in the 
opposite movement from an open to a closed trading system. Maddison (2003) 
provides GDP per capita data (measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) 
for the period 1950-2001. We analyze the time trend of )/ln( capGDP  for the year of 
the policy change and the 10 years before and after the policy change separately for 
all developing countries going through a regime change as indicated by Sachs and 
Warner for which these data are available, see Table 4.1. There are 15 developing 
countries going from an open to a closed trade regime. The average decrease in the 
time trend of the rate of growth was 0.3 per cent per year. There are 32 developing 
countries going from a closed to an open trade regime. The average increase in the 
time trend of the rate of growth was 1.79 per cent per year. This increase is 
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level, as is the difference between the 
decrease following a rise in trade restrictions and the increase following a decline in 
trade restrictions, thus providing support for an asymmetric adjustment process. 
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Table 4.1. Asymmetric trade policy adjustment (time trend of ln income p.c.) 1950 - 
2001 
 from open to closed* from closed to open** 
Number of observations 15 32 
Average time trend 10 years before 
policy change plus year of policy 
change 
0.0191 0.0053 
Average time trend 10 years after policy 
change plus year of policy change 
0.0162 0.0233 
Average change in time trend -.0030 0.0179 
standard error of change in time trend 0.0076 0.0036 
 
* Sri Lanka (1957), Venezuela (1960), El Salvador (1961), Nicaragua (1961), Costa Rica (1962), 
Guatemala (1962), Honduras (1962), Morocco (1965), Syria (1966), Kenya (1968), Peru (1968), 
Jamaica (1974), Bolivia (1979), Ecuador (1984), Sri Lanka (1984) 
 
 
** Japan (1962), Taiwan (1964), South Korea (1969), Indonesia (1971), Chile (1976), Sri Lanka 
(1978), Botswana (1979), Morocco (1985), Bolivia (1986), Columbia (1986), Gambia (1986), Ghana 
(1986), Costa Rica (1987), Guinea (1987), Guinea-Bissau (1987), Mexico (1987), Uganda (1988), 
Guatemala (1989), Philippines (1989), Tunisia (1989), Benin (1990), El Salvador (1990), Jamaica 
(1990), Paraguay (1990), Turkey (1990), Venezuela (1990), Argentina (1991), Brazil (1991), Hungary 
(1991), Mali (1991), Poland (1991), and Uruguay (1991).  
 
Source: calculations based on Sachs and Warner (1995) and Maddison (2003). 
 
In line with our theoretical approach, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) argue that 
Costa Rica’s 1986 – 1991 trade liberalization was accompanied by a surge in import 
variety, where a one percent larger market is associated with about 0.2 percent more 
varieties and a 1 percent lower tariff with an increase in variety of about 0.5 percent. 
Similarly, Haveman, Nair-Reichert, and Thursby (2003) analyze the effect of tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on international trade flows and argue that higher 
multilateral tariffs tend to shift trade towards larger exporters, which indicates that the 
desire to minimize on the fixed (set-up) costs of trade flows is empirically important. 
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In our approach the benefits of trade are reflected in increases in total factor 
productivity. Pavcnik (2002) analyzes the effect of trade liberalization on plant 
productivity in the case of Chile. Her estimates suggest the existence of increasing 
returns to scale in all sectors and show that productivity of plants in the import-
competing sectors grew 3 to 10 percent more than in the non-traded goods sectors. In 
line with our asymmetry argument she also notes the importance of commitment and 
expectations by arguing that (p.264): 63 “plants might not instantaneously react to an 
implementation in a change in trade policy. ..[but only].. after they were convinced of 
the government’s lasting commitment.”  
 
4.10 Conclusions 
We analyze the static and dynamic costs of a change in trade restrictions for a small 
developing economy which combines labour and (intermediate) capital goods in its 
final goods production process. The economy depends on successful R&D projects 
undertaken in the rest of the world and introduced on its market for an increase in the 
range of available capital goods. Any newly invented capital good is only introduced 
on the market in the developing economy if the (expected) discounted value of 
operating profits is larger than the costs of introduction. Since operating profits 
decline as the level of trade restrictions increases, the share of capital goods 
introduced on the market is a declining function of the level of trade restrictions.  
 
The developing economy evolves over time to a balanced growth path in which 
income, welfare, and the share of capital goods introduced on the market in the 
developing economy increase if the level of trade restrictions falls. The optimal level 
of trade restrictions is therefore zero, while a government wishing to maximize 
government revenue will set a strictly positive level of trade restrictions. As a result of 
the sunk-cost nature of the introduction costs, there is an asymmetric adjustment path 
of the developing economy after a change in trade restrictions. An increase in the 
level of trade restrictions will slow-down economic growth and put the economy on a 
transition path to the new balanced growth rate. If the new level of trade restrictions 
exceeds a critical value, the new growth rate will be zero and stagnation occurs. 
                                                 
63 Berden and Van Marrewijk (forthcoming JDE 2007) provide a brief discussion of expectations in 
this model. 
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During this process the estimated static costs of trade restrictions are smaller than the 
dynamic costs of trade restrictions if, and only if, the increase in trade restrictions 
reduces the share of invented capital goods introduced on the market. If trade 
restrictions fall, the developing economy may embark on a rapid catch-up process of 
economic growth by benefiting from the backlog of previously-invented-but-not-yet-
introduced capital goods which may now, as a result of the increase in operating 
profits, be introduced after the fall in trade restrictions. 
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Chapter 5: Maintenance costs, obsolescence, and endogenous growth 
 
“Our whole economy is based on planned obsolescence”  
Brooks Stevens, Industrial Designer 
 
5.1 Introduction 
An important issue for growth theory is the relationship between the resources spent 
worldwide on research and development (R&D) and the number of inventions and the 
introduction of new types of goods and services to satisfy customer and client needs. 
Innovation is undoubtedly very important in today’s world. However, one may 
wonder how many of the inventions and discoveries from the time of Napoleon we 
still cherish today? New management techniques appear, for example, to support the 
organizational structure and management information processes of firms, and 
disappear again once they are replaced by even more up-to-date techniques.  
 
Endogenous growth models – both the AK-type of models of Romer (1986), Lucas 
(1988) and Rebelo (1991), and the R&D-type models of Romer (1990), Grossman & 
Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) – investigate the relationship 
between innovative behavior and economic growth. In contrast to exogenous growth 
models, inventions are not a function of elapsed calendar time, but the result of 
conscious decisions to invest in R&D, arising from people's inspiration and 
perspiration. Within the widely used framework of expanding product variety, the 
phenomenon of obsolescence is disregarded. Aghion and Howitt (1998, p.39) argue 
that "in order to formalize the notion of (technical or product) obsolescence, one 
needs to move away from horizontal models of product development à la Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) into vertical models of quality improvements." Also Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, p.46) say: “[The] … complete symmetry between new and old 
commodities eliminates any possibility of product obsolescence”. Many authors, like 
Hsieh (2001), Barreto and Kobayashi (2003), Boucekkine et al (2004), have indeed 
followed this line of research. Although vertical models of quality improvements are 
constructed to deal with the obsolescence phenomenon, we disagree with Aghion and 
Howitt's statement as such, by analyzing the role of obsolescence if we incorporate 
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maintenance costs in the canonical model of horizontal product differentiation (see 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991, ch. 3). In this aspect, our modeling of ‘obsolescence’ 
in an endogenous growth setting differs from the endogenous growth model with 
embodied technical change developed by Krusell (1998) and Hsieh (2001), the one-
sector model of growth constructed by Aznar-Marquez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2001), and 
the approach of Boucekkine et al. (1997, 2004) and Greenwood et al. (1998) who 
view the obsolescence mechanism as related to investment-specific technical change. 
 
Evidently, new products – that is goods, services, or production processes – become 
obsolete over time. The early maritime industry in New England, for example, which 
had nothing much useful to do in the winter time, used to cut ice from frozen rivers 
and lakes, store it underground, and ship it to India. It has now been replaced by 
refrigerators. Other examples of once useful but now obsolete items in advanced 
societies are buggy whips, slide rules, oil lamps, and the telegraph. We argue that the 
rate at which inventions become obsolete over time is influenced by the degree of 
maintenance costs. A line of reasoning, supporting by McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) 
who show that for Canada a substantial share of GDP is spent on repair and 
maintenance activities. Gylfason and Zoega (2001) also – from an empirical 
viewpoint – investigate the relationship between per capita income and the 
depreciation rate. The term maintenance costs should be interpreted in a broad sense 
and can refer to both technical and economic obsolescence.  
 
Some examples of maintenance costs are: 
Costs of preventive maintenance. To prevent machinery from breaking down too 
frequently, preventive maintenance is carried out. The most important costs of 
preventive maintenance is usually not the cost of labor involved in the maintenance 
process, nor the parts that need to be replaced, but the fact that the machinery is not 
productive during the maintenance process. Over time, as the machine-park is getting 
older, preventive maintenance will be carried out more often. Box 5.1 confirms the 
presence of preventive maintenance costs and their relevance in the airline industry: 
Airbus developed its maintenance system AIRMAN in order to save on preventive 
maintenance of the airplane fleet. 
Costs of (emergency) repair maintenance. Despite the fact that preventive 
maintenance is carried out more frequently as the production process ages, every now 
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and then a machine will break down and has to be fixed again. The fact that the 
production process is stopped represents the highest costs. In most cases, non-
scheduled repair maintenance is more costly than preventive maintenance. Moreover, 
the older the production process, the higher the breakdown frequency. 
 
Costs of updating the production process. The introduction of new production 
techniques or a different marketing strategy frequently requires changes or 
adjustments in the production process. Such changes are more likely to occur if the 
production process has been operative for some time, as new production techniques 
become available and changes in consumers' preferences and demands require an 
adjustment of the marketing strategy. 
 
Cost of replacing part of the production process. In many cases, only part of a 
production line, rather than the entire production process, is replaced. Nonetheless, 
this frequently means that the whole production process is stopped. The older the 
structure of the production process, the larger the possibility that part of the line will 
have to be replaced, and thus the larger the fraction of time the machinery is not 
productive. 
 
Costs of better alternatives. A clear example of economic maintenance costs is 
represented by the arrival of better alternative ways of production or organizing the 
production process, which makes the old production technique more expensive in 
terms of income foregone. The more alternatives arise, the higher the likelihood that a 
production process is replaced by a better one. 
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BOX 5.1. Airbus’ AIRMAN (AIRcraft Maintenance ANalysis) 
 
The airline industry is one in which large-scale investments are needed in order to 
operate a fleet of aircraft successfully. Planes are expensive to purchase but more 
costs soon follow: maintenance costs of various types. Firstly, aircraft are subject to 
preventive maintenance following IATA rules and regulations in order to keep flying 
the safest mode of transport. Secondly, airplanes will have to be repaired if any part 
does not work, does not function as intended or gets damaged during a flight. 
“Aircraft maintenance costs are high and only increase over time when the aircraft 
gets older”, according to Mr. Darteyre of Airbus. 
 
To address the issue of 
maintenance costs, Airbus 
has developed a new 
system designed to help the 
airline industry keep them 
low: the AIRcraft 
Maintenance ANalaysis, 
AIRMAN for short. And 
the system is popular: 
“Virgin Atlantic Airways 
has signed agreements for 
two of Airbus’ support software, AIRMAN and ADOC. The combined use of these two 
systems should optimize Virgin’s aircraft maintenance and lead to considerable 
savings”. AIRMAN collects and structures on-board maintenance messages, helps 
line mechanics with trouble-shooting and provides daily lists of preventive 
maintenance measures. The hangar and on-flight maintenance system also feeds 
directly back to Airbus that can then monitor every sold aircraft worldwide. “Overall 
benefits of AIRMAN are around $4,- per flight hour,” says Mr. Darteyre, “making 
sure our Airbus planes are safer and more economical for a longer period of time”. 
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5.2 The model 
We extend the Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 3) model of horizontal product 
differentiation to incorporate maintenance costs. Labor, the only factor of production, 
is used for maintenance, to produce goods, and for R&D. The returns to R&D arise 
from monopoly rents in imperfectly competitive product markets. 
 
Consumer behavior 
The representative consumer maximizes utility U over an infinite time horizon, using 
preferences as given in equation (5.1). The term )(τD  represents an index of 
consumption at time τ , and ρ  is the discount rate.  
 
( )∫∞ −=
t
dDetU ττρτ )(log)(        (5.1) 
 
The index D reflects a taste for diversity in consumption, based on the Dixit-Stiglitz 
(1977) approach of horizontal product differentiation. We take the product space to be 
continuous. Preferences are defined over an infinite set of products using the index j. 
At any moment, only a subset of these varieties is available, identified by )(τA , 
which indicates the set of firms active in period τ. The set of available products will 
expand as a result of innovation, and contract as a result of obsolescence. The 
households can purchase at time τ  all products of active firms at time τ . Using the 
Dixit-Stiglitz specification, we let );( τjx  denote the consumption of brand j at time 
τ  and define the elasticity of substitution between two products 1)1/(1 >−≡ αε , to 
define the index D as:64 
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64 An alternative interpretation, in which the index D is production and the varieties x are intermediate 
goods, is provided by Ethier (1982). 
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A household spending an amount )(τE  at time τ  maximizes instantaneous utility by 
purchasing the number of units of brand j given in equation (5.3), where );( τjp  is the 
price charged by firm j at time τ . 
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The demand for a variety features a constant price elasticity of demand ε  and unitary 
expenditure elasticity. It can thus be aggregated across consumers to arrive at 
aggregate demand, where E  represents aggregate spending. Defining an exact price 
index (see Appendix 5.A.), the consumer's intertemporal optimization problem given 
in equation (5.1), under a budget constraint that allows borrowing and lending at the 
interest rate )(τr , implies that the growth rate of spending is equal to the difference 
between the interest rate )(τr  and the discount rate ρ , that is ρτττ −= )()(/)( rEE& , 
where an overdot indicates the rate of change over time. Following Grossman and 
Helpman by normalizing aggregate spending to unity, that is 1)( =τE  for all τ , 
implies that the interest rate is equal to the discount rate, that is ρτ =)(r  for all τ . 
 
Producer behavior 
As indicated above, producers participate in three types of activities. First, they 
manufacture the varieties that have been developed in the past. Second, they spend 
resources on R&D in order to invent and introduce new varieties. Third, and most 
important for obsolescence, they have to maintain the production process in working 
condition. 
 
Manufacturing  
Each variety is produced by a single atomistic firm under constant returns to scale65. 
By choice of units, it requires one unit of labor to produce one unit of good x. To 
maintain the production process in working condition, each active firm has to incur a 
fixed labor cost. As explained in the introduction, the maintenance costs arise as a 
                                                 
65 This assumption can be justified in two ways. First, one could argue that inventions are protected by 
infinitely lived patents. Second, if imitation is costly and firms engage in ex post price competition, the 
imitator would earn no profits and consequently would not be able to recuperate its costs made. 
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result of preventive maintenance, repair maintenance, updating, replacement, and the 
arrival of better alternatives. Following Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991), we assume that part of the knowledge created in the economy, as measured by 
the range of active firms, results in non-appropriable benefits in other sectors of the 
economy. In particular, there are positive knowledge spill-overs for maintaining the 
production process at the time of invention and introduction of a new variety66. As a 
result, the fixed maintenance costs in terms of labor, which depend on a parameter b, 
are inversely related to the range of active firms at the time of invention of the good. 
If we let )(τw  be the wage rate at time τ  and (.)m  denote the Lebesgue measure, 
such that ))(( τAm  measures the range of active firms at time τ , then the operating 
profits );( tj τπ  for firm j at time τ  producing a variety invented at time t is given by:  
 
))((
)();()();();();(
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τ
τττττπ −−=     (5.4) 
 
Profit maximization and obsolescence 
The monopolistic producer maximizes the operating profits, given the demand for its 
variety as derived in equation (5.3). Since the price elasticity of demand ε  is 
constant, this results in the well-known constant mark-up over marginal cost: 
 
)(/)();(),();()/11( ταττττε pwjporwjp ≡==−    (5.5) 
 
Note that the optimal pricing rule is the same for all active firms at time τ , and 
independent of the time t of invention of the variety. All firms active at time τ  will 
therefore sell an equal quantity of goods, and receive the same revenue. In view of the 
normalization of expenditure, we can therefore calculate the operating profits for all 
firms active at time τ with a variety invented at time t: 
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66 We hereby do not go into recent literature on the downside effects of knowledge spillovers 
(Alsleben, 2005) or the inter-firm R&D types of cooperation (Hinloopen, 2003). 
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Naturally, the firm will only produce its variety invented at time t if the operating 
profits at time τ  are positive. Equivalently, the firm will stop production if the 
operating profits become negative. Using the terminology of Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) and Pindyck (2004), the maintenance costs are therefore fixed costs, whereas 
the costs of inventing the variety are sunk costs. This allows us to determine the range 
of active firms at time τ  using the indicator function ),( sI A τ , defined to be equal to 1 
if a firm producing a variety invented at time s−τ  is still active at time τ , and 0 
otherwise.67 
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Note that a firm with a variety invented at time t seizes to be active if the measure of 
active firms relative to the time of its invention exceeds a threshold level. If the range 
of active firms is non-decreasing and the wage rate is constant, as will be the case 
below, then the flow of firms from active to obsolete is on a first-in-first-out basis 
(FIFO). Equation (5.7) is called the obsolescence criterion. 
 
 
 
The capital market 
The profits generated in equation (5.6) go to the shareholders of a firm (for example 
in the form of dividends). If the stock markets correctly price the firms, the stock 
value ),( stv  at time t of a firm producing a variety invented at time s equals the 
present discounted value of its future stream of profits.68  In view of our 
normalization, which implies ρτ =)(r , it is equal to:  
 
∫∞ −−=
t
t dsestv ττπτρ ),(),( )(        (5.8) 
                                                 
67 Obviously, operating profits ),( sτπ in equation (5.6) are defined to be 0 if the firm is not active. 
68 As Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 50) note, this is not an assumption but an equilibrium condition 
in a perfect foresight model with infinite lived households maximizing lifetime utility, since 
speculative bubbles cannot arise. The presentation in the text is somewhat simpler.  
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Recall that an overdot indicates the rate of change over time of a variable. If there are 
two time indices, as occurs frequently in the presentation since we have to distinguish 
between the time at which a firm is active and the time of invention of the variety, we 
let a sub-index denote the time index. Differentiating equation (5.8) with respect to 
time t gives: 
 
),(),(),( ststvstvt πρ −=&        (5.9) 
 
This represents a 'no-arbitrage condition' on the capital market, since the sum of the 
profits plus the capital gains are equal to the yield on a riskless loan.  
 
Research and development 
An entrepreneur can add to the range of active firms by inventing a new variety, 
which requires a finite amount of labor invested for a brief period of time into R&D. 
There is free entry and exit of entrepreneurs into the R&D sector. Following, for 
example, Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), R&D generates not only 
new varieties, the revenues of which are appropriated by the entrepreneur through 
claims on the future stream of profits generated by the firm, but also positive 
knowledge spill-overs in the form of increases in the general stock of knowledge. In 
our specification, these knowledge spill-overs reduce the amount of labor required for 
developing new varieties and for the maintenance of new varieties. It is well-known 
that the growth rate of the economy would stop without such beneficial knowledge 
spill-overs. See Van Marrewijk (1999) and Funke and Strulik (2000) for a general 
discussion of the literature. If we let )(tN  denote the range of all varieties invented up 
to time t, we assume therefore that an entrepreneur denoting )(tLn  laborers to R&D 
for a time period dt  develops dtatLtAmdN n ]/)())(([=  new products. The costs of a 
new blueprint at time t are therefore equal to ))((/)( tAmtaw . Given free entry and 
exit in the entrepreneurial market at time t, these costs must be at least as high as the 
value ),( ttv  at time t of developing a new variety: 
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Labor market equilibrium 
Finally, we turn to the labor market equilibrium. The labor force is active in three 
types of activities. There is labor demand nL  to develop new varieties in the R&D 
sector, labor demand xL  for the production of goods, and labor demand mL  for the 
maintenance costs. The constant labor supply L  is provided perfectly inelastic. 
Equilibrium in the labor market therefore requires 
 
LLLL mxn =++         (5.11) 
 
First, note that the required number of R&D laborers depends on the speed NN /&  
with which new products are developed: ))(/)(/( AmNNNaLn &= . Second, note that 
each firm sells )(/1 Apm  units of goods. Since m(A) firms are active, they need 1/p 
units of production labor. Third, note that if a firm with a variety invented at time 
τ−t  is still active at time t, the maintenance labor requirement for that firm equals 
)((/ τ−tAmb . Since the number of such firms depends on the speed at which new 
varieties were developed at time τ−t , there are atAmtLn /))(()( ττ −−  such firms. 
The total maintenance labor required for firms still active at time t with a variety 
invented at time τ−t  is therefore abtLn /)( τ−  units. Using the indicator function 
),( τtI A  defined in equation (5.7), it follows that the total maintenance labor 
requirement at time t is given in equation (5.12). The labor market clearing condition 
is therefore given in equation (5.11') 
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This completes the description of the model. 
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5.3 Derivation of balanced growth equilibrium 
We want to discuss some aspects of the model by analyzing a balanced growth 
equilibrium in which the measure of active firms grows at a constant rate g, that is 
gtemtAm 0))(( = . The distribution of labor over the three types of activities, 
production, maintenance, and R&D, will be constant in the balanced growth 
equilibrium. This implies, as the appendix shows, that the wage rate w is constant 
over time, which implies in turn, using the mark-up pricing rule, that the price p 
charged for a variety of a good is constant as well.  
 
Obsolescence and active production 
Combining the constant growth rate g of the number of active firms and the constant 
wage rate w with the obsolescence criterion derived in the previous section allows us 
to explicitly calculate how long a variety invented at time t will be actively and 
profitably used. Recall equation (5.6) on the operating profits for all firms active at 
time τ with a variety invented at time t (using the fact that the wage rate w will be 
constant): 
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Clearly, the first part of the operating profits on the right-hand-side of equation (5.6') 
will decrease slowly over time as the number of active firms on the market is 
expanding. In contrast, the second term on the right-hand-side of equation (5.6'), 
representing the costs of maintenance, is constant. The value of this constant depends 
on the number of active firms on the market at the time of the invention of the variety. 
These costs are therefore lower the newer the production process. As described in the 
introduction, the maintenance costs are therefore higher for older production 
processes. As soon as the first part of the operating profits is not high enough to 
recuperate the maintenance costs, the firm will stop the production process. If the 
growth rate of the number of active firms is g, it is straightforward to calculate the 
number of time periods f in which the firm will actively produce a new variety using 
equation (5.6'), which gives 
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The explicit definition in equation (5.13) of the time period f as a function of the 
growth rate g and the wage rate w serves as a reminder that we still have to 
(endogenously) determine the value of these variables. Note also from equation (5.13) 
that, other things equal, the period of active production f is longer: 
The lower the growth rate g. If the growth rate g of the number of active firm 
falls, the firm's profits are less rapidly eroded, which means that the firm can stay in 
business for a longer period of time. 
The lower the maintenance cost parameter b. The firm is ultimately driven out of 
business because the maintenance costs become too high relative to the revenue 
generated by the mark-up over marginal costs. Clearly, therefore, if the maintenance 
cost parameter b falls, the firm can stay in business for a longer time period. In the 
limit, as b approaches 0, the firm can stay in business indefinitely. 
The lower the wage rate w. The maintenance costs are directly influenced by the 
wage rate. A fall in the wage rate therefore allows the firm to stay in business for a 
longer time period by reducing the maintenance costs. 
The lower the elasticity of substitution parameter α  (equivalently, the lower the 
price elasticity of demand ε ). If the different varieties are less perfect substitutes for 
one another, that is if the elasticity of substitution falls, the firm is able to charge a 
higher mark-up over marginal costs, which increases its operating profits. Again, this 
allows the firm to stay in business for a longer time period. 
 
LE line (Labor market Equilibrium) 
The labor market equilibrium is already given in equation (5.11'). We can simplify 
this equation considerably along a balanced growth path in which the growth rate g of 
the number of varieties N ever invented is equal to the growth rate of obsolete 
varieties and the growth rate of the number of active firms. Since 
))(/)(/( AmNNNaLn &= , this implies that the labor input in the R&D sector is 
constant because gNN =/&  and the ratio )(/ AmN  does not change. This ratio is of 
course determined by the obsolescence criterion, which, as a result of the first-in-first-
out nature of the number of actively produced varieties, simplifies to: 
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Using equation (5.13) and (5.7’), it therefore follows that along a balanced growth 
path, the range of active firms is given by: 
).1)(()()())(( gfetNftNtNtAm −−=−−=  The above mentioned ratio of invented – 
to – active varieties is equal to )1/(1)(/ gfeamN −−= , implying that 
)1/( gfn eagL
−
−= . Determining the number of production workers is trivial since the 
wage rate is constant, such that wpLx //1 α== . As for the demand for maintenance 
workers, using (5.7’) in equation (5.12) and recalling that the number of workers in 
the research and development sector is constant, given the number of maintenance 
workers: 
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Using the demand for nL  derived above and the definition of ),( wgf  given in 
equation (5.13), it follows that ( ) [ ]bwebL fgm /)1(ln)1/( α−−= − . Equating these 
demands for labor to the supply of labor gives the Labor Equilibrium line:  
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IE line (Innovation Equilibrium) 
Now that we know from equation (5.13) the time period f during which the firm will 
be able to actively produce its goods and reap positive operating profits, we can also 
determine the present value of the stream of future profits, which determines the value 
of the firm for a variety invented at time t: 
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Note that the value of the firm at the time a new variety is invented is inversely 
related to the number of active firms on the market at that time. Innovation takes place 
at time t if equation (5.10) holds with equality. Since the costs )(/ Amaw  of inventing 
a new variety are also inversely related to the number of active firms at time t, this 
term drops out. Substituting equation (5.8'), in equation (5.10) gives the Innovation 
Equilibrium line: 
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In figure 5.1, the IE-line is shown in (g,w)-space. Note that the innovation equilibrium 
line can only be written as an implicit function (except when 0=b , see the next 
section). As is clear from the first part in square brackets on the right-hand-side of 
equation (5.15), an increase in the growth rate g erodes the operating profits more 
quickly, and thus reduces the profitability of new inventions. To restore the 
innovation equilibrium, the costs of inventing a new variety, as determined by the 
wage rate, will have to fall. Consequently, the innovation equilibrium is a downward 
sloping line in (g,w)-space. Figure 5.1 shows two IE lines. The first line, labeled "b = 
0" displays the innovation equilibrium if there are no maintenance costs. This line 
therefore corresponds to the Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 3) model. The second 
line, labeled  "b = 0.3" shows that, other things equal, the growth rate of the economy 
will fall if the profitability of R&D falls as a result of the costs of maintaining the 
production process, as indicated by the arrow in figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: Innovation Equilibrium (IE line)* 
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*Other parameters: 1;4;12;6.0 ==== aL ρα  
 
A balanced growth equilibrium exists if equations (5.14) and (5.15) hold, that is for 
combinations of the wage rate w and the growth rate g for which the innovation 
equilibrium and the labor equilibrium hold simultaneously. 
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Box 5.2. Replacement Killers – the Lipstick Effect 
 
The ‘lipstick effect’ refers to a theory that during a recession women substitute small, 
feel-good items (like lipstick) for bigger items like clothing. Indeed during the 2001 
recession we saw lipstick sales rise by 11%. However, the rise in 2001 was slightly 
disappointing, i.e. the lipstick effect seems to be wearing off. And the reason for that 
is that a recent increase in new types of lipstick has included a lipstick capable of 
staying on as long as eight hours! So replacing lipstick has become less necessary 
than in the 1980s. 
 
What is important is that the lipstick effect is not just a problem for Estée Lauder, but 
rather for the entire economy. It depends on the effect of a technological innovation: 
some innovations make a product more powerful (e.g. personal computers) thus 
increasing the rate of obsolescence of older versions; i.e. economic maintenance due 
to the appearance of better alternatives. But some make a product more durable, 
therefore decreasing the rate of obsolescence (which goes against the argument of 
‘planned obsolescence’ whereby firms deliberately force consumers to replace them 
more often).  
 
Which effect dominates is hard to tell and the effects may well cancel each other out. 
However, in a recession – when consumer spending drops rapidly – the need to 
replace goods because of obsolescence may be the only thing that keeps them 
spending. Does that mean recessions will last longer in the future due to lack of 
consumer spending? 
Source: The New Republic (31/12/2001) 
 
5.4 Maintenance costs and the balanced growth equilibrium 
As derived in section 5.3, the balanced growth equilibrium is determined by the point 
of intersection of the labor market equilibrium and the innovation equilibrium, as 
given in equations (5.14) and (5.15), respectively. Obviously, an equilibrium is only 
economically useful if it is in the first quadrant, such that the wage rate and the 
growth rate of the economy are both positive. Otherwise, the equilibrium growth rate 
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of the economy is zero, innovation does not take place, the share of active firms is 
constant, and firms produce forever. 
 
Balanced growth without maintenance costs 
In the absence of maintenance costs, that is if 0=b , it follows that ∞=),( wgf  and 
the LE line and the IE line simplify to equations (5.14’) and (5.15’) respectively: 
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Solving these equations leads to αρα −−=
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is identical to the solution in Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 3 with knowledge 
spillovers). 
 
To analyse the properties of the balanced growth equilibrium it is useful to define the 
auxiliary variable bwez fg /)1( α−=≡ , where the second equality follows from 
equation (5.13). The natural logarithm of z therefore indicates the time a variety is 
actively produced times the growth rate of the economy. Noting that 
zze fg /)1(1 −=− − , that 1>z  for an interior solution, and that bzw /)1( α−= , 
equations (5.14) and (5.15) change to: 
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Note that the function )(zh  (i.e. the LE-line) is bounded from above by 
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This is illustrated in figure 5.2 in (g,z)-space. 
 
Figure 5.2: Labor equilibrium line* 
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Figure 5.2 shows that with a rising value of z, the growth rate initially increases 
sharply, reaches a maximum and then starts to drop until eventually, when z is 
sufficiently large, the growth rate becomes zero.69 Also in figure 5.2, the linear 
approximations show how the LE-line is bounded from above for any value of b.  
 
                                                 
69 It will not become negative since firms in that case will opt for no longer producing the variety which 
leads to zero-growth. 
LE 
LE2 
 128 
The LE-line is the one with lower maintenance costs. When maintenance costs are 
increased from 0.008 to 0.01 (LE = 0.008 and LE2 = 0.01), we observe that the LE-
line shifts downwards to LE2, i.e. for the same value of the auxiliary variable z, the 
growth rate has dropped.70 This is in line with (5.14) and (5.16) and intuitively 
understandable: when maintenance costs rise, there are less resources available for 
growth (R&D) or production which leads to a lower growth rate. 
 
The IE-line in (g,z)-space 
In (g,z)-space, for 0=g , the IE line starts at 1/1 >+ baρ  and is bounded from 
below. The IE-line is upward sloping in (g,z)-space because a rise in z because of 
lower maintenance costs ceteris paribus or because of lower wages – representing 
lower costs for R&D – leads to higher economic growth. That is so, because the 
number of time periods a firm will actively produce a new variety will rise because 
the maintenance costs drop relative to the revenue generated by the mark-up over 
marginal costs, i.e. the firms are not so quickly driven out of business.  
 
Impact of maintenance costs and obsolescence 
To discuss the impact of positive maintenance costs and obsolescence, we compare 
the balanced growth equilibrium of equations (5.14) and (5.15). In the presence of 
maintenance costs, we can distinguish between three different effects. First, as 
discussed in section 5.3, a drop in the maintenance costs b implies that less workers 
have to maintain the production processes in working condition, such that more 
workers are available for research and develop new varieties. This shifts the labor 
market equilibrium line in figure 5.3 up from LE to LE2 (like in figure 5.2) such that 
the equilibrium moves to the right, with a higher growth rate and a higher value for z. 
At the same time, if a lower share of the firms becomes obsolete because of lower 
maintenance costs, the productivity of the labor force for research and maintenance is 
increased. This effect simultaneously shifts the labor market equilibrium line up and 
leads to a higher value for z as well as a higher growth rate. Third, a decrease in the 
maintenance costs increases the firm's profitability, which shifts the innovation 
equilibrium line down from IE to IE2 in (g,z)-space, moving the equilibrium even 
further to the right. The value for z and the growth rate of the economy are therefore 
                                                 
70 Note that also the bound from above has dropped accordingly. 
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higher as a result of lower maintenance costs and obsolescence. This follows from 
(5.13), (5.16) and (5.17). 
 
Figure 5.3: Impact of lower maintenance costs* 
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So when, as illustrated in figure 5.3, maintenance costs drop, the LE-line rises and the 
IE-line drops. This leads to an increase in the value of our auxiliary variable z and the 
growth rate, g. The latter is not immediately obvious from figure 5.3 so we will come 
back to this in the next section. 
 
The equilibrium as a function of maintenance costs 
The discussion above, illustrated in figure 5.3, gives only the results of two balanced 
growth equilibria. We argue that an increase in the maintenance costs will decrease 
the growth rate of the economy. To get a better view of this claim, we ran many 
simulations and calculated the equilibrium of figure 5.3 for many different values of 
the maintenance costs b. The results are depicted in figure 5.4, with the maintenance 
costs and growth rates on the axes.  
 
LE 
LE2 
IE 
IE2 
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Figure 5.4: Balanced growth and maintenance costs I* 
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Figure 5.4 depicts all equilibrium combinations in (b,g)-space. When maintenance 
costs are zero, economic growth maximal (in this setting around 0,23) and the 
auxiliary variable, ∞→z . This outcome is identical to the Grossman-Helpman result 
(Grossman & Helpman, 1991, Ch. 3). As the maintenance costs rise the rate of 
innovation decreases (in accordance with the graphical results obtained in figure 5.3), 
both because innovation becomes less profitable and because a larger share of the 
labor force is engaged in maintenance activities, and therefore no longer available for 
production or R&D. This leads to lower levels of economic growth, which can be 
seen directly from figure 5.4. The higher the maintenance costs, the higher the rate of 
obsolescence, the lower the rate of economic growth in an economy. So eventually, 
there is a value for b, b*, where the growth rate becomes zero (we have assumed that 
growth be non-negative). For any size of the maintenance costs higher than b*, the 
growth rate will also be zero. This is illustrated below in figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5: Balance growth and maintenance costs II 
 
 
Welfare 
The final issue to address is the impact of incorporating maintenance costs on the 
welfare level achieved by the economy in the balanced growth equilibrium. Here we 
did not find any surprises. As shown in Appendix 4, for a given level of the elasticity 
of substitution, the welfare level achieved by the economy in the balanced growth 
equilibrium is proportional to )ln( xLg . An increase in maintenance costs, which 
reduces the share of workers available for production and R&D and reduces the 
profitability of R&D, leads to a reduction in the rate of innovation, and thus to a 
reduction in the welfare level of the economy. The fact that, for high levels of 
maintenance costs, the share of the workforce Lx engaged in production may rise a 
little bit if the maintenance costs increase (and the degree of obsolescence falls) is 
never powerful enough to lead to an increase in welfare in any of our simulations.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
We analyze the impact of obsolescence of economic inventions by incorporating 
maintenance costs in the endogenous growth model of expanding product varieties. 
This contrasts with the existing literature, which ignores maintenance costs and uses 
the model of quality improvements to describe obsolescence. Firms invest funds in 
R&D to invent and introduce new products continuously. The profitability of these 
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new products diminishes over time as a result of the invention and introduction of 
even newer products, and as a result of the ever higher costs of maintaining the 
production process in working condition. If the maintenance costs become too high, 
the operating profits become negative and the firm stops producing the older varieties. 
We show that in a partial equilibrium framework, that is, other things being equal, the 
economic life span of innovations, that is the period during which a new variety is 
actually produced before the product becomes obsolete and is replaced by even newer 
varieties, is longer (i) the lower the growth rate of the economy, (ii) the lower the 
maintenance costs. 
 
"Other things" are, however, not equal. The rate of innovation and the share of active 
firms are determined endogenously within the structure of the model, thereby 
affecting the speed of obsolescence. We show that an increase in maintenance costs 
(i) reduces the rate of innovation, (ii) reduces the period of active production of a 
newly invented variety (i.e. increases obsolescence) up to a critical level, (iii) reduces 
the welfare level, and (iv) reduces economic growth.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
… is the art of looking for trouble, finding it, misdiagnosing it, and then misapplying 
the wrong remedies. 
Groucho Marx 
 
Throughout this thesis, the concept of economic growth has been at the centre and via 
theoretical and practical research we have attempted to gain new insights into factors 
that influence growth and the mechanisms through which this happens. 
 
Most inventions and new ideas become obsolete over time, reducing the growth rate 
of an economy. Uncertainty has a negative impact on economic growth levels. 
Moreover, it seems to exert pressure on a country to become more closed because of 
volatility in international (primary product) prices. But countries that are more closed 
may experience negative dynamic welfare effects and may forsake the import of new 
technologies and ideas that others have invented in the first place. It seems as if a 
delicate balance needs to be found. 
 
Economic growth and uncertainty 
Long-run growth depends on the introduction of new goods and new state-of-the-art 
practices to become more efficient given the resources available. From all growth 
models it becomes clear that technology growth is the engine for economic growth – 
whether modeled exogenously or not.  
 
For the research done, we show that higher levels of uncertainty have a negative 
impact on the rate of technological innovation and economic growth. If firms are not 
sure about the process of technological development at the micro-level, growth rates 
drop. It is not realistic to assume that firms operate in a world of certainty where 
inventions will happen for sure at the individual firm-level. In a stochastic 
environment, the costs must equal the expected revenues. And the expected revenues 
can be calculated by the revenues of newly developed varieties times a certain 
probability that a firm is successful. From chapter two it becomes clear that only if we 
look at knowledge capital as a public good, a country can consistently show a positive 
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rate of technological innovation and thus growth. It is the public knowledge character 
that causes the overall level of knowledge in the economy to go up so that everyone 
can benefit from this generated knowledge. A constant positive growth rate can this 
time be sustained because even though the returns of developing a new variety 
decrease so do the costs of product development due to the existence of a pool of 
general knowledge capital. More uncertainty causes the expected discounted profit 
levels to drop and thus reduces the incentive for domestic firms to invent new 
varieties, lowering the potential for economic growth. 
 
Technology imports and the endogeneity of openness 
If we analyse the growth issue from the perspective of a small developing country – 
the underlying assumption in the articles presented in this PhD thesis – we note that 
by far the largest share in R&D does not take place inside the developing countries 
but rather in the developed world.  
This means that for developing countries a crucial channel through which technology 
can be acquired is through openness to international trade and investment. Through 
foreign direct investment and the import of goods, new technologies and inventions 
incorporated in those goods and services are produced by multinationals inside the 
country or imported. This mechanism for growth is important as we recall that most 
developing countries do not engage R&D themselves but largely rely on technological 
progress in the developed world. The level of openness of a country determines how 
easy that dispersion process is.  
 
The regression analysis in chapter three confirms the positive empirical relationship 
between openness and growth for a set of 53 countries over the 1970 – 2000 period. 
Openness and secondary education are the two variables that affect output growth 
positively according to the regression outcomes. 
 
Chapter four claims that the negative dynamic welfare effects of trade restrictions are 
highly underestimated, making the case for openness even stronger than suggested. In 
chapter four, the static and dynamic costs of a change in trade restrictions for a small 
developing economy which combines labour and (intermediate) capital goods in its 
final goods production process are analysed. The economy depends on successful 
R&D projects undertaken in the rest of the world and then introduces them onto its 
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domestic market for an increase in the range of available capital goods. Any newly 
invented capital good is only introduced on the market in the developing economy if 
the (expected) discounted value of operating profits is larger than the costs of 
introduction. Since operating profits decline as the level of trade restrictions increases, 
the share of capital goods introduced on the market is a declining function of the level 
of trade restrictions. The developing economy evolves over time to a balanced growth 
path in which income, welfare, and the share of capital goods introduced on the 
market in the developing economy increase if the level of trade restrictions falls. The 
optimal level of trade restrictions is therefore zero, while a government wishing to 
maximize government revenue will set a strictly positive level of trade restrictions. 
Additionally, there is an asymmetric adjustment path of the developing economy after 
a change in trade restrictions. A decrease in the level of trade restrictions – which 
leads to more openness - may lead the developing economy to embark on a rapid 
catch-up process of economic growth by benefiting from the backlog of previously-
invented-but-not-yet-introduced capital goods which may now, as a result of the 
increase in operating profits, be introduced after the fall in trade restrictions. The case 
of North- and South-Korea illustrates the point of how profound the long-run impact 
of trade restrictions is. Static analyses cannot explain such large differences but a 
dynamic analysis based on the invention and introduction of new goods, can. 
 
Technological innovations lead to economic growth and the lower the level of 
uncertainty the higher the level of innovations (chapter two); the more open a country 
(i.e. the lower a country’s trade barriers) the stronger the positive dynamic welfare 
effects through – amongst others – innovation (chapter four). Chapter three 
establishes the positive empirical relationship between openness and growth.  
 
However, in chapter three we also show that volatility (uncertainty) has a negative 
effect on economic growth and on openness especially of small developing countries. 
Terms-of-trade volatility affects the export sectors of some countries more than 
others. When we observe empirically that volatility in primary product prices on the 
world markets (natural resources like oil, copper or basic primary commodities like 
coffee and sugar) is relatively high compared to price volatility of manufacturing 
goods and when we measure higher shares of primary products and natural resources 
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in the exports of small developing countries, the latter are especially prone to the 
negative impact of terms-of-trade volatility.  
 
In a stylised Armington-model we define two sectors: the tradable and non-tradable 
sector within which we distinguish between export and import goods in order to 
address the terms-of-trade volatility. We have a CES composite good at the demand-
side (consumption of domestically produced goods and imports) and a CET 
composite good that is supplied (domestic production and exports). When we solve 
for quantities and prices, we derive a system of equations that show that the overall 
impact of uncertainty on real returns and the equilibrium capital stock in the economy 
is negative (how negative depends on the characteristics of the j(T)-function). This in 
turn leads to a lower transitional growth path towards a (lower) steady-state. 
However, on top of the economy-wide impact, certainty equivalence arbitrage leads to 
sectoral re-allocation of resources. Within the given equilibrium framework, it is the 
export sector that experiences higher levels of volatility due to erratic movements in 
world prices (with developing countries experiencing this effect more strongly than 
developed countries due to the aforementioned volatility in primary product prices on 
the world market). In order to compensate the export sector for higher levels of 
uncertainty, the marginal product for the composite good produced must go up. It is 
shown in chapter three that this can only be achieved through a reduction in exports 
and a subsequent allocation of the surplus of marginal product to capital. The 
consequences are reductions in both exports and imports which implies that the 
country is becoming more closed. We thus conclude that openness is endogenously 
determined through volatility in the terms-of-trade (amongst others) in a negative 
way. When empirically testing these findings, we conclude that there is a weak link 
through the volatility – openness to economic growth channel but that the direct effect 
of terms-of-trade volatility, though small, is significant at the 10% level. Running 
growth regressions shows that terms-of-trade volatility can explain about 4% of the 
variation in growth rates. Also we find that volatility has a negative impact on 
openness but this seems to be more a long-run phenomenon: higher volatility for a 
prolonged period of time causes structural adjustments in the economy. At the same 
time we observe that the terms-of-trade volatility is higher in poorer countries 
suggesting that the negative endogenous impact on developing countries could be 
stronger.   
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In chapters three and four we argue in favour of more openness to enhance inflows of 
capital and technology because it leads to higher levels of economic growth. Now we 
see that because of volatility as described in chapter three there is an endogenous 
force – albeit a long-run and not too strong one – that pushes a small developing 
country towards a smaller tradable sector, essentially closing the economy from the 
riskier international markets with terms-of-trade volatility. The price of export 
orientation and higher levels of openness to attract technology and international 
capital seems to have the effect of creating more volatility also. An economy that tries 
to diversify risk may very well do that through investing in less risky (non-tradable) 
sectors. Governments in developing countries should be very well aware of these 
forces. 
 
Openness and growth 
But openness is worth pursuing because it attracts investments and raises the rate of 
innovation in the developing country, thus promoting economic growth, does it not? 
In general it does, but we should be careful not to overestimate the effects of openness 
on technological innovation. The message to be careful comes, among others, from 
chapter five where we model and analyse successfully the impact of obsolescence of 
economic inventions by incorporating maintenance costs in the endogenous growth 
model of expanding product varieties despite warnings that one needs to look at 
vertical models of quality improvements. We show that if obsolescence is introduced 
by expanding the Grossman and Helpman (1991) model into a three-sector model, 
obsolescence leads to lower rates of innovation and lower levels of economic growth.  
 
Firms invest funds in R&D to invent and introduce new products continuously. The 
profitability of these new products diminishes over time as a result of the invention 
and introduction of even newer products and as a result of the ever higher costs of 
maintaining the production process in working condition; i.e. as a consequence of 
obsolescence. If the maintenance costs become too high, the operating profits become 
negative and the firm stops producing the older varieties. We show that in a partial 
equilibrium framework, that is, other things being equal, the economic life span of 
innovations, that is the period during which a new variety is actually produced before 
the product becomes obsolete and is replaced by even newer varieties, is longer (i) the 
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lower the growth rate of the economy, (ii) the lower the maintenance costs, and (iii) 
the lower the elasticity of substitution between different varieties. But the rate of 
innovation and share of active firms are determined within the general structure of the 
model, thereby affecting the speed of obsolescence endogenously. The direct effect of 
an increase in maintenance costs (speeding up obsolescence) dominates initially, 
while eventually the indirect effect of an increase in maintenance costs, reducing the 
rate of innovation (and reducing obsolescence) prevails.  
 
Back to Pakistan 
My quest for new insights into the phenomenon of economic growth has taken me 
past technology, uncertainty and volatility, openness, obsolescence and trade and 
government policy. I am still in touch with Mr. Malik in Peshawar via the digital 
highway that he – good for him – has access to. He has asked me about my PhD work 
and after my explanation wondered how my work could help the people in Peshawar 
and Mayar that I got to know. That was a confrontational yet very good question. 
Good, because I believe it the purpose of a social science like economics to be 
socially involved and to assist in improving the quality of life of peoples all around 
the world. Confrontational because he asked it in such a way – although polite – that I 
felt forced to leave the mathematics and general conclusions and translate my findings 
into what they could really mean for poor rural Pakistan.  
 
I answered to Mr. Malik that my work has given me some very valuable and new 
insights that are relevant to Mayar and its people but also that it is limited in scope 
and does not try to explain the world. The insights generated are the need to reduce 
uncertainty in the Pakistani economy, the need for more openness of the Pakistani 
economy and permanent technological innovation, mostly imported from abroad. 
 
Reduced uncertainty 
According to chapter two, the major decision for a firm is not simply to look at labour 
productivity in an R&D sector, but at the probability the R&D sector is successful in 
inventing a new variety thus changing the value of  a Pakistani firm and the economic 
growth rate of the private sector and the economy as a whole. The higher the level of 
uncertainty – due to internal problems of the firm, due to red tape and bureaucracy, 
due to political interference or uncertainty, the lower the rate of growth. Higher levels 
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of education for more people – on the other hand – lead to a higher probability of new 
inventions which raises the level of innovation and economic growth rate. The 
sustainability of the innovation process also depends largely on the public goods 
character of knowledge. The larger the spill-over effects, the stronger the self-
sustainable character of innovation. Spill-overs are larger, the stronger the public 
goods character of knowledge and the more open Pakistan becomes. The openness of 
Pakistan leads to the import of new technologies instead of having to invent 
everything domestically. Trade policy uncertainty and trade policy changes have a 
profound effect on this engine for technological innovation as chapter four has 
illustrated. 
 
Economic and political uncertainty in Pakistan 
Uncertainty at the economic and political levels is very high and detrimental to 
development in Pakistan. Economic uncertainty comes from three main sources: 
bureaucracy and corruption inside Pakistan, trade policies of Pakistan’s trading 
partners and volatility of the terms-of-trade for Pakistan. 
 
Pakistan suffers from very high levels of corruption as figure 6.1 shows for the year 
2002. In the surveyed World Bank dataset for 2002, only Albania, Bangladesh and 
Peru show higher levels of perceived corruption than Pakistan (measured by the share 
of managers surveyed that rank corruption as a major business constraint in the 
country).  
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Figure 6.1. Corruption levels  
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Secondly, trade policies of Pakistan’s trading partners (like the European Union) are 
discriminating against cheap labour producing countries like Pakistan especially in 
areas like clothing and textiles and primary agricultural commodities.71 If we look at 
the exports of Pakistan in table 6.1 we see that it is exactly clothing, textiles and 
leather that constitute the top-15 of most exported products of the country. We also 
see that the absolute size of these exports is increasing rapidly from 2000 to 2004. 
Though not shown in this figure, the share of the top-15 exported goods is increasing 
as a share of Pakistan’s total exports, indicating an increased dependency – or 
specialisation if you will – of the country on these – primary product – sectors. 
 
                                                 
71 We only need to remember the ‘War on textiles’ in 2005 between China, the EU and the USA to have 
an enlightening example of how protective the developed world is regarding cheap labour-intensive 
imports. 
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Table 6.1. Top-15 exports of Pakistan (2000, 2002, 2004) 
Product group Value 2000 Value 2002 Value 2004 
  US$ '000 US$ '000 US$ '000 
658 - MADE-UP TEXTILE ARTICLES     1.354.148,00      1.761.462,00      2.344.959,00  
652 - COTTON FABRICS, WOVEN      1.072.969,00      1.241.891,00      1.769.612,00  
651 - TEXTILE YARN      1.188.501,00         972.971,00      1.114.919,00  
843 - MEN/BOY WEAR KNIT/CROCH         513.009,00         509.863,00         748.752,00  
845 – ARTICLES OF APPAREL NES         311.711,00         302.455,00         686.550,00  
042 - RICE         534.063,00         463.132,00         682.793,00  
841 - MENS/BOYS WEAR, WOVEN         540.397,00         523.108,00         517.969,00  
848 - HEADGEAR/NON-TEXT CLOTHG        399.180,00         306.551,00         427.293,00  
653 - MAN-MADE WOVEN FABRICS         509.238,00         447.432,00         341.029,00  
334 - HEAVY PETROL/BITUM OILS           56.810,00         126.806,00         317.629,00  
894 – BABY CARR/TOY/GAME/SPORT        282.478,00         326.634,00         315.858,00  
611 - LEATHER         204.231,00         240.387,00         284.839,00  
846 – CLOTHING ACCESSORIES         143.796,00         270.343,00         282.288,00  
659 - FLOOR COVERINGS ETC.         282.021,00         243.587,00         252.349,00  
842 - WOMEN/GIRL CLOTHING WVEN        132.609,00         173.194,00         193.284,00  
Source: International Trade Statistics 
 
The third source of uncertainty stems from terms-of-trade volatility. The empirical 
results from chapter three show, that there is a negative direct effect of terms-of-trade 
volatility on economic growth as well as a negative (but weaker) indirect effect on 
economic growth via openness. On top of that, figure 6.2 shows a negative trend for a 
large set of countries between terms-of-trade volatility and economic growth, in 
support of the evidence from chapter three (Pakistan is shown by the red dot). 
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Figure 6.2. Terms of trade volatility and economic growth. 
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More openness 
This thesis clearly establishes a theoretical and empirical (direct and indirect) link 
between openness and economic growth. More openness leads to the imports of new 
technologies which may enhance the economic growth rate of Pakistan both because 
of these imports and because of the self-sustainable process of technological 
innovation. These technological innovations do not just have static but more 
importantly dynamic welfare effects for the Pakistani economy in the longer run when 
the number of new varieties in the Pakistani economy is affected. Moreover, their 
effects are asymmetric: if President Musharraf decides to lower trade restrictions, a 
rapid increase in production is predicted. However, if he decides to increase trade 
restrictions, only a gradual deterioration of the level of production will follow. Free 
trade will allow Pakistan to reap most benefits for the Pakistani citizens in general and 
inhabitants of Mayar in particular. 
 
Ongoing technological innovation 
Technological innovation is the engine for long-run growth of Pakistan. Even though 
in the shorter run, many economic gains can come from accumulation of labour and 
capital, in the longer run, the way forward is through innovation: spill-over effects 
 143 
will be sufficiently large, levels of openness allow foreign technologies to enter 
Pakistan, the newest products and processes from abroad are imported leading to 
consumer and producer gains and dynamic welfare effects in the long run. New 
technologies from abroad serve as an engine to economic growth because they 
increase productivity and efficiency of production, thus increasing the level of welfare 
in Pakistan. 
 
Three warnings are in place for Pakistan regarding technological innovations in this 
respect. First, let North-Korea serve as an example of what a prolonged period of 
economic (and political) isolation can do to a country. Second, for a set of countries 
the asymmetric effect of trade restrictions was illustrated. Third, chapter five serves as 
a warning as it shows that technologies may well become obsolete over time as a 
consequence of higher maintenance costs. Given the Pakistani climate and terrain 
conditions, maintenance costs for certain innovations (e.g. agricultural ones) may be 
relatively high which means – in line with chapter five – that growth levels in 
Pakistan’s agriculture may not benefit as much from new technologies as expected.72 
 
It is not the aim of this thesis to provide Pakistan with all the answers it needs for 
economic growth and rural development. Admittedly, we have only looked at a small 
part of the problem. Also it is much easier to criticise wrong policies and to just 
identify the problems facing development of a country rather than to come up with 
actual policy recommendations that turn out to be successful. Besides, even when 
Pakistan does grow economically, there is no guarantee that the benefits will accrue to 
the poor and rural populations, for example in Mayar. Despite the fact that a ‘holy 
grail of development’ does not exist, some major conditions that may lead to 
economic growth of Pakistan have been addressed: technological innovations, level of 
openness, level of maintenance costs and rate of obsolescence and the (perceived) 
level of uncertainty.  
“Economic growth is everything, but it is not the only thing”. 
                                                 
72 Importing new high-technology tractors and machines for rural Pakistan, for example, may be 
recommended from the theoretical growth model point of view. However, these tractors will only be 
beneficial if the local population is educated enough and trained enough to work with them. In reality, 
most of these machines break down and rust away in the same year they are received. In essence these 
imports are becoming obsolete rapidly because there is no maintenance available. 
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Appendix 1: Reduced form constants. 
 
Reduced form constants, jA , used in the stylised model of Armington-based trade 
used in Section 3.4. 
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As mentioned in footnote 56, for the parameter φ  we note that 
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Appendix 2: Empirical data Growth and Openness Regressions.  
BASIC DATA PCGRGDP7000 PCGDP70 XGDP7000 ToTV7000 SE7000 PF7000 GDP70 
Argentina 0.68 6830.00 8.45 24.23 65.32 3.18 31.40 
Australia 1.89 13636.00 16.46 6.48 94.28 1.00 38.76 
Austria 2.69 16053.00 34.40 2.95 99.02 1.00 14.97 
Belgium 2.44 16209.00 64.68 2.85 107.55 1.07 25.60 
Bolivia 0.22 856.00 23.02 29.49 35.75 3.32 1.09 
Botswana 7.55 590.00 56.78 8.93 35.76 2.32 0.10 
Brazil 2.36 2394.00 8.76 17.84 38.65 3.30 34.79 
Cameroon 1.16 508.00 23.97 24.26 22.84 5.82 1.07 
Colombia 1.83 1377.00 15.76 18.27 47.50 2.86 7.40 
Costa Rica 1.92 2347.00 35.01 9.17 43.16 1.13 0.99 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.77 927.00 37.23 12.54 20.08 5.41 1.65 
Denmark 1.67 23446.00 33.23 3.33 107.36 1.00 16.17 
Dominican Republic 3.41 874.00 27.28 10.00 43.68 2.52 1.30 
Ecuador 1.29 879.00 26.13 25.56 52.81 3.11 1.57 
Iceland 3.00 13733.00 35.52 5.17 94.30 1.00 0.51 
India 2.67 212.00 7.32 7.92 39.29 2.79 62.88 
Indonesia 4.30 298.00 26.44 15.88 40.37 5.32 11.00 
Ireland 4.24 7908.00 56.08 5.36 99.79 1.11 4.36 
Italy 2.35 10801.00 21.73 7.05 78.92 1.41 107.30 
Jamaica 0.36 1951.00 43.02 15.85 61.76 2.20 1.72 
Japan 2.83 20015.00 11.46 11.49 95.34 1.34 203.74 
Korea, Rep. 6.03 2164.00 30.12 8.14 86.25 3.84 8.87 
Malawi 0.79 121.00 25.04 13.60 7.36 5.61 0.35 
Malaysia 4.37 1371.00 66.15 7.30 54.04 3.93 4.21 
Malta 6.05 1927.00 80.17 6.29 80.71 1.63 0.19 
Mexico 1.81 2295.00 16.74 25.19 52.82 3.70 40.20 
Nepal 1.54 154.00 13.38 6.82 28.24 4.02 0.85 
New Zealand 1.02 12467.00 28.05 11.19 91.61 1.00 6.45 
Nicaragua -1.61 917.00 23.69 12.96 39.76 4.38 0.49 
Norway 3.15 15669.00 38.76 12.02 101.75 1.00 12.66 
Papua New Guinea 0.75 870.00 43.69 17.79 12.26 2.34 0.60 
Paraguay 1.70 1064.00 22.35 11.78 32.07 4.46 0.52 
Peru 0.21 2359.00 15.63 10.75 62.26 3.98 7.24 
Philippines 1.10 845.00 28.97 11.96 69.16 3.79 6.58 
Portugal 3.44 5016.00 26.57 11.06 65.78 1.91 7.14 
Rwanda 0.88 263.00 9.68 29.68 5.86 6.11 0.30 
Spain 2.50 8507.00 17.65 6.68 99.09 2.20 38.80 
Sri Lanka 3.10 340.00 30.03 17.97 65.07 3.38 3.16 
Swaziland 2.14 784.00 71.86 13.82 42.17 5.21 0.13 
Sweden 1.86 19598.00 32.07 5.89 99.58 1.02 34.48 
Switzerland 1.16 35490.00 35.18 3.16 95.56 1.00 21.35 
Syria 2.25 578.00 22.18 26.81 49.90 6.52 1.73 
Turkey 2.08 1633.00 12.71 10.08 43.82 3.64 18.02 
Uruguay 1.52 4013.00 19.14 10.00 73.88 3.29 2.02 
Zambia -1.82 699.00 36.31 59.67 20.49 4.70 1.22 
Zimbabwe 0.58 607.00 26.96 8.75 37.46 4.95 1.62 
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OPENNESS ln_XGDP ln_TOTV ln_size 
Argentina 2.13409654 3.1875915 3.4468716 
Australia 2.801066217 1.8687205 3.6572856 
Austria 3.537929615 1.0818052 2.705781 
Belgium 4.169380025 1.047319 3.2424752 
Bolivia 3.136367775 3.3840512 0.0870947 
Botswana 4.039130388 2.1894164 -2.282782 
Brazil 2.170650707 2.8814431 3.5493012 
Cameroon 3.17660224 3.1888289 0.0657877 
Colombia 2.757317957 2.9052604 2.0010745 
Costa Rica 3.555492715 2.2159373 -0.015114 
Cote d'Ivoire 3.617242898 2.5289235 0.4995624 
Denmark 3.503603363 1.2029723 2.783034 
Dominican Republic 3.306014007 2.3025851 0.2639015 
Fiji 3.911113825 2.4932055 -1.227583 
Finland 3.376177969 1.512927 2.4076656 
France 3.059839386 1.5993876 4.9869094 
Greece 2.919349835 2.1621729 2.4641085 
Iceland 3.570195603 1.6428727 -0.675307 
India 1.990087858 2.0693912 4.1412441 
Indonesia 3.274769974 2.7650605 2.3976225 
Ireland 4.026830286 1.678964 1.4724721 
Italy 3.078836281 1.9530276 4.6756007 
Jamaica 3.761639367 2.7631695 0.539996 
Japan 2.438594911 2.4414771 5.316825 
Korea, Rep. 3.405327711 2.0967902 2.1823365 
Malawi 3.220614429 2.6100698 -1.049822 
Malaysia 4.191912621 1.9878743 1.4362743 
Malta 4.384167724 1.8389611 -1.660731 
Mexico 2.817929569 3.2264471 3.6938172 
Nepal 2.593722839 1.9198595 -0.161343 
New Zealand 3.333947181 2.4150205 1.8633046 
Nicaragua 3.16524166 2.5618677 -0.709277 
Norway 3.657476403 2.4865719 2.5386054 
Oman 3.995465956 3.7534961 -0.534435 
Papua New Guinea 3.777194868 2.8786365 -0.517515 
Paraguay 3.107031424 2.4664032 -0.648174 
Peru 2.749490678 2.3749058 1.9789304 
Philippines 3.366175614 2.4815677 1.8837307 
Portugal 3.279924178 2.403335 1.9651524 
Rwanda 2.269884056 3.3904734 -1.214023 
Spain 2.870772519 1.899118 3.6585233 
Sri Lanka 3.402349256 2.8887037 1.1502555 
Swaziland 4.27475511 2.6261168 -2.009915 
Switzerland 3.56057395 1.150572 3.0609112 
Syrian Arab Republic 3.099396333 3.288775 0.5475432 
Turkey 2.542382438 2.3105533 2.8914268 
Uruguay 2.951697681 2.3025851 0.7050758 
Zambia 3.592037534 4.0888294 0.2021242 
Zimbabwe 3.29442376 2.1690537 0.4811908 
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GROWTH GRGDP ln_Y70 R_lnXGDP lnSSE lnPF 
Argentina 0.68 8.82908 -0.503678 4.179262 1.15643 
Australia 1.89 9.5204686 -0.247149 4.546216 0 
Austria 2.69 9.683651 0.0565431 4.595279 0 
Belgium 2.44 9.6933219 0.7701187 4.677956 0.06899 
Bolivia 0.22 6.7522704 -0.022109 3.576658 1.20039 
Botswana 7.55 6.3801225 0.0612812 3.576918 0.84218 
Brazil 2.36 7.7807209 -0.553031 3.654615 1.195 
Cameroon 1.16 6.2304814 -0.051798 3.128565 1.76155 
Colombia 1.83 7.2276625 -0.228933 3.86073 1.04982 
Costa Rica 1.92 7.7608932 -0.016953 3.764914 0.11778 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.77 6.8319536 0.2408996 2.999724 1.68838 
Denmark 1.67 10.062455 0.0768087 4.676198 0 
Dominican Republic 3.41 6.7730804 -0.188275 3.77689 0.92341 
Ecuador 1.29 6.7787849 0.1192255 3.966623 1.1337 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3.32 6.1696107 -0.213195 4.156928 1.63761 
El Salvador 0.34 7.3932631 -0.244629 3.316809 1.20039 
Fiji 1.62 7.4656553 0.2207372 3.957761 1.07451 
Finland 2.68 9.6290507 -0.01113 4.688979 0.45199 
France 2.24 9.7057681 0.1527258 4.548098 0.38137 
Greece 2.04 8.8025225 -0.237935 4.487926 0.76214 
Iceland 3.00 9.527557 -0.311982 4.546481 0 
India 2.67 5.3565863 -0.90548 3.670957 1.0245 
Indonesia 4.30 5.6970935 0.3102987 3.698178 1.67174 
Ireland 4.24 8.9756302 0.5323434 4.603115 0.10178 
Italy 2.35 9.287394 0.2372207 4.368381 0.3441 
Jamaica 0.36 7.5760973 0.471796 4.123256 0.78683 
Japan 2.83 9.9042373 -0.125297 4.557496 0.29214 
Korea, Rep. 6.03 7.6797136 0.1766149 4.45722 1.34529 
Malawi 0.79 4.7957905 -0.39906 1.996211 1.72404 
Malaysia 4.37 7.2232957 0.7958482 3.989725 1.36828 
Malta 6.05 7.5637197 0.3962213 4.390804 0.48551 
Mexico 1.81 7.7384881 0.2364996 3.96681 1.30737 
Nepal 1.54 5.0369526 -1.104684 3.340814 1.39075 
New Zealand 1.02 9.4308404 0.1573751 4.517486 0 
Nicaragua -1.61 6.8211075 -0.411247 3.682861 1.47591 
Norway 3.15 9.6594395 0.6232161 4.622545 0 
Oman 2.73 8.0471896 0.8536169 3.652434 1.80065 
Papua New Guinea 0.75 6.7684932 0.3416428 2.505979 0.85015 
Paraguay 1.70 6.9697907 -0.491148 3.467765 1.49611 
Peru 0.21 7.7659931 -0.420472 4.131319 1.38182 
Philippines 1.10 6.7393366 0.21574 4.23635 1.33123 
Portugal 3.44 8.5203881 0.1171935 4.186282 0.64748 
Rwanda 0.88 5.572154 -1.113863 1.768881 1.80946 
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Spain 2.50 9.0486446 -0.166918 4.596076 0.78683 
Sri Lanka 3.10 5.8289456 0.2617531 4.175412 1.2164 
Swaziland 2.14 6.664409 0.4926888 3.741796 1.6514 
Sweden 1.86 9.8831828 0.366732 4.600951 0.0177 
Switzerland 1.16 10.477006 0.1645862 4.559708 0 
Syrian Arab Republic 2.25 6.3595739 -0.010897 3.910021 1.87455 
Turkey 2.08 7.3981741 -0.489888 3.779994 1.29277 
Uruguay 1.52 8.2972944 -0.46547 4.302428 1.18958 
Zambia -1.82 6.5496507 0.6926562 3.020138 1.5468 
Zimbabwe 0.58 6.4085288 -0.207161 3.62314 1.59867 
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Appendix 3: Static and dynamic welfare costs in terms of welfare. 
 
Defining the static and dynamic welfare costs of an increase in trade restrictions 
analogously to the static and dynamic costs in terms of income, see equations (4.19) 
and (4.20), and using (4.7), (4.16)-(4.18), and the definitions in (4.1’), (4.14), and 
(4.15), we get: 
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Executive Summary (English) 
 
The issue of economic growth and its causes is one that has intrigued us for many 
hundreds of years. Adam Smith (1776) was not the first nor was he the last to look at 
peoples’ levels of income and changes in income over time. Since Smith many 
economists have worked on economic growth and various growth models have been 
developed: the Harrod-Domar and the Solow models of exogenous economic growth 
and since 1986 the various endogenous growth models. The scientific aim of making 
models is to try to explain that what is observed in the world around us in an abstract 
and structured way.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to look at economic growth and address some important 
omissions or even misinterpretations in the literature that, at the same time, bring the 
growth models closer to being practically relevant. More specifically, I focus on the 
following four problems with respect to economic growth: uncertainty in endogenous 
growth models, terms-of-trade volatility and the endogeneity of openness, the 
dynamic effects of trade restrictions and the phenomenon of obsolescence in 
endogenous growth models of expanding product varieties. These topics have been 
neglected among economic growth researchers or even misrepresented. 
 
Uncertainty 
What is the effect of uncertainty on economic growth? Although it is intuitively 
understandable that we expect and find a negative relationship between the two, what 
matters is the mechanism between uncertainty and economic growth. If we can 
understand the ways in which one affects the other, we may more effectively address 
any negative consequences for people’s levels of income and income growth when 
looking at uncertainty, because many of us would not agree with Ursula Le Guin 
when she says that “The only thing that makes life possible is permanent, intolerable 
uncertainty; not knowing what comes next”. In chapter two, I  introduce uncertainty 
into an endogenous growth model to analyse the impact uncertainty has, to show how 
the mechanism of uncertainty translates into economic growth and to emphasise the 
fundamentally different interpretation when we leave a deterministic world for one in 
which outcomes are only expected outcomes in a probabilistic world. 
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Chapter two shows that with minor mathematical changes from the Grossman and 
Helpan (1991) model, the mechanism and interpretation of economic growth alter 
fundamentally. If we live in a world of uncertainty, we can no longer simply look at 
productivity in a certain research and development sector. Instead we have to look at 
the probability the research and development sector is successful in inventing new 
varieties, thus changing the value of the firm and the growth rate. The probability of a 
successful R&D sector, and subsequently the self-sustainability of a process of 
innovation, then depends on the public good character of knowledge, the level of 
education and training of researchers, the number of researchers that are active and 
the ease with which foreign technological findings can be imported. The public good 
character of knowledge has a lowering effect on the costs of product development. If 
the pool of general knowledge is large enough continuous growth of the economy is 
ensured. This also depends on the size of the economy, how patient people are, how 
successful R&D departments are to invent new varieties and how much variety in 
consumption households have.  Also because we introduce uncertainty, the model 
now incorporates an important fact of life. 
 
Terms-of-trade volatility and the endogeneity of openness 
Another type of uncertainty for an economy is volatility in the terms-of-trade. Since 
the Prebisch-Singer (1950) hypothesis that developing countries experience 
deteriorating terms-of-trade, economists have argued and disagreed as to what matters 
for growth: the trend or the volatility in the terms-of-trade. In chapter three, I use first 
a general then an Armington specification (with CARA preferences) to analyse the 
effects of terms-of-trade volatility on economic growth and show – through 
formulations and properties of a j-function – that a higher level of volatility leads 
overall to a lower real expected rate of return on capital as well as a lower level of 
capital. This means the economy is less efficient when subject to terms-of-trade 
uncertainty. Additionally, in chapter three, I show implicitly that sectoral re-allocation 
of resources takes place because we need certainty equivalence to be equalised. The 
only way to achieve equal certainty equivalent returns economy-wide is through 
reducing the number of exports because a reduction leads to a higher marginal 
product to the composite good which is needed to offset the reduction in mean returns 
as a consequence of volatility in the terms-of-trade. In the optimum, the tradable 
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sector will shrink exactly enough to raise the expected rate of return in that sector to 
equal the marginal product of capital under certainty plus the certainty equivalent 
(CE). The entire surplus from the tradable sector is allocated to capital for risk 
compensation which leads to a lower marginal product of labour and thus lower 
wages. Fully in line with the finance literature, this result implies that through 
diversification away from the risky sector, investors decrease the variance at the 
expense of lower mean returns. This means that uncertainty in the level of terms-of-
trade leads to a more ‘closed’ economy and that this effect on openness is 
endogenous. I show by running several regressions that there is a negative and 
significant direct effect of terms-of-trade volatility on economic growth. The volatility 
– openness – growth mechanism is also empirically observed but weak. The direct 
link between volatility and growth is significant at the 10% level with volatility 
explaining about 4% of the variation in economic growth rates. 
 
Dynamic effect of trade restrictions 
Traditionally, economists have measured welfare effects of trade restrictions by using 
classical micro-economics and resulting Harberger-triangles. These measure the re-
distributional welfare effects in a world where everything exists, i.e. where we live the 
interior of goods space. But if we have already invented everything, why then is the 
so much focus on R&D, innovation and knowledge economies and why then do we 
measure technical and process innovations to play such an important role in economic 
growth? Romer (1994) is the first to mention the fact that we should not look at the 
world through static but rather dynamic glasses. I argue in chapter four that it is 
indeed the dynamic welfare effects of trade restrictions we need to look at and show 
that we can do so by using an endogenous growth model. What are the main findings? 
First, the estimated static costs of trade restrictions are smaller than the dynamic costs 
of trade restrictions if, and only if, the increase in trade restrictions reduces the share 
of invented capital goods introduced on the market. In this dynamic setting it is 
therefore not the fact that we ignore the Dupuit triangles of newly invented goods in 
estimating the effects of an increase in trade restrictions, as it is in the Romer (1994) 
model, but the fact that an increase in the trade restrictions affects the share of newly 
invented goods not introduced on the market. Second, as a result of the sunk-cost 
nature of the introduction costs, there is an asymmetric adjustment path of the 
developing economy after a change in trade restrictions. An increase in the level of 
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trade restrictions will slow-down economic growth and put the economy on a 
transition path to a new balanced growth rate. If the new level of trade restrictions 
exceeds a critical value, the new growth rate will be zero and stagnation occurs. If 
trade restrictions fall, the developing economy may embark on a rapid catch-up 
process of economic growth by benefiting from the backlog of previously-invented-
but-not-yet-introduced capital goods which may now, as a result of the increase in 
operating profits resulting from the decrease in trade restrictions, be introduced on the 
market in the developing economy. The second effect, I believe, is one of the main 
reasons for the observation that economies that have been isolated and closed for 
prolonged periods of time (e.g. North-Korea) have failed to bring prosperity and 
growth to their citizens. 
 
Maintenance costs and obsolescence 
One important aspect in every day life is the fact that – besides innovations and new 
products – old ones become obsolete. In the vertical endogenous growth literature of 
quality improvements the phenomenon of obsolescence has been explored and 
developed. However, in the strand of endogenous growth models used in this thesis, 
the horizontal endogenous growth models of expanding product varieties, this has not 
been the case. Moreover, Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991) are quoted saying this is not possible: Aghion and Howitt (1998, p.39) argue 
that "in order to formalize the notion of (technical or product) obsolescence, one 
needs to move away from horizontal models of product development à la Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) into vertical models of quality improvements" and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, p.46) say: “[The] … complete symmetry between new and old 
commodities eliminates any possibility of product obsolescence. Fortunately the 
model of quality improvements … can address this shortcoming of the present 
formulation…”  
 
In chapter five, contrary to the abovementioned international opinions, I introduce the 
notion of various types of maintenance costs that lead to product obsolescence when 
the maintenance costs rise over time. A firm will only produce its variety invented at a 
certain time if the operating profits are positive at any later time. Equivalently, the 
firm will stop production if the operating profits become negative. This allows us to 
determine the range of active firms using the obsolescence criterion. If the range of 
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active firms is non-decreasing and the wage rate is constant, as will be assumed, then 
the flow of firms from active to obsolete is on a first-in-first-out basis (FIFO). In 
equilibrium we have a non-negative solution where the innovation equilibrium and 
labour equilibrium balance. When maintenance costs rise, more workers have to 
maintain the production processes in working condition, such that less workers are 
available for R&D and production of new varieties. Also when a lower share of firms 
becomes obsolete because of lower maintenance costs, the productivity of the labor 
force for research and maintenance is increased. These effects, lead to a higher profit 
for the firm and higher levels of economic growth. Therefore, contrary to the 
assertions by Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), 
obsolescence can – via the concept of maintenance costs – be successfully introduced 
in horizontal models of expanding product varieties, making this strand of models 
much more realistic. 
 
Overall, uncertainty has a negative influence on economic growth, either through a 
reduction in the profitability of the R&D sector or via an indirect effect through 
reduced level of openness which is a consequence of risk aversion in an economy. 
The level of openness has a positive effect on economic growth through allowing the 
imports of new goods and ideas. While the a higher level of openness because of a 
drop in trade restrictions leads to static welfare gains through competition and lower 
prices, dynamic welfare gains can be much higher if the share of goods and 
technological innovations that is introduced in an economy rises. Trade policy has an 
asymmetric effect on the transitional paths to new steady states, depending on 
whether trade restrictions rise or drop. Economic growth is negatively influenced by 
rising maintenance costs of processes and production.  

Samenvatting (Nederlands) 
 
Het onderwerp van economische groei en haar oorzaken heeft veel mensen gedurende 
honderden jaren geïntrigeerd. Adam Smith (1776) was noch de eerste, noch de laatste 
die naar inkomens en inkomensgroei heeft gekeken Sinds Adam Smith hebben veel 
economisten gewerkt aan economische groei en verschillende groeimodellen zijn 
ontwikkeld. Van de exogene groeimodellen (bv. het Solow-model) tot de endogene 
groeimodellen vanaf 1986.  
 
Het doel van deze dissertatie is het bekijken van de relatie tussen onzekerheid, 
technologie en economische groei. Daarnaast worden in deze dissertatie ook enkele 
omissies en verkeerde academische conclusies aan de kaak gesteld en oplossingen 
aangedragen om dit te veranderen.  
 
In het algemeen heeft onzekerheid een negatieve invloed op economische groei, 
danwel via een afname van de effectiviteit van de onderzoekssectoren in bedrijven, 
dan wel via een indirect effect via een afname in de openheid van een land vanwege 
risicomijdend gedrag van ondernemingen. Het niveau van openheid heeft een 
positieve invloed op de economische groei omdat hierdoor importen van nieuwe 
goederen, methoden en technologische uitvindingen wordt gestimuleerd. Een land dat 
opener is, ondervindt niet alleen statische welvaartsvoordelen zoals in de klassieke 
micro-economie wordt bekeken. Als het aandeel van goederen in technologische 
uitvindingen toeneemt als gevolg van het afnemen van handelsbarrières, vinden er 
bovenop de statische effecten ook dynamische welvaartseffecten plaats die veel groter 
van omvang zijn en een positief effect hebben. Als gevolg van deze welvaartseffecten 
en het feit dat uitvindingen ‘sunk cost’ zijn, heeft handelsbeleid een asymmetrisch 
effect op de transitie van een economie naar een nieuw evenwicht, afhankelijk van of 
het handelsbeleid. Economische groei wordt ook negatief beïnvloed door stijgende 
onderhoudskosten. Via onderhoudskosten is het mogelijk om in horizontale endogene 
groeimodellen economische obsolescence te verklaren. Dit in tegenstelling tot wat 
veel top-economen beweerd hebben en/of beweren.  
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